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Summary
This study evaluates the development of a discursive approach to social psychology in
terms of this discipline's most pressing metatheoretical question: what is the relation
between the individual and the social in social psychology? This question is illuminated
through a discussion of traditional cognitive approaches to social psychology as well
as postmodern critiques of the discipline, after which the discursive approach is
introduced to address shortcomings in both these perspectives. The discursive
approach incorporates a key insight of recent developments in the philosophy of
language, namely that language is not primarily referential, but constructive of our
experiences and relationship to reality. By taking seriously both the performative or
rhetorical and the abstract-systemic characteristics of language, discursive social
psychology addresses the traditional issues of individualism and the reduction of the
social on two levels: first, as it is revealed in especially traditional cognitive approaches
to social psychology; and secondly, as it supports a set of specifically Western cultural
values that reproduce cultural and political practices and power imbalances. Discursive
social psychology is subsequently presented as a definite advance with regard to
providing richer conceptions of social-cognitive processes and the socio-cultural
foundations of psychological phenomena. Despite this there are also important
limitations that should be taken into account before discursive social psychology is
imported to South Africa as a critical alternative: the focus on language goes along with
a negation of the materiality and embodied nature of experience. Because experience
cannot be pre-reflexively psychological meaningful, discursive social psychology
remains to develop a theory of agency that indicates how criticism, resistance and
change is possible.
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Opsomming
Hierdie studie evalueer die ontwikkeling van 'n diskursiewe benadering tot die sosiale
sielkunde in terme van hierdie dissipline se mees knellende metateoretiese vraag: wat
is die verhouding tussen die individuele en die sosiale in sosiale sielkunde? Hierdie
vraag word aangespreek deur eers te kyk na tradisioneel kognitiewe benaderings tot
en postmodernistiese kritiek op die sosiale sielkunde, waarna die diskursiewe
benadering bekendgestel word soos dit die tekortkominge in hierdie twee perspektiewe
aanspreek. Die diskursiewe benadering inkorporeer 'n sleutel-insig van onlangse
ontwikkelinge in die taalfilosofie, naamlik dat taal nie primêr referensieel is nie, maar
konstruktief en medebepalend van ons ervaring van en verhouding tot die werklikheid.
Deur beide die performatiewe of retoriese en die meer abstrak-sistemiese kenmerke
van taal ernstig op te neem, spreek die diskursiewe sosiale sielkunde die tradisionele
knelpunte van individualisme en reduksie van die sosiale op twee vlakke aan: eerstens,
soos dit onthul word in veral tradisioneel kognitiewe benaderings tot sosiale sielkunde;
en tweedens, soos dit 'n stel spesifiek Westers-kulturele waardes onderhou wat bydra
tot die reproduksie van kulturele en politieke praktyke en mags-wanbalanse.
Diskursiewe sosiale sielkunde word gevolglik aangetoon as 'n definitiewe vooruitgang
wat betref die uiteensetting van ryker konsepsies van sosiaal kognitiewe prosesse en
die sosiaal-kulturele grondslae van sielkundige fenomene. Ten spyte hiervan is daar
egter ook belangrike gebreke wat in ag geneem moet word voordat diskursiewe sosiale
sielkunde as kritiese alternatief na Suid-Afrika ingevoer word: die fokus op taal gaan
qepaard met 'n negering van die materialiteit en liggaamlikheid van ervaring. Omdat
ervaring nie pre-refleksief sielkundige betekenis kan hê nie, bly hierdie ontwikkeling se
verstaan van agentskap in gebreke om te verduidelik hoe kritiek, teenstand en
verandering moontlik is.
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1Chapter 1
Conceptualisation and outline of the study
1.1. Introduction
The past few decades have been witness to the growing stature of discussions around
the nature of language in the philosophy and methodology of the social sciences 1.
These are discussions that raise concerns challenging the social sciences on
epistemological, ontological as well as methodological levels. It therefore affects the
core regions of social. scientific self-understanding and subsequent disciplinary
formations or identities. Of primary concern here is a shift from a conception of
language as a purely referential or representational system, to one where language is
considered to mediate our thoughts and experiences of reality. When followed through,
this understanding of language threatens to implode the traditional scientific resorts of
ontological essentialism and epistemological finalism, and to erode the appeal of
research methods that try to ensure these.
Such notions might seem threatening and destabilising, but they are nevertheless taken
on with great enthusiasm by critical social scientists. Subsequently, the "turn to
language" in philosophy more generally (Van der Merwe, 1994a) can now be traced to
various new forms of practice in the social sciences. These reveal a pervasive concern
with language as a primarily non-referential, constructive system that displaces the
burden of meaning from either a transcendental subjectivity or an already existent
reality to the structure or functioning of language itself. Precisely how the structure of
language carries and manages meaning - whether it is a structural or rhetorical
accomplishment - is still, and will in all likelihood remain, a site of debate. For the
moment it is enough to note that it is precisely the destabilising, seemingly threatening
effect of such new conceptions of language that induce the excitement around their
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2extension into the social sciences as models for understanding social processes and
the participation of individuals in social life.
Why is this so? The critical environment in which the social sciences have to justify its
practices has radically changed in especially the latter part of the 20th century. It is no
longer possible to separate epistemological concerns from more general political
critiques of social scientific involvement in the production and reproduction of
exploitative social practices. One useful way to explain this interrelated process is to
embed it in the more generative framework of the postmodern. The postmodern can
be initially defined as a general affirmation of difference and the irreducibility of local
practices to grand theories or meta-perspectives, resulting in an ontological
fragmentation and multiplication of what previously went unchallenged as human
nature. Social scientific values that rest on foundational and universalistic assumptions
can only be reproductive of particular ethnocentric ideas and practices. This general
framework of the postmodern in effect created (or at least indicates) a reflexive and
critical environment that allows the favourable reception of the "turn to language" as a
possible source of theoretical models and methodological innovations in the social
sciences.
This study has as its broad concern the evaluation of the role of language in the critique
and the reconstruction of the social sciences in the light of metatheoretical as well as
political concerns. However, this investigation will be on a more limited level: language
will be questioned more specifically in the context of social psychology. In this discipline
important contributions have been made in this regard, especially during the last
decade. Since these have taken off quite strongly also in South Africa, it is time to
critically evaluate the contributions made to social psychology in this country that draw
from new understandings of language. In this regard it should be said that language
has been imported into social psychology primarily under the name of discourse
analysis. This seems to indicate first and foremost a research method, and since more
than methodological innovation is at stake in this study, the more recent and integrative
notion of discursive social psychology will be used instead.
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3This does not mean that there is one homogenous approach that characterises the turn
to language in social psychology. Within the philosophy of language, as was already
mentioned, different approaches to meaning and signification are developed. What is
central though, is that language is seen as not primarily a referential system. Language
is seen as discourse; a constructive medium. The implication of this, generally, is that
focus on talk and text in social psychology does not give the researcher access to
underlying cognitions or psychological states. Rather, psychological phenomena
emerge from interactive and communal processes, and language plays a constructive
role in these - even though is understood differently across traditions. Evaluating
discursive social psychology entails both teasing out the contradictions emanating from
drawing on different models of language, and relating it to more fundamental issues
concerning the identity of social psychology as a discipline. Here the focus will be, as
will be outlined in the following section, on the relation between the individual and the
social in social psychology.
After the research question and objectives have been introduced, an outline of the
different chapters will be provided. The final section of this chapter comprises of a brief
description of the analytic approach taken in this study.
1.2. Research questions and objectives
In order to provide the introduction and critical discussion of discursive social
psychology in this study with a definite focus (a specific research question), this new
development will be read in terms of the most basic tensions that riddle any attempt to
define the field. In this regard it is useful to be aware that there are innumerable
definitions of social psychology, indicating that like all disciplines and fields of
knowledge production, social psychology is a contested domain. Many stakeholders
claim ownership of it, and the discipline is still starkly divided around conceptual,
theoretical, methodological and geographical lines. However, all definitions of social
psychology contain at least an implicit answer to the following dilemma: what is the
relation between the individual and the social?
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4The relation between the individual and the social is the key metatheoretical debate in
social psychology, and still remains a very relevant concern in the development of the
discipline. For various reasons this question is usually confronted as a dichotomy:
social psychologists traditionally had to choose either individual or society as unit of
analysis. The most important reason for this state of affairs is that mainstream social
psychology developed in the United States of America primarily as a sub-discipline of
psychology. This subjected social psychologists to the metatheories guiding
psychology as a whole, which was, in succession, behaviourism and cognitivism. The
effect was that traditional or mainstream social psychology has opted for the individual
level of analysis, which caused a seriously impoverished understanding of the social in
social psychology.
While certainly still dominant, this image of social psychology has always been a
contested one as well. Since the relation between the individual and the social is so
central to any conception of the discipline, most new approaches see it as their task to
counter the neglect of the social and the general individualism that characterise
traditional (mostly cognitive) social psychology. In other words, discursive social
psychology is not the first to make these claims and try and address them. To begin
with, there have always been strong voices of dissent from within the folds of traditional
social psychology itself. While the primacy of individual levels of analysis itself was
accepted, these social psychologists disagreed with a growing detachment of social
psychological research from real world problems. Amongst other things, they
advocated more applied as opposed to laboratory research. More radical, in the sense
that it leans to the other end of the individual-social dichotomy, are critiques feeding on
the divide between psychology and the other social sciences, at least in the US. This
divide has occasioned the parallel existence of sociological approaches to social
psychology, seeing the structural and relational aspect of society as analytically prior
to the psychological make-up of individuals.
What sets the discursive approach apart from both the above traditions of critique is that
it is also strongly suspicious of traditional epistemological and ontological categories,
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5the value of rationality, and the universal application of theories. In other words, it
seeks to develop a social psychology that sets itself apart from traditional conceptions
of Western scientific practice. In this regard non-referential accounts of language
enable a critique and reconstruction of traditional social psychology's individualism and
its diminutive understanding of the social on at least two levels: first, as a
metatheoretical shortcoming of cognitive social psychology specifically; and second, by
seeing individualism not so much as a neglect of the social, but as a political investment
in the value of individual subjectivity for the purposes of reproducing specific Western
cultural practices.
In the light of this the following question can be asked of discursive social psychology:
how does it address individualism and the reduction of the social in social psychology,
and does it do so adequately? Does it manage to resolve the individual-social dualism
in social psychology? These questions structure the conceptual space in which
discursive sociai psychology will be introduced and evaluated in this study, and underlie
the following specific research objectives:
• To provide a background to the problem of individualism as it affects the
development of social psychology. Here the focus will be on the development
of social psychology as a sub-discipline of psychology and the gradual rise of
cognitive levels of explanation, as well as on points of intersection between
social psychology and notions of the postmodern.
• To introduce contemporary debates about the nature of language and meaning
and its extension into social psychology. The focus will be on the way language
is used to account both for the failure of cognitive approaches to processes of
meaning-giving and social interaction, and for the epistemological and political
status of social psychology as a science studying individual participation in social
life.
• To conceptually evaluate the adequacy of language as a model for a social
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6psychology of the postmodern, which is here conceived of as a social
psychology that has the ability to account for the cultural patterning of behaviour
and thought, the tenacity of particular cultural forms of life, and the ability people
have to resist oppression and the politicisation of experience.
• To argue that discursive social psychology, due to an over-reliance on language
as discourse, neglects the way experience is also pre-reflexively and non-
discursively patterned; the effect of which is a conception ofthe relation between
the individual and the social in social psychology that is blind to material and
embodied aspects of social agency.
The above has been a fairly abstract outline of what the study will achieve. The next
section does so more concretely by outlining the different chapters.
1.3. Outline of the study
As was made clear above, this study addresses language in social psychology in terms
of the traditional concern about the nature of the relation between the individual and the
social. In the first chapter this theme is historically reviewed in the light of social
psychology's development as a sub-discipline of psychology. After indicating that this
entailed forging a lasting schism between psychological and sociological approaches
to the discipline, the development of the psychological tradition is traced further in the
light of behaviourist and then cognitivist metatheories. The neglect of social levels of
analysis that these lines of development entailed gave rise to a substantial crisis of
confidence in the discipline during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Challenges to
individualism and the social amnesia social psychology so clearly suffered at that stage
are introduced, and it is argued that most of these traditional attempts to rid social
psychology of its problems were failed. Critical discussions of social cognition and
social identity theories clearly show that the reason for this is a continued dichotomy
between cognition and society.
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its crisis of individualism from the outside, so to speak. For this purpose the notion of
postmodernism is introduced and critically applied to social psychology. Postmodern
notions cast a radical doubt on scientific rationality, and see knowledge claims as
culturally specific and socially reproductive. A brief description of the context of social
psychology in South Africa shows that individualism does not simply imply a neglect of
the social, but often functions to maintain relations of power. The question now posed
is that if social psychology's individualism reveals itself as a geopolitical value and
intimately responsive to social organisation, how should social psychology be taken
further? A first attempt to answer this is to evaluate attempts to create a postmodern
social psychology. The description of such developments show many interesting
transformations, but it is argued that academic descriptions of postmodernism often
resonate only with the life worlds of Western cultural elites, and that postmodern social
psychologists often import notions from other social sciences rather uncritically. Both
these lead to a social psychology that potentially has little of its own to say about
important contemporary topics such as culture, identity and experience. The final
section argues for a different approach to the postmodern: postmodernity should be
seen as signifying cultural patterns and changes that fracture overarching Western
meta-perspectives and universalist claims, and the aim should to develop a social
psychology that can describe real instances of this.
These two chapters set the stage for a more systematic inquiry into the role of language
in 'contemporary social psychology. The next chapter begins with a discussion of the
shift from referential to non-referential understandings of language. The focus will be
on two important approaches: analytic or ordinary language philosophy as
spearheaded by Ludwig Wittgenstein; and post-structural transformations of Ferdinand
de Saussure's structural linguistics. After the general introduction these approaches are
extended into social psychology. The first approach is applied on two levels. A concern
for the performative dimensions of language use informs a radically different
understanding of cognitive processes, which is illustrated with regard to categorisation
and its role in the study of racist talk. Cognition is a contextually specific, rhetorical
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approach to language is also shown to destroy the epistemological foundations of
cognitive mentalism, implying that persons should be seen as socially constructed.
Post-structural models are now discussed for the different perspective they bring:
discourses are abstract frameworks of meaning that determine individual instances of
meaning-giving, and these are not consensually constructed but intimately related to
power.
The chapter culminates, after these discussions, in an evaluation of discursive social
psychology. To set this up two important conceptual notions is discussed that link
performative and more abstract conceptions of discourse; or, that allows discursive
social psychology to see individuals as both constructed through discourses and
sophisticated and creative discourse users. These notions are reflexivity and ideology.
The former accounts for the construction of meaning while the latter accounts for the
way meaning stands in the service of power (Thompson, 1984). It is argued that by
seeing the relation between the individual and the social as largely discursive and
reflexive the material and embodied nature of experience is neglected. Discursive
change does not inevitably lead to changes in experience or social conduct, and if this
is not accounted for in a conception of agency there is little chance for discursive social
psychology to adequately address the psychological capacity for resistance and
change: something that this development takes very seriously.
ln'a concluding section recent developments in cultural psychology, cognition, and the
resurgence of interest in Marxism in psychology are sketched as contexts where a more
embodied social psychology can be developed, and where the appropriate position of
language can be negotiated.
1.4. The metatheoretical imperative
Before moving on to the next chapter, it is necessary to make a few brief comments on
the status of this text as a research project. The title already locates it: the approach
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9taken here is metatheoretical, not empirical. This goes against the strong empiricist
tradition in psychology as a discipline and years of relative neglect of conceptual
reflection on its own foundations. Recent developments in the philosophy of science,
however, have made this an untenable position (Doyal & Harris, 1986). No observation
is theory neutral, and it carries values that emanate from individual scientists, scientific
institutions, and the geopolitical concerns of the Western world itself.
These developments have made it absolutely essential that psychological scholars
engage in conceptual and metatheoretical reflection on the theories and research
activities constituting their discipline. Luckily there are many indications that this
realisation has taken root in the discipline of psychology. Examples are many: the
launch of a journal such as Theory & Psychology about a decade ago; the founding of
an International Society of Theoretical Psychology at about the same time; and perhaps
most important, the creation of postgraduate programmes in what is now called
theoretical psychology at various universities abroad.
While journals, degree courses and professional societies are good indicators of the
strengthening and development of a particular new sub-field within a discipline, all new
pursuits aren't necessarily relevant for all environments, and the question might be
posed whether such seemingly esoteric activities can be afforded in South Africa.
Certainly, there is no real development of theoretical psychology in this country, and the
quest for relevance leads down other avenues: applied and action research, community
interventions, programme evaluations. With regard to academic institutions and the
degrees they offer psychology finds itself in a rather precarious position in South Africa:
continued professionalisation might single psychology out as one ofthe few humanities
or social sciences that will survive the onslaught of budgetary cuts and university
rationalisations, but will it happen without compromising the substance and integrity of
what we are teaching?
The view that informs this study in these regards is that metatheoretical work is even
more crucial in South Africa (and other Third World contexts) than in the Western world.
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The reason for this is simple: theories and knowledge claims are imported from abroad
irrespective of their contextual relevance or their ideological baggage. Psychology has
a long colonial history (aspects of this, as it relates to social psychology, will be
discussed in a later chapter), and metatheoretical work in psychology can fulfill an
important gate-keeping function. Only by scrutinising the imported products that
psychology so easily takes over from America and Europe will make it be possible to
resist them when necessary, and then perhaps finally contributing to a psychology that
makes sense to apply to the problems and crises that are specific to this country.
NOTES
1. This chapter introduces the research question and relevant concepts, but is in itself not a literature
review. Because the nature of the study is metatheoretical (see section 1.4) the claims that are made
here will all be addressed, with full coverage and discussion of the relevant literature, in later chapters.
For that reason only a minimum amount of references are used in the present chapter.
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Chapter 2
Locating the social in social psychology:
a historical perspective
2.1. Introduction
This chapter serves as an introduction to the representation and conceptualisation
of the social in traditional forms of social psychology. Since the spectres of
postmodernism and constructionist epistemologies have already been set in store
in the previous chapter, "traditional" signifies here all those approaches that regard
social psychology as a sub-discipline of general psychology, and asserts the
individualised nature of psychological processes. It will further be argued that it is
impossible to create a more social version of the discipline 1without relinquishing the
idea that psychological processes are ontologically individual. As will become clear,
even the most progressive attempts to expand the traditional account of social
psychology fail precisely here, by insisting that individual psychology is finally
reducible to a self-enclosed cognitive system.
Traditional social psychology occupies a vast textual and institutional space. Since
the chapter uses its development to argue for a particular position, and does not
recount it for its own sake, a detailed or even representative history of its
development and form will not be attempted. It is enough to restrict the discussion
to a review of a few exemplary moments. The historical ground that is covered span
the early foundations of social psychology as a sub-discipline of psychology, the
period of pertu rbation (late 1960s and early 1970s) often referred to as "the crisis",
as well as certain key developments after the crisis and up to the present. From
these descriptions it will be argued that, despite many creative reformulations, social
psychology's problematic reduction of the social persists as long as it sees the
psychological as detached from cultural and historical process, and conduct and
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experience as mere tokens of individualised and generic psychological structures
and mechanisms.
The argument will be pursued along the following lines. First, a few brief comments
are made on social psychology as a sub-discipline. Being caught between both
sociology and psychology in terms of its disciplinary loyalties always invoked an
academic censorship on how the social is related to the individual as a psychological
subject in social psychology. While social psychology is now primarily identified as
a sub-discipline of psychology, it is important to pay attention to its divided origins
and development, since it alerts one to the fact that traditional social psychology's
reduction of the social should not be ascribed only to the metatheoretical
perspectives, behaviourism and cognitivism, that primarily provided its psychological
form. Psychology and sociology themselves often upheld a strict segregation
between the individual and the social, conceptualised as a self-enclosed and
ontologically secure psychological subject, and the equally ontologically demarcated
notions of society, structure and institution.
The discussion then shifts towards a consideration of what might be referred to in the
light of the above as the "psychologisation" of social psychology. As was indicated,
this proceeded in terms of academic psychology's most dominant successive 20th
century metatheories, namely behaviourism and cognitivism. In both cases, no
attempt is made here to provide a complete overview of behaviourist and cognitive
contributions. The concern is mainly with the conceptualisation ofthe individual and
the social as it manifests in exemplary instances of these perspectives in social
psychology. Floyd Allport, often presented as the originator of social psychology as
an experimental science, will be discussed as representative of the behaviourist
contribution. His influence established certain core behaviourist notions to persist
even after cognitive social psychology succeeded its behaviourist counterpart.
The eventual demise of behaviourism in social psychology made place for a
cognitive perspective that gradually, partly due to its early onset compared with the
rest of experimental psychology, transformed the former into a very progressive
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branch of the discipline in the United States of America. Early cognitive social
psychology is discussed here with reference to the import of Gestalt psychology to
the USA by immigrant psychologists such as Mozafer Sherif, Kurt Lewin, Solomon
Asch, and Fritz Heider. These Gestalt principles displaced the behaviourist
orthodoxy in at least two ways relevant to the current discussion. First, it opened up
the so-called "black box" and enabled the consideration of mental phenomena in
accounts of social conduct. Second, it established the study of groups in social
psychology as a scientifically legitimate pursuit. While especially the latter signalled
an enlarged conceptualisation of the social in social psychology in those years, it
was never central enough to last as a paradigm. The subsequent concern with
cognition entrenched psychological processes once again as ontologically self-
evident facts of individual mental life, so that the reduction of the social continued
unabated under a cognitive metatheory.
The discussion then proceeds to a consideration of the various challenges to the
reduction of the social from within social psychology itself. These challenges
summoned force under the rubric of "the crisis" during the late 1960s and early
1970s, and its leitmotif became the foundation of a more social social psychology.
The crisis will here be addressed as a purely internal affair, which means that
attention will be given only to critiques that remained committed to a view of social
psychology as a scientific sub-discipline of psychology. Within this general
framework, however, the assessment of social psychology's crisis and proposed
solutions also varied markedly, and these will be addressed accordingly.
By the late 1970s the crisis has largely subsided and traditional social psychology
seemed to have weathered the storm. This can be illustrated most powerfully by the
stronghold that the study of social cognition attained on social psychology during the
1980s and the 1990s. Social cognition refers here to the large-scale import of
concepts and perspectives from cognitive and experimental psychology into social
psychology. In this regard, social cognition is a thorough assimilation of social
psychology into general psychology, an isomorphic fit that does not allow the
explanation of social phenomena inany other terms than general psychological laws.
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As such, social cognition represents one of the most complete identifications of
social psychology with general psychology yet, and since it does not aspire to a
foundational position in the social sciences, also the most debilitating and ignorant
reduction of the social as an analytic category.
Although the talk of crisis did eventually succumb to the colonising stride of cognitive
social psychology, its continued importance rests therein that it also created the
space, conceptually as well as geographically, for the development of new
approaches to the discipline. That is, approaches to social psychology that kept
social cognition from attaining a completely hegemonic hold as a metatheory. The
tradition of intergroup theory is a good example. Referring to the work accumulated
under the rubrics of social identity and self-categorisation theories, it provided an
important and progressive attempt to provide a more social social psychology.
However, it is argued that it ultimately fails to do so convincingly, and the reasons for
this failure most strikingly locates the dilemma of social psychology: the impossibility
to overcome the schism between the individual and the social when it remains
entrenched as an opposition between cognition and society.
Unfortunately, the vast majority of work in traditional social psychology now allows
little other way of representing the individual than in cognitive terms, and neglects
the notion of society, so it seems, for precisely that reason. Traditional social
psychology, and it still occupy the core of the discipline, fails to implode the barrier
between the individual and the social. All in all then, this chapter argues for the
necessity to locate the discussion about social psychology, its reductionism and
possible solutions, in a different context. This context will have to be one where the
relationship between psychology and society itself is problematised.
2.2. Between sociology and psychology one must choose
Discussing traditional social psychology's reductive representations of the social
without considering the relation between this discipline and others that also address
the social, will result in a critique that is insensitive to the dynamics underlying the
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formation of its identity. It is more than clear from the developmental history of social
psychology that its identification as a sub-discipline with specifically psychology is
far less natural or complete than is sometimes presumed. In fact, the identity and
institutionalisation of social psychology had always been suspended between
specifically psychology and sociology in terms of its loyalty to an overarching
disciplinary orientation. It is therefore no misnomer to distinguish in this regard
between a psychological and a sociological social psychology (Cook, Fine, & House,
1995; Farr, 1996; Stryker, 1997f
Most expositions of the current form(s) of social psychology neglect to thematise and
especially problematise this history of divided disciplinary loyalties. It is a neglect
that diminishes a full account of psychological social psychology's reduction of the
social, since it contests it only as a residual problem of prevailing psychological
metatheories. However, the intellectual (or disciplinary) landscape in which social
psychology developed itself often takes for granted a taxonomic distinction between
individual and society as tropes around which the social sciences have to organise.
Psychology and sociology, especially in the US, developed as two separate
disciplines largely around these tropes, and because both developed also within an
epistemological orthodoxy emphasising positivism and scientific foundationalism,
individual and society were set against one another as mutually exclusive and
ontologically contradicting levels of explanation.
The effect of this imposed division on the development of social psychology can be
described as a form of academic censorship. It limits the explanatory reach
accessible to any form of social psychology, since it has always to fix first its
disciplinary loyalties by answering the epistemological question: which is primary,
the individual or society? From the perspective of its psychological form, the
individual is the only legitimate level of analysis, and the social should thus be
conceptualised without transgressing the encapsulated notion of society as that
which belongs "properly" to the discipline of sociology. It sets psychological
processes and structures apart as ontologically secure from the contingencies of
social history, and leaves little room for a conceptualisation of the social in
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psychological social psychology involving more than processes of interpersonal
interaction.
Very significantly, the division described above persisted (and persists) even through
growing critiques of psychological social psychology's penchant for individualism and
its general reduction of the social. It also disregards important debates in sociology
about micro-levels of analysis and the significance of processes of interpersonal
interaction (Turner, 1996). For this reason it is relevant to observe the maintenance
of the division from both perspectives, especially since there is little in the history of
the discipline that supports such a segregated institutionalisation. Not even
rhetorically claiming for social psychology a "double birth" (Sherif, 1967) can hide the
obviously enforced nature of the division. Sheriff was referring to the publication in
1908 of the first two textbooks bearing in their titles the words social psychology,
written respectively by a psychologist (McDougal, 1908) and a sociologist (Ross,
1908). Using this date to indicate the birth of their discipline, social psychologists
make these concurring publications share the burden of signalling a natural division
between a psychological and a sociological social psychology (Farr, 1996).
Apart from the fact that it is a rather dubious move to assign the birth of social
psychology to exactly the year in question", its rhetorical mandate is further
superseded by the mere fact that social psychology functioned long after 1908 as an
interdisciplinary pursuit. Large amounts of collaborative work, even when a search
is confined to "contemporary" topics such as attitude measurement, fill the literature
óf the first few decades of the present century. Just as significantly, even in the
1920s PhD programmes in social psychology were hosted jointly by departments of
sociology and psychology (Allport, 1968; Farr, 1996). More strict segregation only
took effect during the 1920s, gradually, and then became the norm especially after
the Second World War. This process will be elaborated in the next section from the
perspective of psychology.
Currently, there are little traces left of these early collaborations, and even when
scholars acknowledge the existence of two forms of social psychology, they present
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their relation as unproblematic, and best left uncontested. Consider in this regard first
how the editors of a recent volume of social psychological readings (McGarty &
Haslam, 1997) position the sub-discipline and their own disciplinary allegiances from
the perspective of psychology:
Social psychology, for the purposes of this book at least, is a branch
of psychology. It is concerned with those aspects of mental life which
relate to social interaction and social phenomena in general. It is
important to distinguish from the outset this type of social psychology
(which is a branch of psychology) from another important and
continuing tradition of social psychology which is a branch of
sociology. This is really a separate tradition that approaches similar
topics from a different direction. Sociological social psychology has
its own textbooks and journals. (pp. 5 - 6)
The authors assign the division to the persistence of a tradition. Clearly, tradition is
not invoked here as some historically contingent pattern. If that was the case, they
certainly would not have accepted so timidly the institutionalisation of a scientific
pursuit on a notion that signals no foundational divide. Further, just as no real
explanation is given for this division between psychological and sociological social
psychology, the former is located as the study of mental life as it relates to social
phenomena without explaining the exact relation between mind and society.
Rhetorically, then, the notion of tradition is invoked not so much to explain or even
to describe, but rather-to guard the division between psychological and sociological
forms of social psychology.
While the above makes sense in terms of what was already said about the nature
of the censorship as it affected psychology, it is interesting to see that not only
psychological social psychologists guard their turf in these terms. Thus, apart from
insisting on the epistemological primacy of the notion of society with regard to the
explanation of social phenomena, sociological social psychology usually pays at
least lip-service to the ontological reality of psychological processes as individualised
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structures and events. In other words, more often than not such scholars also
naturalise the division between the two forms of social psychology rather than to
assert their position to the exclusion of the other, with the effect that the position of
social psychology and the boundaries set up by academic traditions are once again
left unquestioned. In this regard the following extract from a recent introductory
textbook to sociological social psychology, developed from a symbolic interactionist
perspective" (Hewitt, 1996), is equally revealing:
Psychologists do not deny that social and cultural forces shape the
environment within which such basic psychological processes as
learning, cognition, or emotion take shape. But their main interest is
in the processes themselves rather than in their social setting. As a
result, psychological social psychologists make the individual their
main unit of analysis. Sociologists, on the other hand, seek to
describe and explain patterns of conduct among larger aggregates of
people - groups, communities, social classes, and even whole
societies. Without denying the importance of the mind or of
processes that operate at the individual level, sociological social
psychologists give priority to human association and make society the
beginning point of their analysis. (p. 7)
Apart from defending the abstractions of individual and society as epistemologically
and seemingly ontologically mutually exclusive domains, it presents their relation to
each other with regard to social psychology as some form of benevolent division of
labour. But surely, even if social scientific work could be divided as easily as is
suggested in the extract, would we not expect a certain collaboration at some point,
or at least a periodic coordination of research findings? In contradiction to the
suggestion by McGarty and Haslam (1997) above, this would certainly occasion
some shared journals and textbooks? To conclude, these tales of institutional
divisions alert us continuously to the contest of faculties", so to speak, and should
be kept in mind when embarking on any discussion of social psychology in its
psychological form.
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2.3. The psychologisation of social psychology
The discussion thus far indicates that social psychology's isomorphic identification
with general or individual psychology should be seen as a deliberate process of
"psychologisation". While this draws attention to the colonising effect of psychology
on the construction of social psychology, it should not lead one to think the social
was ever monolithically conceptualised within and across psychological
metatheories. By reviewing behaviourism and cognitivism, it becomes very clear
that the social has been extensively debated within psychological social psychology
itself.
2.3.1. Behaviourism: the legacy of Floyd AI/port
The development of scientific psychology in the United States of America is
intimately related to the metatheory of behaviourism. With its empiricist concerns
and its adherence to experimentation as the propermethodological posture enabling
these, behaviourism was the ideal candidate for a scientific psychology at a time
when the philosophy of science, at least in the Anglo-American world, dictated a
natural scientific model of rationality and objectivity also for the social sciences
(Doyal & Harris, 1986). But while behaviourism continued to dominate general
psychology in the US for nearly five decades, it did not enjoy nearly the same
longevity in social psychology. The latter were in fact established as a cognitive
science long before the so-called "cognitive revolution" in general psychology took
effect (Baars, 1986; Farr, 1996; Hogg & Vaughan, 1995). On the other hand, the
influence of the behaviourist orthodoxy on social psychology should not be
underestimated. In many ways, this influence was foundational and lasting,
especially in the provision of social psychology's scientific form - for, while
cognitivism enlarged the object field of social psychological research, it yielded to the
same scientific prescriptions as behaviourism.
FloydAllport's (1924) Social Psychology, a text to which Rob Farr (1996) refers as
"foundational at least in relation to psychological forms of social psychology" (p. 98),
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is indeed the exemplary account of the discipline's psychologisation in terms of a
radical behaviourism. Allport defined social psychology as "the science which
studies the behavior of the individual in so far as his behavior stimulates other
individuals, or is itself a reaction to their behavior' (p. 12, emphasis in the oriqinal)".
By this definition, social psychology is firmly situated within the stimulus-response
categories of behaviourism, and is only distinguished from general psychology by its
focus on social behaviour. Social behaviour, in turn, was defined as "the stimulations
and reactions arising between an individual and the social portion of his environment;
that is, between the individual and his fellows" (p. 3; emphasis in the original). In
other words, social behaviour does not differ qualitatively from behaviour as a
general psychological unit, allowing the social its psychological impact only as an
aspect of a more general taxonomy of stimulus conditions. Social psychology adopts
a theoretical system that functionally reduces social phenomena to sequences of
interpersonal interaction, approximated by individually encapsulated psychological
mechanisms.
This reduction of the social comes through most clearly in the manner Allport (1924)
asserted himself against the possibility of a scientific study of social qroups'.
Although he defined social psychology as the study of social behaviour, it became
clear in the previous paragraph that this designation does not extend behaviour as
an emergent psychological property of any construct larger than the organic unit of
the individual. This implies that only individuals can lay claim to the property of
behaviour, and that to assign behavioural agency to the group in a manner
irreducible to the individual level of analysis amounts to basing a scientific claim on
a logical fallacy. It has to be confronted by insisting on the intransigence of the
individual as the analytic frame against which social phenomena are theoretically
assimilated. Consider his own statement is this regard:
There is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely
a psychology of individuals. Social psychology must not be placed in
contradistinction of the psychology of the individual; it is a part of the
psychology of the individual, whose behavior it studies in relation to
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that sector of his environment comprised by his fellows. (p. 4,
emphasis in the original)
With this emphatic denial of the psychological reality of the group, Allport (1924)
most decisively established social psychology along individualist lines. This doesn't
mean that he was interested in addressing only the isolated individual, and ignoring
issues of broader social importance. In fact, insisting on the behaviourist reduction
of social behaviour enabled him to imbue his social psychology with strong
foundational claims: "Since all behavioral phenomena of groups are reducible to
mechanisms of individual behavior in the social environment, the relation of social
psychology to the disciplines which treat ofthese higher aggregates is a fundamental
one" (p. 382). While Allport here acknowledged a social environment that is
characterised by the configuration of individual behaviour into "higher aggregates",
encompassed by constructs such as society, culture and organisations, these can
only be studied independent of psychology in a descriptive manner. He insists that
the social environment can be functionally reduced to the psychological
(accumulated behavioural) effects of stimulus-response interactions, and indeed
should be reduced in order to be understood scientifically.
Allport's work presents a rather radical casting of social psychology as a sub-
discipline of general psychology. The eventual and lasting power of his influence on
its development, however, does not rest as heavily on his foundational campaign
and his orthodox behaviourism as it does on the more general parameters for social
psychology he laid down. Most important among these was his insistence on the
laboratory as the proper context for social psychological knowledge production".
Once this was accepted as a methodological truism, even theory that is less inclined
to isolate the individual ended up reproducing a certain blindness to the importance
of social context. Some of the other parameters he entrenched are the definition of
social psychology as the study of largely interpersonal behaviour, the already
mentioned idea that social psychology is completely patterned on and conceptually
assimilated into the laws of general or individual psychology, and a view that the
social is psychologically exhausted once interpersonal processes had been
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accounted for. The persistence of these assumptions becomes clear when the shift
to cognitive levels of analysis is discussed.
2.3.2. Cognitive social psychology: the Gestalt tradition
During the 1930s, and especially in the years directly following the Second World
War, social psychology developed in important new directions. Apart from the
gradual diversification of its object field, it also underwent a significant
metatheoretical shift. The discipline started to rely strongly on cognitive
explanations, and this well before the so-called "cognitive revolution" took effect in
general psychology. This important development was largely due to the emigration
of influential European psychologists to the US in anticipation of the Second World
War. The names of Kurt Lewin, Muzafer Sherif, Solomon Asch, and Fritz Heider, all
of whom are today considered as founders of modern social psychology, deserve
special mention in this regard.
These scholars brought with them a metatheoretical approach in marked contrast to
behaviourism, namely Gestalt psychology. Like behaviourism, Gestalt psychology
developed in opposition to the introspection ism dominating psychology in the late
19th century. However, particularly due to its philosophical roots in rationalist
philosophy and its concurrent rise with phenornenoloqy? (Farr, 1996), it did not follow
the rather stifling alternative of positivism and objectivism. This enabled the
empirical study of various subjective mental processes, such as perception.
Consider Turner et al.'s (1987) description of Gestalt psychology's basic approach
to cognition:
Gestalt psychology took it for granted that the whole was different
from the sum of its parts; that the perceptual organization into an
interdependent, 'dynamic' system produced new, higher order
properties which were different from the properties of the individual
stimuli and changed their character. (pp. 12 - 13)
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In other words, any psychological explanation has to account for the active
involvement of human mental functions - internal and generic organising principles-
leading to a "psychological accumulation" whereby the brute objective given of a
stimulus is transcended and only then achieves its psychological reality. Social
psychology was immediately affected by this account of cognitive mediation. The
mentioned Gestalt psychologists, once in the US, proceeded with research agendas
often concerned with addressing social issues. Many of them, for example, sought
psychological explanations for the transformation of European society into one
characterised by racial and national hatred during the spell of two world wars".
Cognitive processes were theorised to account for issues such as the influence of
group norms on perception, judgement and behaviour, and communicative
processes of social influence such as propaganda (Hogg & Vaughan, 1995).
An important metatheoretical marker in this development of a cognitive social
psychology was the refutation of Floyd Allport's individualistic dismissal of the
psychological reality of the social group. The truism that "the whole is more than the
sum of its parts" not only necessitated addressing mental processes, but had
implications for how human interactions and relations should be theorised.
Interactions and relations have to be seen as contexts that are emergent of
psychological effects not reducible to behavioural responses elicited by the presence
of an isolated stimulus - in this regard another individual. In other words, "we and
they become a total functional system, perceptually and behaviourally, producing
new whole properties such as slogans, values, standardized emotional experiences,
etc., that take precedence over and change individual responses" (Turner et al.,
1987, p. 12). Supra-individual categories such as groups make perfect sense, and
are indispensable, within such a theoretical model.
The study of group processes was initially more important than the study of cognitive
processes for their own sake, and represents an enlarged conception of the social
in social psychology. Systematic concern with groups in social psychology dates
from as early as the 1930s. An early classic in this regard was the imaginative
experiment done by Muzafer Sherif about the formation of social norms. Sherif
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(1935, 1936) used the autokinetic effect to create the illusion of movement with
regard to a stationary light in an otherwise dark room, and asked his research
subjects first individually and then in each others' company to judge the distance the
light was moving. Since no independent frame of reference existed for such a
judgement, it provided Sherif with the perfect opportunity to measure the influence
of other people on such a task. His findings did indeed support the existence of
emergent psychological properties related to group processes: individual judgements
concurred towards a shared estimate after they had been exposed to the
judgements of other people. What was established was a social norm. The central
propositions emanating from this and related experiments with regard to the reality
of the social group, is summarised by Turner et al. (1987):
Through social interaction, group members created collective
products such as norms, slogans, stereotypes, etc., which were
internalized by and transformed the psychology of individuals. In
other words, they argued that Allport's claim that there were only
individuals failed to understand that the group concept was needed
precisely to explain the nature of individuals. (p. 12)
This enlarged understanding of the social was further refined with Kurt Lewin's
establishment of the Research Centre for Group Dynamics at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology in 1944. Lewin and his associates studied phenomena such
as group standards, leadership styles, group decision making, and group
éommunication (Lindzey & Aronson, 1968). As was the case with Sherif, these were
primarily pursued by means of laboratory experiments. In fact, Lewin's manipulation
of complex variables in the laboratory setting is often seen as his most important
contribution to social psychology and the social sciences generally.
An important effect of this adherence to the laboratory as the primary site for the
production of knowledge was that focus had to remain on smaller groups; that is,
collections of up to thirteen people, rather than on larger or more abstract
collectivities or categories such as race, gender, nationality, or crowds. But the
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practical constraints of the laboratory was not the only reason why social psychology
primarily studied small groups. Much of the already mentioned research was
commissioned by the military or by industry, and therefore had a strong pragmatic
focus, geared towards application in those settings. The kinds of questions asked
resided around how group structure and cohesion influenced the efficiency and goal
effectiveness of small interdependent groups (Hogg & Abrams, 1988), issues of
obvious concern to these sectors.
Aside from these methodological and applied constraints, there is no reason to
believe that Lewin considered group psychology to be theoretically exhausted by
studying small groups. His own empirical work reveals an ongoing concern with
categories such as nationality and ethnicity, and with practical application more
broadly emancipatory than merely providing for the military and industry (Lewin,
1952). It also shows a concern for intergroup behaviour, not only for the internal
dynamics of groups (Lewin, 1948). However, these were aspects of Lewin's work
that receded into the background. One reason for this was that some of his most
influential associates and students developed theoretical models and empirical
operationalisations for group structure and cohesion that were more restricted than
the general Gestalt perspective allowed. In this regard, two explanatory strategies
were dominant. Lewin himself opted forthe notion of interdependence to understand
cohesion. He is cited by Turner et al. (1987) as having said:
(I)t is typical of well-organized groups with a high degree of unity to
include a variety of members who are different or who have different
functions within the whole. Not similarity, but a certain
interdependence of members constitutes a group. (p. 94)
Interdependence considers as motivation for human action the attempt to gain from
others fulfilment of needs, whether these be material or psychological. It seeks to
indicate the formation of groups in terms of the access it gives to rewards that are
not possible outside its structural unity. Festinger and others have opted for the
process that Lewin plays down in the above extract, namely similarity. People are
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thought to prefer association with others who are similar to them in, for example, the
views they hold. Here the focus on unique, context specific outcomes is hampered,
and the group becomes a context where that which already exists is merely affirmed.
It doesn't seem to be emergent of any psychological effects, except confirmation.
While there clearly are important differences between these theoretical approaches,
one glaring similarity is of even greater concern to the present discussion. Both
interdependence and similarity were usually operationalised as either liking or
attractiveness. The restriction that this imposed upon the concept of the group is
explained by Hogg and Abrams (1988):
On the one hand, the stress on the group as a dynamic system of
interdependent members strongly implies that there are properties of
the group as a whole, such as cohesiveness, which cannot be
reduced to mere interpersonal attraction, but on the other hand there
is a theoretical failure to explain how attraction to the group could be
generated by any process that does not ultimately boil down to
interpersonal attraction. (p. 98)
In other words, despite the many ingenious experiments that were conducted, no
theoretical model that really did justice to the Gestalt notion of a group as a
psychologically super-ordinate and dynamic system was developed. In principle,
neo-behaviou rist operationalisations of the social as mere processes of interpersonal
interaction kept dominating the field. Aronson (1997) remarks that even
interdependence theories were often still cast in neo-behaviourist terms. The
theoretical and empirical task in was then seen as having to locate the external
award serving as the motivation for particular behaviours. In other words, while
notions such as social norms imply a psychological accumulation that cannot be
accounted for by reducing explanation to either individual or inter-individual levels,
this was never really metatheoretically followed through in the development of social
psychology.
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Unfortunately, the turn away from neo-behaviourist models proceeded by placing
nearly all focus on the supposed internal dynamics ofthe individual cognitive system.
The effect of this was that the study of group processes came to be relegated to be
just a topic in social psychology, assimilated under a cognitive perspective
approaching the status of a metatheoretical position. In the years concurrent with
the gradual growth of the cognitive perspective in social psychology, group
processes was further a topic that drastically receded to a marginal position in the
discipline. Like all topics of scientific concern, the group went in and then out of
fashion. In the early 1970s Steiner could indeed ask, "Whatever happened to the
group in social psychology?" (Steiner, 1974).
As was said before, social psychology's cognitive development predated the
cognitive turn in general psychology. While not yet having access to complex
models of information processing and the architecture of mind, such developments
were anticipated in attempts to explain the cognitive economy in terms of notions
such as consistency (Hogg & Vaughan, 1995). All consistency theories and
research hypotheses that build on them, assume that people actively try to minimise
contradictions between their beliefs, their attitudes, and their perceptions of their own
behaviour. A good example of a theory that builds directly upon the notion of
consistency, is Leon Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957).
Festinger was a colleague of Lewin at the Institute, and after Lewin's death one of
the most influential proponents of social psychology's development, making a big
impact with his theories of informal communication (1950) and social comparison
(1954). However, it was his development of cognitive dissonance theory, and his
conducting the first, almost paradigmatic experiments based on this theory, that
introduced into social psychology a thoroughly cognitive perspective.
As was said, dissonance theory is grounded firmly in the assumption of a cognitive
economy directed towards consistency. In fact, Festinger (1957) concedes this by
explaining his choice for the concepts consonance and dissonance over consistency
and inconsistency as due not to fundamental reasons, but simply because of its
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greater theoretical neutrality. He explains dissonance as a motivational factor in a
cognitive sense in the following paragraph:
In short, I am proposing that dissonance, that is, the existence of
nonfitting relations among cognitions, is a motivating factor in its own
right. By the term cognition, here and in the remainder of the book,
I mean any knowledge, opinion or belief about the environment, about
oneself, or about one's behaviour. Cognitive dissonance can be seen
as an antecedent cognition which leads to activity oriented toward
dissonance reduction just as hunger leads to activity oriented toward
hunger reduction. (p.3)
From this general position, Festinger (1957) deduced the following two hypotheses:
1. The existence of dissonance, being psychologically
uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try to reduce the
dissonance and achieve consonance.
2. When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the
person will actively avoid situations and information which would
likely increase the dissonance. (p.3)
The experimental elaboration of these hypotheses nearly proved to be, as was
already indicated, paradigmatic in social psychology during the late 1950s and the
early 1960s. The reason for this was that it provided a perspective and approach
broad enough to be applicable to almost all traditional domains of social psychology,
whether it be group dynamics, interpersonal relations, attitudes, or social influence.
The accumulation of experiments around these notions would itself warrant a survey
of book length. For current purposes, however, it would be sufficient to refer to only
one early and indeed exemplary set of experiments.
These experiments were conducted by Festinger and a colleague in order to study
the effect of cognitive dissonance on the motivational power of an award in a
situation of forced compliance (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). For this reason,
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Festinger had subjects do, one at a time, a very monotonous and tedious
experimental task. Afterwards, and under the pretence that his research assistant
was unavailable for the next run of the same experiment, he asked a subject who
had just completed the task if s/he would care to stand in as assistant. Festinger
informed this person that the experiment tested the effect preconceptions about a
task had on a subject's enjoyment thereof. The new "assistant" had merely to inform
the next subject that he or she had just completed the task, and had found it very
enjoyable. This, of course, was a lie, and Festinger made sure ofthis by specifically
choosing a subject as "assistant" who had already expressed dislike towards the
experimental tasks. For this lie, Festinger paid certain "assistants" $1, and others
$20. The results of these experiments were indeed startling: People paid the lesser
amount became convinced of their own liking of the task to a much greater extent
than was the case among those paid the larger amount. In other words, and in
opposition to any neo-behaviourist preconceptions, the motivational power of the
monetary reward was effectively inverted.
The explanation for this in terms of cognitive dissonance is fairly straightforward.
Telling a lie causes a state of dissonance between two cognitions (between attitude
and perception of own behaviour). When the person is offered a large amount in
reward forthis lie, the dissonance can be explained away by adding a third cognition,
namely that the reward justifies or at least explains the telling of the lie. However,
when the reward is small, it does not offer an explanation for the behaviour, and the
dissonance caused is not reduced. In fact, the small reward increases the
experience of dissonance, because it accentuates the contrary nature of the initial
behavioural response. In orderto reduce dissonance, then, the person changes one
of the initial cognitions. Since it is easier to change an attitude than to pretend not
to have acted as one did, the person changes the cognition about the level of task
enjoyment. In other words, the person comes to believe that the task was more
enjoyable than it actually was. Festinger's experiment showed that a greater reward
is not always conducive to a greater psychological effect (attitude change, here). In
order to understand psychological effects such as social influence, compliance and
persuasion, it is necessary to highlight the cognitive processes that mediate their
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occurrence. By disentangling such effects from the objective givens of specific
stimuli and rewards, and thus from its immediate environment, the psychological is
clearly being individualised by this theory.
The effect of this was that the social psychological subject, henceforth, was firmly
situated as a perceptual agent, approaching the social world (that is, interaction with
other people), as a detached theorist, spurred on by the general demands of the
cognitive economy not only to achieve consistency in terms of own cognitions, but
also imposing upon the perception of others a certain consistency and cognitive
form, with regard to the understanding of their intentions, motives, traits and
dispositions as these relate to their behaviour. The development in cognitive social
psychology that did the most to furnish this picture of the individual as a cognitive-
perceptual agent, and thus to secure the social as external to the psychological, was
attribution theory. Having its foundations in Fritz Heider's (1958) psychology of
interpersonal relations, attribution theory developed into the most forceful theoretical
approach in social psychology during the late 1960s and the 1970s. The most
important attribution theories were those of Jones and Davis (1965) and Harold
Kelley (1967, 1972). Generally speaking, attribution theory concerns itself with the
manner in which social perceivers attribute intentions, causes and traits in order to
account for other people's behaviour. In Heider's formulation, it regards the person
as a naive psychologist, theorising others' behaviour in terms of a basic distinction
between internal and external causes.
jones and Davis (1965) built on these basic ideas with the notion that perception of
others is guided by the attempt to make corresponding inferences. This means that
we attempt to draw from manifest behaviour conclusions about the underlying traits
that cause them. Kelley's theory concerned itself more with the kinds of information
and the modes of information processing that enable people to make causal
attributions. Apart from distinguishing between internal and external observations,
he theorised a difference between attributions drawn from multiple observations, and
those based on a single observation. In the former case, the principle of covariation
makes us draw on consensus, distinctiveness and consistency as relevant
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information. In the latter, Kelley (1973) proposed us having causal schemata,
underlying our perceptions as well-organised and cognitively represented theories
and hypotheses regarding other people's behaviour.
To summarise, attribution theory as an approach to social psychology presents an
image of interpersonal relations not based on mutual investment or reciprocal effects
of any kind, as might be said to be the case in neo-behaviourist alternatives, but on
the manner in which a perceiver approach and tries to solve a range of cognitive and
explanatory tasks. Actual interaction recedes to the background to make place for
the cognitive processes that precedes it. The focus of social psychology becomes
thus thoroughly individual, with theories of cognition becoming ever more abstract
and functionally individualised. Metatheoretically speaking, social psychology as it
reveals itself in these developments explicitly studies a self-propelled and general
cognitive economy. The social is, as in behaviourism, a stimulus condition -with the
important exception that psychological processes are even further removed from that
stimulus condition by addressing its cognitive mediation.
While cognitive social psychology was here presented as a gradual "inward turn" in
terms of the discipline's metatheoretical location, it was also made clear that the
preceding focus on groups never really equated to a social psychology that was at
any stage "social enough". Leaving aside even the specific theoretical restrictions
discussed, the notion of the group as it was conceptualised with Gestalt principles
still severed its psychological dimensions from any account of its structural or
institutional formation and position within the broader context of society. In this, the
division between psychology and the social sciences discussed earlier becomes
clear once again. It should come as no surprise then that social psychology's
relation to society became an issue on more than one level at about the same time
as its cognitive focus became pervasive. This turn of events is discussed in the next
section.
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2.4. Crisis ...
Up to this point, social psychology was described primarily in terms of its
undervaluation of the social and its consequent individualist metatheory . At the end
of the 1960s, this individualism encompassed social psychology on all levels of its
identity as a discipline: it created the mould in terms of which the individual was
conceptualised as a cognitive-behavioural psychological subject; kept a very
circumscribed image of the nature of social reality in play; predetermined what could
pose as legitimate research questions; and also informed the methodological
technologies that would warrant such research with scientific status. It will become
clear towards the end of this chapter that much has stayed the same in social
psychology in this regard, and that its mainstream heads for the next millennium with
the same concerns still in place. But however unresolved, this does not mean that
social psychology's reduction of the social went completely unchallenged within the
discipline. Attempts to redefine the relation between individual and the social are
equally part of the discipline's history.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, social psychology was overcome by a self-
critical affliction borne out of concern with its form and identity as a discipline.
Referred to as "the crisis" in social psychology (Elms, 1975; Foster & Louw-Potgieter,
1991; Parker, 1989a), these years witnessed the proliferation of challenges to
traditional social psychology, all somehow questioning the relevance of its
knowledge claims or practices of knowledge production. While these challenges
brought social psychology face to face with its relation to society, the concerns were
not exclusively focussed on the metatheoretical level described earlier. In other
words, society was not necessarily addressed as an index of the social. Society
rather became a concern in terms of the discipline's silence on social issues at a
time when student activists and civil rights movements forcefully challenged the
social order. It thus seemed as if the increasing focus on individual cognitive
processes exacted a price in return, namely a neglect of the contexts of human
action and experience. For many at the time, the isolated site of the laboratory
served as the primary metaphor not only of social psychology's silence on issues of
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power and oppression in the real world, but its active participation in the reproduction
of such a social order (McGuire, 1967; Ring, 1967 Tajfel, 1972).
Yet, there also was a deeper, more metatheoretical critique of social psychology
taking root at the same time (Israel & Tajfel, 1972; Strickland, Aboud & Gergen,
1976). Although directed towards different aspects of the discipline's apparent
shortcomings as a social science, this gradually growing tradition of critical studies
depended on the institutional space provided by the crisis for arguments that took
social psychology to task on a more fundamental level. Forthis reason, even though
the crisis is now a historical commonplace in social psychology, it also remains a
much contested concept (Burman, 1996; Morgan, 1996). Accounts of the crisis still
maintain substantial differences in how it should be diagnosed, as well as in the
significance it should be afforded within the development of social psychology at
large. More traditional approaches, for example, see the crisis as contained within
the clearly delineated historical period of the late 1960s and early 1970s. As such,
it is represented most often as a developmental phase in the teleological sense of
mediating growth to a greater scientific maturity. This perspective is aptly
demonstrated in the recollection of Berscheid (1992): "Twenty-five years ago, social
psychology was experiencing growing pains" (p. 8)11.
Critical traditions on the other hand, and the current study is certainly located here,
employ the crisis rhetorically as a position from where a continued problematisation
and reconstruction of social psychological endeavours are possible. In this use of.
the concept, the crisis has never been resolved, and is developmental only in the
sense of being generic for approaches to the discipline that challenge the
foundational pretensions oftraditional social psychology. As was already indicated,
this rhetorical use is grounded in actual critical events during the late 1960s and
early 1970s - and in that sense is no more rhetorical than the traditional use. The
critiques that are of interest to this study build up directly to the debates around
language and discourse that will be discussed in a later chapter. The interesting
thing here is that social psychology's problem was very accurately diagnosed in this
early critical work, but that it was never successfully addressed. In fact, it brought
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
34
social psychology to the brink of considering the formative role of language in its
understanding of the nature of the relation between the individual and the social, but
a complete acceptance of its implications had to wait until later.
Within traditional social psychology, at the time of the crisis, diagnoses of the
discipline's perturbation were confined mainly to issues such as the following: a
perceived triviality of topics; the problem of generalising findings from the laboratory
to real-world contexts; questions of ethics (especially the issue of informed consent);
and the validity of findings based primarily on data received from college and
university students as research subjects (Allport, 1968; Sears, 1986). In other
words, the focus was on "procedural" concerns, remaining on the level of
methodology and research design. As far as the reduction of the social was
concerned, it was assigned to the neglect of real-world contexts in the design,
interpretation and application of social psychological research. These concerns, and
the way they related to social psychology's "posture" and not its metatheoretical
foundations, are summarised well by Gordon Allport (1968):
...(M)any contemporary studies seem to shed light on nothing more
than a narrow phenomenon studied under specific conditions. Even
if the experiment is successfully repeated there is no proof that the
discovery has wider validity. It is for this reason that some current
investigations seem to end up in elegantly polished triviality -
snippets of empiricism, but nothing more. (p. 68)
However, more than being the optimistic manifestations of growing pains, dependent
for its resolution on procedural refining and theoretical invigoration, the crisis in social
psychology also provided a critical site from where the metatheoretical and
geographical (American) hegemony of traditional social psychology could be
seriously challenqed". Critical reflection in social psychology began to disentangle
itself from psychological metatheories and positivist philosophies of science, and
covered ground that were startlingly new in the discipline. For example, some
argued that analytic attention should be on the subjective accounts subjects give of
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their actions, rather than upholding the empiricist ideal that take as relevant data only
observable and objectifiable patterns of human behaviour under regulated conditions
(Harre & Secord, 1972). Related to the above, the image of the person as a passive
behavioural agent was seriously contested in favour of a more hermeneutic
conception of the individual as an active, creative and meaning-governed agent
(Shotter, 1975). A third example is Kenneth Gergen's controversial and influential
thesis that social psychological knowledge should be seen as historical description,
and should "largely be considered the psychological counterpart of cultural norms"
(Gergen, 1973, p. 318).
These contributions do not stand isolated in terms of the developmental trajectory
of critical social psychology, and they were directly taken up by the later turn to
language. It is in this sense very informative to look more closely at the forceful
challenge to the reduction of the social that these ideas were part of. The focus will
here be on the dislocation of the geographical hegemony of American social
psychology in the name of a self-consciously mobilised European tradition.
European social psychology, from the outset, defined itself in opposition to the
individualism and reduction of the social characterising American approaches. In
this sense, it was spearheaded by the leitmotif of developing a more social social
psychology. There were of course fundamental critiques of the discipline that were
not European, and the European tradition is in no way homogeneous. However, as
a broad tradition it exceeded in terms of moving from critique to reconstruction, and
the alternative approaches to social psychology developed in its sway became very
popular in most English speaking academic contexts outside the US: South Africa
being no exception (Foster & Louw-Potgieter, 1991; Painter & Theron, 1998).
Many different explanations for this deliberate European attempt to provide a more
social social psychology could certainly be forwarded. For example, European social
psychologists were often more interdisciplinary inclined. Here it is important to
remember that behaviourism had little impact on psychology in Europe, and that the
strict distinction between psychology and the other social sciences did not exist. It
was therefore possible for theoretical ideas to migrate across disciplinary
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boundaries, just as it was possible for philosophical ideas to receive social scientific
attention. Apart from this, European social psychologists also viewed social
phenomena from the perspective of two successive world wars, experiencing
firsthand the influence of social events on individual lives. Whatever the reasons
were, European social psychology directly addressed the censure that was so
strongly part of social psychology's identity in the US. To summarise, European
social psychology is characterised by
the view that social psychology can and must include in its theoretical
and research preoccupations a direct concern with the relationship
between human psychological functioning and the large-scale social
processes and events which shape this functioning and are shaped
by it. (Tajfel, Jaspers, & Fraser, 1984, p. 3)
In this manner the crisis of relevance was placed firmly before the door of any form
of conceptual and methodological individualism, while in turn relating the latter
directly to the American hegemony over the discipline. Because the
conceptualisation of the social in American social psychology informed both an
inadequate understanding ofthe psychological dimensions of social phenomena, as
well as of the social dimensions of human behaviour and psychological processes,
European social psychology sought a better theoretical understanding of "the
interaction between the human individual and his social context" (Tajfel, 1972, p. 12).
Such are-conceptualisation ofthe relation between the individual and the social had
,
further to be accompanied by a broader conceptualisation of the latter, so that the
social in social psychology would encompass "social inequalities, political violence,
wars, under-development or racial conflict" (Moscovici, 1972, p. 21).
Simply asserting the incorporation of such large-scale social processes into the
discipline's conceptualisation of the social would obviously not suffice if it remained
unclear precisely how the psychological subject should be treated as participant in
such phenomena. In this regard, social psychology has to relinquish its focus on the
individual as an isolated and epistemic subject, knowing the world and acting upon
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it in terms of processes and information or knowledge unrelated to other people. The
French social psychologist Serge Moscovici (1972) took this task to heart, and his
critical and reconstructive comments remain among the most lucid to be read in all
the crisis literature. According to Moscovici, social psychology limited itself severely
by neglecting to see society as involving the individual on a level that does not allow
a reduction to co-presence induced in a laboratory, or abstracted into a mathematical
aggregate. This meant that "despite its technical achievements, social psychology
has become an isolated and secondary science" (p. 62) - for what account of social
life excludes norms, rituals, and other aspects of social history?" Moscovici's
response to individualism in social psychology is quoted in some detail below:
Acceptance of these views led to the neglect of some fundamental
aspects of social phenomena. Society has its own structure which is
not definable in terms of the characteristics of individuals; the
structure is determined by the process of production and
consumption, by rituals, symbols, institutions, norms and values. It is
an organization which has a history and its own laws and dynamics
that cannot be derived from the laws of other systems. When the
"social" is studied in terms of the presence of other individuals or of
"numerosity", it is not really the fundamental characteristic of the
system that are explored but rather one of its sub-systems - the sub-
system of inter-individual relationships. The kind of social psychology
that emerges from this approach is a "private" social psychology
which does not include within its scope the distinctiveness of most of
the genuine collective phenomena. It can therefore be argued that,
for reasons which are partly cultural and partly methodological, the
.systematic perspective in social psychology has not been truly
concerned either with social behaviour as a product of society orwith
behaviour in society. (pp. 54 - 55)
The last sentence here deserves particular attention, since it illustrates the extent to
which social psychology would have to reformulate its own identity in orderto answer
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creatively to the challenge of becoming "more social". It goes without saying that
traditional social psychology did not address "behaviour as a product of society".
Both behaviourist and cognitive social psychology explicitly held on to different
understandings of behaviour. In the former, behaviour is the product of responses
to discreet stimuli, reducing society itself to the accumulated product of interpersonal
interactions. Cognitive social psychology, in turn, understands behaviour as
mediated by information processing: society might provide us with information, but
our responses are determined by how we make sense of it, and these processes are
individual.
But Moscovici also states that individualist social psychology neglects "behaviour in
society". This is a somewhat different charge, and one that directly address social
psychology on the metatheoreticallevel. If he conceded that social psychology does
in fact address behaviour in society, it would imply two things. First, that social
behaviour can be detached from a social context, and secondly, that while social
psychology erred in not explicating the social contexts of behaviour, its basic
understanding of social behaviour was intact. To distance himself from such a
dualism of individual and social, he challenged the idea of social behaviour as
constituting the focus of social psychology. Social psychology is concerned rather
with symbolic activity, which means that the structural reality of society is always
already implied in any understanding of human conduct. The individual has to give
meaning to and derive meaning from a social world in a way that is not exhausted
by accomplishing a perceptual task, or by weighing up the presence of other people
from the vantage point of a purely individual cognitive calculus. His conception of
such a social psychology is very clear in the following working definition (Moscovici,
1972):
The central and exclusive object of social psychology should be the
study of all that pertains to ideology and to communication from the
point of view of their structure, their genesis and their function. The
proper domain of our discipline is the study of cultural processes
which are responsible for the organization of knowledge in a society,
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for the establishment of inter-individual and intergroup conduct which
creates a common social reality with its norms and values, the origin
of which is to be sought again in the social context. (p. 55)
This was a remarkable conception for its time, and brings social psychology to the
brink of considering the formative nature of language. The idea that social
psychology should study information as organised and represented on a cultural
level, clearly steers away from information as a purely mental content. Also, when
this organisation and representation are postulated to operate on the level of
ideology, transmitted communicatively, and responsible for the construction and
reconstruction of a particular social reality, it is a small step to considering language
both in a structural and performative sense.
2.5.... and beyond
In this section, certain key developments in social psychology "after the crisis" is
addressed. What is of interest here is the fact that social psychology still finds itself
with the same dilemma, namely of how to sufficiently conceptualise the social and
its relation to the individual. It therefore becomes important to understand why
responses to the crisis were not entirely successful. The developments addressed
here represent both the traditional and critical responses to the crisis discussed in
the previous section.
Át the beginning of the 1980s the crisis was considered to be over from the
perspective of traditional social psychology. As Leon Festinger (1980) wrote at that
time, with an air of almost hopeful anticipation: "The malaise is probably over" (p.
238). This sense of well-being related closely to the fact that traditional social
psychology had a largely procedural understanding of the crisis, and held the
conviction that adherence to better techniques, a more coherent and pervasive
metatheory, a broader subject base, and also some application to real-world
problems would divert the crisis as a challenge to its integrity. The context for such
an integrated social psychology was provided for by the development of the cognitive
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metatheory in experimental psychology, informing the tradition of social cognition.
Social cognition erupted onto the scene not only as a new topic for social
psychological investigation, but as a fully fledged metatheoretical approach
(Augaustinos, 1995). Throughout the 1980s and up to the present it maintains itself
as the dominant form of social psychology.
It became clear in the previous section that more critical responses to the crisis
sought to break down the analytical barrier between the individual and the social.
Here the focus will be on the tradition of intergroup theory. Intergroup theory is a
shorthand for the social identity tradition developed by Henri Tajfel and his
colleagues at the University of Bristol during the 1970s, as well as its extension into
self-categorisation theory by John Turner during the 1980s (Abrams & Hogg, 1990;
Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1978, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1982,
1995; Turner et al., 1987). As one of the most popular products of the European
approach to social psychology, intergroup theory can be said to have spearheaded
the search for a more social version of the discipline (Turner & Oakes, 1986, 1997).
Its achievements and also its apparent failures serve as good indicators of the
direction social psychology has to follow in order to finally address the problem of
individualism.
2.5.1. Social Cognition
Social cognition as an approach designates the generalisation of the assumptions
óf experimental cognitive psychology to social psychology. Broadly stated, this
means that cognitive social psychology is recast in terms of the principal metaphor
of the human mind or cognition as an information processing system (Baars, 1986).
Social cognition, however, does not resemble a radical departure from early
cognitive social psychology, and stays within the parameters defined especially by
cognitive dissonance and attribution theories. In other words, rather than a
revolution within social psychology, it rose to the occasion as the primary form of
cognitive social psychology's reificafion.
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The differences that do exist between early cognitive social psychology and its latter
form in social cognition, is one of degree. Social cognition, bolstered by the
industrious development of experimental psychology, has access to a richer
vocabulary according to which cognitive processes can be charted. The minutiae of
information acquisition, storage and retrieval, both structurally and procedurally, are
intricately theorised in cognitive psychology, and social psychology is readily fitted
into the scheme it provides. As such it is formulated from the assumption that the
"study of social knowledge (its content and structure) and cognitive processes
(including acquisition, representation and retrieval of information) provide a key to
understanding social behaviour and its mediating factors" (Macrae & Hewstone,
1995, p. 535).
Social psychology remains theoretically subsidiary to general psychology, because
structurally and procedurally social knowledge is modelled to fit a pre-given and
abstracted mental system. In the words of Ostram (1994), "the social cognition
approach is based on the assumption that constructs relevant to cognitive
representation and processes are fundamental to understanding all human
responses, regardless of whether those responses are social or nonsocial in nature"
(p. ix). What designates social psychology as social then, is not a characteristic of
the basic mechanisms of cognition, but rather of what is cognised. As was the case
in early cognitive social psychology, the social is reduced to the stimulus condition
that the presence of other people provides. Only, in the elaborated vocabulary of
social cognition, analytic focus is even less on actual interactive events, and nearly
éxclusively on mediating, asocial cognitive processes. If the social is the context of
intrinsically individual processes, this context is further reduced to merely its mental
representation.
This all-consuming concern with intra-individual processes and states is aptly
demonstrated by the contemporary focus on the all-purpose construct of the schema.
Schemas are conceived of as knowledge structures, coherent representational grids
consisting of information stored in the long-term memory, specifying "both the
attributes associated with a particular stimulus domain and the interrelations among
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those attributes" (Macrae & Hewstone, 1995, p. 536). In terms of social cognition,
schemas are necessary because they enable people to make sense of their stimulus
worlds; they provide one with, as it were, working hypotheses regarding all possible
behavioural sequences, perceptual stimuli, judgements or events. As such,
schemas may be designated as individual or social. Social schemas encompass
other people, the self, or sequential social activities or events. Schemas are purely
individualised structures that help a miserly individual along on its isolated quest in
a social world. This isolation sees the individual in much the same role as the
romanticised scientist: as such, the "social lives of individuals flow from how they
perceive, hypothesize or reason about each other" (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p. 13).
This inflation of the cognitive system and its resulting vocabulary merely reproduces
the individualism of early cognitive social psychology. Gradually, however, some
social cognition researchers are beginning to realise this. They understand that the
question, "whatever is social about social cognition?", cannot be answered
adequately with vacuous statements such as: it has a social origin, a social content,
and it is shared". Such statements cannot breach the problem of the reduction of
the social in social psychology, because they imply formulations of the social that are
already inadequate. Structurally, social knowledge remains an isolated individual
possession. Procedurally, the image of cognition is equally privatised, and often
theorised in terms of an adaptive perceptualism. This makes recourse to statements
about shared knowledge worthless, because the "shared goods" can only be thus
designated afterwards; that is, not as interactive product, but as correlated
perspective.
The realisation of the above limitations brought a slight tempering of the arrogant
affirmations characterising the approach in the early 1980s, and a more earnest look
at the disservice it might be doing our understanding of social life". In this regard,
it is revealing to read the statement of one of the founding figures and popularisers
of social cognition, Susan Fiske (here with a colleague, J-P Leyens):
(S)ocial cognition research adopts a non-confrontational view of
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society from the perspective ofthe individual. That is, it ignores group
conflicts and group membership and concentrates on the essentially
asoeietal individual. We would add that this individual is a
nonstigmatized White male member of the silent majority. In other
words, this person has no reason to believe that anyone worth
considering differs from himself in any important ways. The ideal
society to which this individual belongs is composed only of
individuals like him, and it is bad taste to encapsulate people in
specific groups because supposedly everyone is essentially the same
if one looks hard enough. (Fiske & Leyens, 1997, p. 96)
They acknowledge here not only the epistemological shortcoming of not addressing
the societal dimension of individual lives, but explicitly address the historically
specific values that have accompanied social psychology's individualism. These are
values that itself testifies to the societal dimensions of the perceptions, behaviours,
knowledge, and Identities of traditional social psychologists. However, even though
this a surprisingly critical reflection coming from one of the champions of social
cognition research, it merely repeats the drift of the critical comments made by
people such as Tajfel and Moscovici a quarter of a century earlier. Critically, it
seems as if traditional social psychology is reinventing the wheel. In the cited text,
Fiske and Leyens see a possible way out for social cognition in collaboration with
intergroup theory. This is an act of acknowledgement after many years of ignorance
about non-American approaches to the discipline. Yet, whether this will provide a
way out of social psychology's dilemma, depends on whether intergrouptheory itself
succeeds to do what they set out to.
2.5.2. Intergroup theory
As was already indicated, the designation "intergroup theory" (IGT) is used here in
reference to a broad approach to social psychology with social identity and social
categorisation theories as its cornerstones. Both these are complex theories to
which justice cannot be done in the present context, but a brief description is very
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valuable for this discussion. The reason for their relevance is largely the fact that it
reworks the social in social psychology from the vantage point of a basic cognitive
metatheory. In other words, it asserts a continuation between basic and social
cognitive processes, and therefore sees the psychological as ontologically individual.
Yet, it is situated by its protagonists in clear opposition to social cognition, and rightly
so. Consider a statement by Hogg and Abrams (1988) in this regard:
(T)he approaches differ markedly in their understanding of the term
"social" in social psychology. For social cognition it simply means
"people", so judgement, perception, memory and so on, become social
only to the extent that they concern people. There is no theoretical
treatment of emergent properties of social interaction - such as shared
perception, norms, and so on - or of group membership as a
psychological state with specific and unique effects. For social identity
the entire analysis rests precisely upon the theoretical analysis of
group membership. (p. 88)
IGT thus returns to the neglected traditions of group dynamics and intergroup
studies, in a general attempt to "rediscover the group" in social psychology (Turner
et al., 1987). However, unlike traditional approaches to the group, it facilitates this
return by trying to safeguard it against reducing the psychological reality of the group
again to mere processes of interpersonal attraction. Groups are conceptualised as
informing psychological states that are irreducible to intra- and interpersonal levels
óf analysis, and directly related to the structural reality of society. Forthis IGT draws
on a conception of society as a constellation of different social categories that stand
in conflicting power relations to each other. In themselves, however, these
categories are mere statistical entities, and do not explain the involvement of people
in them. IGT sets out to explain how they are internalised and determines behaviour,
or, how "the individual becomes part of a social group and a social group becomes
part of the individual's self-concept" (De la Rey, 1991, p. 44).
The self-concept assumes a central role in this theoretical system, since it makes it
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
45
possible to relate basic cognitive processes to societal structures. According to IGT,
the self-concept is a cognitive schema, a knowledge structure filled with propositions
about the self, and in this regard can have both individual and social content.
Individual content simply refers to unique personal attributes and personality traits,
and is called the personal identity. Social content, in contrast, derives from the
knowledge of belonging to particular social categories, consists of categorically
specific attributes, norms and behavioural patterns, and is called the social identity.
The number of social identities that an individual might have is only limited by the
amount of groups they belong to. What is important is that the social identity, by
representing the social group in the individual mind, underlies social behaviour that
is irreducible to intra- or interpersonal levels of analysis.
The structural distinction between individual and social identity is the first step in the
direction of relating cognitive processes to higher (more social) levels of analysis.
The second step is made by drawing a further theoretical distinction, namely
between interpersonal and intergroup behaviour. Interpersonal behaviour occurs
when a person interacts with someone else in terms of his or her personal identity;
that is, they interact as individuals. Previous approaches to the psychology of group
belonging were theoretically limited to interactions on this level, as was indicated
earlier in the chapter. Intergroup behaviour, on the contrary, occurs when two
people interact as representatives of particular social groups; that is, in a context
where their social identities are salient and point towards attributes, values and
behaviours that are assimilated from a social category. See Hogg (1995) in this
regard:
For example, talking with a close friend about a mutual acquaintance
would most likely render a particular personal identity salient and
cause one to consider oneself and one's partner in terms of that
identity. Talking with the same close friend about the outcome of a
sporting contest if you support opposing teams would very likely render
the interaction an intergroup one based on definitions of self and other
in terms of opposing supporters' groups. (p. 556)
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The shift from personal to social identity is contextually effected. Such contextual
events might be fairly mundane, as the above example, or much more pervasive.
If one thinks about apartheid South Africa, it is clear that the racialisation of society
made it very difficult not to act in an intergroup manner. But whether the context is
mundane or historically entrenched, the psychological processes that make any shift
from an interpersonal to an intergroup event possible. These processes should be
more closely described, because they are in fact the real linchpin attaching individual
to society within IGT. While there is a minor difference between social identity and
self-categorisation theories with regard to the description of the structure of the self-
concept", they agree that social identity is cognitively represented as knowledge of
the self, and involves a mediation of the individual and society by means of the
process of categorisation.
In other words, where the process of social identification encompasses all "the
psychological processes involved in translating social categories into human groups,
in creating a psychological reality from a social reality" (Hogg & Abrams, 1988, p.
17), these processes are invariably private, perceptual processes, even in a system
where society is taken seriously for its psychological import. By insisting on the
cognitive process of self-categorisation as central to the shift from interpersonal to
intergroup interactions, society can be theoretically assimilated without compromising
the psychological ontology. Categorisation is indeed theorised as a general
cognitive-perceptual process, driven by an adaptive economy, that attains a
sociological dimension only when it is directed towards situating the self in opposition
to others; in others words, when social identities are formed and evoked as self-
categorisations.
In this, IGT builds on categorisation research done by Henri Tajfel and his colleagues
in the early 1970s, giving rise to what is now referred to as the "minimal group
paradigm" (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971 )17. In these experiments, they
wanted quite literally to establish the minimal conditions that would incite intergroup
bias. They involved a number of British schoolboys to participate in studies that
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only adds historical substance but is necessary in order to make
accurate predictions concerning specific instances of stereotyping:
one needs to know the macro-social context in order to predict how
individuals will behave in specific situations. (p. 77)
IGT thus reveals a clearly intended social scope, and is an advancement over
traditional cognitive approaches. Yet, it is not without serious internal contradictions.
While the focus on social causality, social justification and social differentiation
seems invoke Moscovici's ideal of social psychology being the study of
communication and ideology, such social processes will have to be subsidiary to
more basic processes of signification. The true mediation between the individual and
the social is not forged on the level of negotiation and systems of knowledge that
exist and are represented beyond the individual, but in the individual cognitive
system itself - in the basic mechanisms that situate the individual as a perceptual,
private subject, able to make sense of the world and to belong to groups without the
intervention of other people. The problem with this is that it is unclear why one would
hold on to a model of the person as a perceptual miser, when the most important
aspects of social behaviour seem to rest on processes of negotiation and shared or
distributed significations?
There is thus a clear tension between knowledge as finally a perceptual process, and
not dependent on society, and knowledge as a societal product. Unfortunately it is
a tension that, by insisting on the individualised nature of psychological processes,
makes it impossible to follow leads that will enable a consideration of people as
psychologically part of social life by processes that are not driven by a cognitive
economy. Of course, this will invoke the question of whether such a project is still
a psychology at all. These contradictions have been picked up extensively by critics
of the approach in the last years, but will not be discussed here. They are debates
that create the environment for the arguments that will be pursued in this study, and
will therefore be addressed in all the following chapters. Suffice to say that even
here, after such a thorough attempt to rid social psychology of its key metatheoretical
concerns, the opposition between cognition and society threatens to abstract the
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individual to the detriment of social psychology's understanding of social life.
2.6. Conclusion
In this chapter a history has been sketched of social psychology's struggle for an
identity as a discipline. It was argued that such an identity will always begin with or
end in a resolution to the problem of the relation between the individual and the
social. Because of social psychology's uncomfortable relation to psychology and
sociology, and due to its acceptance of cognitivism as a metatheory, this problem
was usually addressed in terms of a reduction of the social.
Quite a strong critical tradition within social psychology invested great amounts of
energy into rectifying this individualism and reduction of the social, because it
threatened, ever since the late 1960s, to make social psychology a rather trivial
pursuit. Yet, success in this regard cannot be seen as entirely convincing. The
question inevitably arises whether social psychology should be a psychological
concern, accompanied with an even deeper question: what precisely, culturally or
socio-historically speaking, is the relation between (Western) psychology and
individualism?
To address issues such as these, the focus will have to be shifted rather radically.
For one, it is necessary to leave behind the history of social psychology as such, at
least for the moment. The answers, so it seems, do not reside there. But where will
they be found, and how will they be addressed? How should the question regarding
social psychology's crisis be reformulated? These questions will be addressed in the
next chapter.
NOTES
1. One cannot simply refer to social psychology as a discipline. It is usually afforded only sub-
disciplinary status of psychology and sociology respectively. But because this tendency will be
problematised and critiqued in this chapter, the notion of discipline is used to indicate social
psychology - except, of course, where its relation to psychology and sociology is explicitly discussed.
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2. This distinction will only be used in the present section. In the rest of the chapter, all references
to social psychology refers to its psychological form, except when stated otherwise.
3. It is of course a fallacy to assign to any scientific discipline an exact origin. Things are always more
complex than such a practice will suggest. Of course, certain dates are highly significant, but they are
significant usually relative to the current position a particular historian is taking. Therefore, in social
psychology, other investments and values can easily find other (and earlier!) dates to indicate its
"birth". For example, the simple experiments done by Triplet in 1896 are often referred to as the first
of its kind in social psychology (Hogg & Vaughan, 1995), serving as a reference point for the
experimentalist. For those more socially inclined, the crowd psychology of Le Bon can be an equally
legitimate date of birth, as can the social psychology courses George Herbert Mead presented from
1899 - 1922 (Farr, 1996). In fact, there is no reason why the dates cannot be pushed back altogether,
to the Greek rhetorical tradition (Billig, 1987).
4. Symbolic interaction ism is an approach to sociology that had traditionally argued for the importance
of issues surrounding agency and activity in a tradition often more disposed towards the study of larger
structural aspects of social life. The origins of symbo!ic interaction ism is in Mead's work, and as was
noted above, and he explicitly articulated his work as a social psychology. Rob Farr (1996) rightly
indicates Mead as one of the fathers of social psychology, and as one of its strongest theoretical
minds. He sees in Mead a very powerful example of a social psychology that is not tied down by either
the concerns of psychology or sociology, but that is a social science discipline in its own right.
Considering this broad perspective and the quality of the theory, it is a tragedy that Mead has been
so neglected by psychological social psychologists.
5. The allusion here is of course to Immanuel Kant's discussion of the relation between philosophy
and other faculties, such as law and medicine (Culler, 1983). Here it indicates simply a general
division between different fields of knowledge production, especially in academic contexts.
6. Many of the classic texts in the social sciences of course abound with sexist language. The usual
acknowledgement and disclaimer (sic) will not be used here, but the problematic nature of the
language is, indeed, noted. Also, when quoting American sources, different spelling conventions are
often encountered, for example "behavior" as opposed to "behaviour". The original spelling will be
kept.
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7. Allport aimed this behaviourist denial of the social group at a very specific theoretical tradition,
namely Le Bon's hypothesised group mind, later taken up and extended by McDougal (Hogg &
Vaughan, 1995). The group mind theory had rather good fortunes in the history of the social sciences,
since even Freud used it to developed his account of group phenomena (Farr, 1996).
8. This was of course not his own idea. From 1890 onwards, psychology in the US developed as a
laboratory science, a characteristic that had an important impact on its relation to the other social
sciences. In fact, the circumscribed focus on the human organism and its psychological processes
under laboratory conditions were in line with psychology's desire to be a biological rather than a social
science (Danziger, 1990).
9. Which is in marked distinction to the philosophical roots of behaviourism, namely Lockean
empiricism and the logical positivism of the Vienna circle.
10. The influence of war on the development of social psychology is a story in itself (Farr, 1996).
Consider the following account by Muzafer Sherif (1967). This Turkish psychologist clearly situates
his own concern for social psychology in his experiences of war and forced migration:
As an adolescent with a great deal of curiosity about things, I saw the effects of war:
families who lost their men and dislocations of human beings. I saw hunger. I saw
people killed on my side of national affiliation; I saw people killed on the other side. In
fact, it was a miracle that I was not killed along with the hundreds of other civilians who
happened to be near the invasion points the day Izmar (Smyrna) was occupied by an
army, with a blessing of the victorious Western colonial powers at the end of World War
I...
At that early age I decided to devote my life to studying and understanding the causes
of these things. Of course for some years I did not know how to go about it, but I
started reading whatever I could lay my hands on about history and social problems.
By the time I came to the United States for graduate study, I had firmly decided that my
life's work would be social psychology.
What is remarkable about this passage, is to sense the social consciousness guiding the work of one
of social psychology's pioneers. It also stands as an accusation against a social psychology that has
lost so much of this realism.
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11. This rhetorical use of the crisis as involving the maturation of social psychology is quite pervasive
in the literature. Coats and Feldman (1996, p. 8) write: "If social psychology was born at the turn of
the century and reached adulthood in the 1940s, its first midlife crisis came in the 1960s". In accounts
such as these, little is conceded in terms of approaches to social psychology that did not follow the
traditional trajectory. They are simply ignored.
12. In this chapter the focus is only on the popular distinction between European and American
approaches. This does not mean that other forms of geographical hegemony was not also critically
addressed. More specifically, both European and American approaches can be seen as Western
approaches, which beg the question about social psychology in the former Soviet republics, in Eastern
countries, and of course in Africa. The practice of exporting social psychology to non-Western
contexts will be addressed in greater detail in the following chapter.
13. Moscovici (1972) often expressed his disgust in the individualism of American social psychology
in no unclear terms. For him, individualism was more than merely a defective metatheory: it carried
with it a particular complex of values that set individuals up in the ideological sense of being self-
determined, responsible and ethical. In his own words: ''This 'social psychology of the nice person'
was to me then - as it still is today - offensive in many ways; it had little relevance to what I knew or
had experienced" (p. 18).
14. This debate, and elaborate explanations for the solutions only mentioned here, can be found in
Nye and Brower (1996).
i5. The use of arrogance to describe the initial posture of social cognition in social psychology is not
an over-statement. In the mentioned text the author asks himselfthe question whether social cognition
is sovereign in social psychology. His answer? "Of course it is (p. xi)", which he follows up by saying:
"Indeed, it is easy to imagine a future in which there is no longer a need for a separate Handbook of
Social Cognition. The Handbook of Social Cognition will become the Handbook of Social Psychology"
(p. xii). Even accepting that people are entitled to their views, in science as in every life, statements
such as these reveal a remarkable ignorance towards the diversity of social psychology, and the
radical difference between many recent developments and social cognition research.
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16. The difference referred to here can be explained in the following way: "Where social identity theory
seeks to explain intergroup discrimination in terms of a need for a positive social identity, self-
categorization theory shift in self-perception from self-categorization in terms of personal identity to
self-categorization in terms of social identity" (Turner, 1995, p. 502).
17. This research again has its roots in earlier experiments in perception by Tajfel (1957).
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Chapter 3
Reconsidering the subject:
Social psychology, postmodernism and
identity
3.1. Introduction
This chapter continues to describe social psychology's grappling with the relation
between the individual and the social, and its struggle, at least from the perspective
of psychology, to redeem itself of the individualism that accompanied so many of its
traditional solutions. As became clear in the previous chapter, there is no easy
solution to this metatheoretical dilemma, especially if discussion remains locked
inside the metatheoretical confines of general psychology. The focus in this chapter
will therefore no longer be on the crisis as an affliction completely internal to social
psychology itself. It is explicitly related to upheavals and perturbations, crises
indeed, characterising the intellectual climate in Western spheres of cultural
production at large.
This shift in emphasis is not a rhetorical strategy unique to the argument developed
in this text, and is prefigured by developments in critical social psychology ever since
the 1980s. In an important publication a decade ago, for example, Ian Parker and
John Shotter (1989) stated that "the crisis is not to be found just in the theories and
assumptions of social psychology, but in a whole set of 'crises' to do with the very
character or context of western intellectual life" (p. 1). Ian Parker (1989a) repeated
this in another publication by saying that "the continuing crisis in social psychology
is part of a broader cultural and political crisis" (p. 64). Dowd (1991) similarly
claimed that the crisis in social psychology relates to "structural transformations and
associated cultural shift(s)" (p. 188) in Western society and culture. Within such a
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perspective individualism is not treated as a conceptual blemish on social
psychological theory as such. Social psychology, as part of the psychological
sciences more generally, owes its theoretical and institutional space to more general
societal requirements regarding the regulation of the specific structure of Western
self-understanding, giving individualism a normative value in the development of this
society. These statements will be elaborately addressed in the remainder of the
chapter. For the moment it is enough to realise that the crisis in social psychology
cannot be separated from crises of colonialism, development, and rationalism; and
as will become clear in the following chapter, a crisis of representation.
Locating social psychology in such a framework has the following effect. The
discipline is revealed as intimately responsive to social and cultural processes. It is
argued that social psychology's crisis is not so much one not of a reduction of the
social, but of a complicity with the normative patterns and strategies that have
characterised the social organisation of Western culture and its value-spheres in
colonial contexts. In order to address this strategic relationship between social
psychology and the structure of individual subjectivity in Western cultures, the
current discussion takes its cue from Raiser (1997) when he says that "the crisis in
social psychology should be viewed as part of the crisis of modernism, heralding the
advent of postmodernity" (p. 96). Drawing on the rhetoric of postmodernism in this
discussion might seem a confounding strategy: it certainly is an often vague and
over-determined concept (some would say it is not a concept at ali). This, however,
does not mean that the notion ofthe postmodern has no heuristic value in discussing
issues relating epistemology to society and culture. For all its vagueness
postmodernism is a pervasive theme in recent social science debates, and using it
in this context allows a synchronisation of critical discussions that could otherwise
easily stay locked behind disciplinary doors. The guiding theme in all postmodern
ideas, as will become clear in this chapter, is a rejection of key Enlightenment
assumptions regarding the nature of knowledge.
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But using the notion of the postmodern is relevant for another reason, one that is
more specific to social psychology and the current study. Postmodernism is often
extended beyond its critical use to delineate new forms of theorising and engaging
in social research. To state it differently, a strong case is being made for
postmodernism as social theory. It is especially in the social sciences such as
sociology and anthropology, as well as new hybrid discipline's such as gender and
cultural studies that postmodern knowiedges are being developed. Although not as
pervasive, this has also been attempted in social psychology, setting postmodern
social psychology up as having untied the shackles of individualism, and being a
discipline truly receptive to the fragmented and often dislocated nature of experience
and knowledge in contemporary society. To conclude, the postmodern is not only
used to challenge social psychology's relation to society. It also sets the parameters
of a reconstructed, post-individualist social psychology. One of the aims of this
chapter is to evaluate the idea of a postmodern social psychology, and to see if what
is on offer indeed reconstructs social psychology in a way that makes it relevant to
the South African context.
The argument will be presented in the following way. The first section contains a
conceptual clarification of the notion of the postmodern as it is employed in this
chapter. Its currency is traced in both popular and academic discourses, with the
focus specifically on how postmodernism extends its aesthetic connotations to
become a critical and reconstructive index in the social sciences. In doing this, the
concept of postmodernity is disentangled from that of postmodernism. This is a
useful distinction in the current context, since postmodernity is continuously used as
a sociological designation referring to the characteristics, experientially and
institutionally, of a late-capitalist, post-colonial and information society. For some
these changes are foundational enough to warrant a qualitative change in the way
the social world is theorised. In as much as such changes also extend to the
structure of subjectivity and the nature of self-understanding, theories like these are
informative for social psychology and its struggle to theorise the relation between the
individual and the social.
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Following this, postmodernism in its critical sense is explicitly related to the social
sciences. By way of discussing a general erosion of objectivity and rationality in the
philosophy of science, the position of the social sciences is explained as one where
concerns with epistemology and knowledge cannot be divorced from ideology and
power. The history of psychology in South Africa illustrates this clearly. Social
psychology developed in this country with a liberal agenda that seemingly served as
a corrective for a blatantly racist psychology. With its response to the problem of
race relations in terms of variables such as attitudes, stereotypes, and social
distance, it implicitly challenged Apartheid as a solution. South African social
psychology, with its focus on intergroup relations rather than theory building, was
also "more social" than its US counterpart. This is further accentuated by the later
popularity of the social identity approach in South Africa. The postmodernist critique,
however, claims that this liberalism also reveals infusion of knowledge with power.
It elevates the individual cognitive subject and abstracts it from its social
environment. As a case study, the history of social psychology in South Africa
illustrates both the limits of the traditional models already theoretically introduced in
the previous chapter, and the nature of postmodernism as a critique of the social
sciences.
While the previous section takes the postmodern on for its critique of the social
scientific and thus the social psychology project, the next section addresses
postmodern ism as a veh icle for reconstructive approaches to social psychology. The
focus is on whether it is possible and feasible to speak of the development of a
postmodern social psychology, and for this reason a few formulations of this idea will
be evaluated. Central to these formulations is a general dismissal of the traditional
psychological subject by describing the social as itself post-individual in its
organisation. People are understood to participate in the social no longer as
centralised experiential agents, and therefore the focus of analysis should be on the
social processes that support and sustain contingent forms of person-hood.
Unfortunately, such claims are often simply adopted from postmodern theory, and
not from independent studies of social life. It is argued that this inevitably limits the
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construction of a social psychology that is relevant to the South African context.
However, this is not indicative of a detached scholasticism in postmodern social
psychology. Postmodern theory itself is often colonised by disciplines that allow little
conceptual space for social psychology as a psychological contribution to the
understanding of social life.
In the final section, then, the question is asked whether it is possible to develop a
social psychology of the postmodern, rather than simply a postmodern social
psychology. This theme is discussed around instances of cultural and identity
politics in South Africa. It seems as if the study of identity and multiculturalism
requires more sophisticated accounts of how identities are embodied, sustained,
challenged and changed by social agents than is made available by postmodern
theories. The chapter therefore culminates in an appeal of sorts for a social
psychology that will have the conceptual tools necessary to address social issues in
the South African context. How such a social psychology might look will be the
theme of the next chapter.
3.2. The postmodern: conceptual clarification
Attempting to define the postmodern is perhaps ultimately a self-defeating project.
One reason for this is that the postmodern owes its currency precisely to a
realisation that signification is ultimately problematic; that it plays itself out in a
system where things and words are continuously severed from each other. Stated
somewhat differently, the postmodern conjures up a crisis of referential thinking, the
sort of thinking that is necessary to delineate the definition of a concept, that enables
theoretical reason, and that assumes the reflexive ability of the human being to
scientifically describe its own being. This section takes on the complexities and
fuzziness of discussions around the postmodern, attempting to set up at least a
provisional mould for discussing social psychology's entrapment in larger crises. In
order to do this, the postmodern is approached as a conglomerate of specific terms
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and their correlates, namely postmodernism (as opposed to modernism), and
postmodernity (as opposed to modernity).
It is in the guise of postmodernism that the postmodern has its widest popular
resonance. Functioning largely as a stylistic or aesthetic concept describing
characteristic features of developments in literature, the visual arts, music and
architecture, postmodernism signals a break with artistic modernism (Olivier, 1994).
Artistic modernism was characterised by various features, one being the privileged
position enjoyed by art and the artist as creative genius, providing an alternative
(aesthetic, moral) gaze into the nature of character, society and human relationships.
The conditions of possibility for this should be sought in the gradual differentiation
of the field of cultural production from other fields of production (Bourdieu, 1993).
Within this field the artist assumed the position of an agent of supposed creative
genius, providing modern artistic production with the further characteristics of an
avant-garde, the proliferation of new forms of artistic expression, and the priority of
artistic intention over standardised expressive form (Harvey, 1990).
Postmodernism, on the contrary, introduced new sensibilities about artistic
expression and the role of the artist. Although postmodernism is also characterised
by a proliferation of expressive form, its production is no longer tied to the intentions
of a creative genius orto the programmatic notions of an avant-garde (Olivier, 1994).
Works of art seem to defy coherent meanings and individual intentions according to
an arbitrary and regressive logic of perpetual stylistic recycling and pastiche. This
is accompanied by a deconstruction of the oppositions between "high" and "low"
culture, or "serious" and "popular" art, introducing an apparent acceptance of
consumerism and repetition 1. In this way postmodernism also undermines the
critical, constructive and moral posture of modernist art by retreating into a self-
referential world of surfaces without depth; making it at times irreverently playful, and
at times nihilistic, non-resolving and open-ended. To conclude, postmodernism
undermines the received notions of art itself with "a brutal aesthetics of squalor and
shock" (Eagleton, 1996, p. 64).
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If these briefly sketched stylistic and aesthetic distinctions exhausted all the
implications of the postmodern, it would be difficult to account for its insistent and
critical incorporation into the social sciences. Both have been elaborated, however,
to stretch beyond exclusive reference to artistic production and to address shifts in
the modes of cultural production more generally. In this sense modernism does not
only refer to artistic sensibility in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, but to the
whole system of values and beliefs which prepared the cultural environment in which
such conceptions of artistic production and appreciation, as one aspect of a
modernising world, were in the first place possible. This expanded conception of
modernism should be described against the background of what is referred to by
historians of Western culture and society as the eighteenth century Enlightenment.
Consider the following statement by Steven Seidman (1994) in this regard:
At the heart of the modern west is the culture of the Enlightenment.
Assumptions regarding the unity of humanity, the individual as the
creative force of society and history, the superiority of the west, the
idea of science as Truth, and the belief in social progress, have been
fundamental to Europe and the United States. (p. 1)
Building as it were on the European Renaissance and the Scientific Revolution, "an
educated elite, expressing supreme confidence in the power of reason, attempted
á rational analysis of European institutions and beliefs" (Perry, Chase, Jacob, Jacob,
& Von Laue, 1994, p. 403). In this regard the achievement of the natural sciences,
establishing a sense of rational order in the physical universe, was seen to enable
also a rational analysis, and in fact a rationalisation, of human institutions. The
Enlightenment age is characterised, amongst many other things, by the development
of important values and ideas such as the following: the undermining of the
legitimacy of traditional value-systems and cosmologies in favour of the certainties
of objective scientific inquiry based on the assumed rational capacities of the human
subject; the idea that society should be rationally ordered in terms of the
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institutionalisation of morality into a general rule of law; and the values of individual
freedom, liberty, equality and accompanying notions of human rights, institutionalised
in the idea of a nation-state functioning as a democracy.
If the notion of modernism is seen as a correlate to Enlightenment ideas and values
about the nature of the world and human subjectivity, modernity is often used to
describe the de facto societal and cultural changes that accompanied it. Briefly,
modernity can be described by mentioning the development of capitalism and market
economies, the industrialisation of human labour and economic activity, the process
of rapid urbanisation, the incredible achievements of science and technology and its
radical transformation of the life-world, the spread of democracy and nationalism,
and the bureaucratisation of the state and other large institutions. These features
refer primarily to modernity in an institutional sense, but it is just as important to keep
in mind the experiential dimension of life in such a context. Featherstone (1989, p.
199) in this regard views modernity "as a quality of modern life inducing a sense of
the discontinuity of time, the break with tradition, the feeling of novelty and sensitivity
to the ephemeral, fleeting and contingent nature of the present."
Such a description might go some way to capture life in the modern cosmopolitan
cities and urbanising areas of the early decades of this century, but it hides the fact
that no description of modernity can be limited to the effects it had on Western
society. An integral aspect of modern Western self-conception, fuelled by the
álready mentioned beliefs in human reason and the emancipatory effects of scientific
and economic development, was the idea of its superiority to the non-Western world
and its inhabitants. This provided the justification needed for the many practices of
Western expansionism, imperialism and colonialism. The subsequent transformation
and recruitment of various non-Western contexts into extensions of the modern world
produced societal and experiential features that were clearly different from those in
the Western centres, but that should still be studied and understood in terms of the
logic and practices of the project of modernity.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
62
It is in relation to this inflation of the concepts of modernism and modernity to
describe the features of the formation and global dissemination of Western culture,
and the inevitable idea of its own superiority, that also postmodernism expands its
original currency as relating only to artistic sensibility (Lyotard, 1984). From its onset
the project of modernity was a troubled one, and the seeds of discontent were very
often the ironic products of processes of modernisation itself. In this regard at least
three examples can be mentioned. First, the experience of cultural diversity added
to making Western values and assumptions relative, or less secure (Featherstone,
1995). Second, the World Wars contributed much to discredit Enlightenment ideals
by effectively shattering the idea that technological innovation would teleologically
lead to a state of world stability and prosperity. Third, colonialism did not lead to a
simple process of cultural assimilation. Rather, it ignited many violent struggles
against the hegemony of Western culture, providing force to arguments that see
modernity and modernism as intrinsically oppressive and exploitative of cultural
others (Horkheirner & Adorno, 1976).
These actual problems with the project of modernity concurred with challenges on
a more intellectual level. Relevant here is the rise of critical voices in philosophy and
cultural studies in direct opposition to Enlightenment reason. Postmodernism as a
cultural and intellectual disenchantment with the modern project is in this way rooted
in philosophies dating back to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, and draws together
recent philosophers such as Heidegger, Adorno, Derrida and Foucault (Olivier,
1994). All these figures were or are concerned with either deconstructing
metaphysics and Enlightenment reason to show its aporias and internal divisions
(Heidegger, Derrida), or with revealing the oppressive and disciplinary cultural logic
of specific practices of modernity (Foucault, Adorno f Therefore, in both artistic and
intellectual spheres postmodernism signals a sensibility of discontent, a crisis in the
moral foundations of modernism. In the realm of the social sciences, as will become
clear in the next section, this would erupt into a crisis of confidence that has an
epistemological and political foundation.
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The above paragraphs, however briefly, delineate the ways in which the interlocking
concepts of modernism, postmodernism and modernity will be used in this chapter
and the remainder of the study. The concept of postmodernity is a more difficult and
contested one in social theory (Bauman, 1992; Lash, 1990). Its problematic status
can be explained as a disagreement amongst social theorists about whether the
critical sensibility of postmodernism reveals a fundamental and discontinuous social
and cultural shift in the structure of Western society. Recall the description of the
centrality of Enlightenment ideals in Western society by Steven Seidman (1994) a
few pages earlier, and compare that to his following statement:
This culture is now in a state of crisis. Signs of cultural turmoil are
everywhere: the resurgence of religious fundamentalism, in the
declining authority of key social institutions, in the enfeeblement of
western political ideologies and parties, and in the cultural wars over
literary and aesthetic canons and paradigms of knowledge. A broad
social and cultural shift is taking place in western societies. (p. 1)
Antagonists to the idea of postmodernity claim that such shifts can still be explained
as outcomes of the modernising project, and do not necessarily indicate any
structural discontinuity. Defenders on the other hand want the notion to do precisely
such conceptual work. They argue that the social and cultural shifts taking place are
fundamental and discontinuous enough to warrant its description as a condition of
postrnodernlty (Harvey, 1989). In this way postmodernity is introduced to social
theory as the socio-cultural correlate on institutional and experiential level of
postmodernism, following the same pattern as the earlier discussion about the
relationship between modernity and modernism. This means that postmodernism,
both as a broad cultural and more specific intellectual climate, is not a contrary
sensibility forged only in the realm of ideas. It has to be discussed in the light of
material aspects of current trends in social and cultural life.
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What are the social and cultural changes that proponents of the notion of
postmodernity refer to? There are quite a few, but the following will give an
adequate indication of its intended empirical scope. First, there are presumed
economic changes. Traditional capitalism seems to develop into an age of post-
industrialism and consumerism. It is argued that the decentring of industry in this
sense creates pockets of existence where the primary principle of economic
participation is not based in production, but in consumption. Not only goods are
consumed; we find ourselves continually in an information society where images and
ideas attain great value. Secondly, there is the rapid development and acceleration
in the field of information technology. If we take theorists such as Vattimo (1992)
and Baudrillard (1995a) seriously, mass media and the Internet saturate of our lives
with other views and potentials, subverting the idea of reality itself.
As will become clear, postmodern attempts to redefine social psychology buys into
these perspectives quite strongly. Notions of postmodernity in fact provide a
paradigmatic instance of the social, leaving the discipline to formulate the way it will
study individual lives in these terms. Later in this chapter the question will be posed
whether the critical and reconstructive gains of this theoretical alliance opens social
psychology up or closes it to a study of South African instances of social change.
Sticking to the scheme at hand, in South Africa spheres of life that might be deemed
pre-modern, modernising, and already postmodern intersects in interesting ways.
Partly due to the political past of this country, these processes are further
corroborated by the country's re-entry into and embracing of the global economy.
It will become very relevant to reflect on how postmodern theory, imported as it is
from abroad, manages these intersections between different spheres of life.
Before moving on, one more feature of the postmodern and especially the notion of
postmodernity remains to be addressed. Are there distinguishable experiential
correlates to the social changes that supposedly characterise the condition of
postmodernity? Whether one accepts the idea of postmodernity as indicating
fundamental change or not, the basic experiential tenets of life in a consumer
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oriented, information saturated and culturally pluralising society is captured
particularly eloquently by Willie van der Merwe (1994a):
...(T)he distinctive existential impact of the informational, electronic
and mass-media revolution we are living through at the moment, with
its very real effects on people's experiences and perceptions of the
fundamental categories of time and space, the displacement or
sublimation of reality by a hyperreality or simulacrum of images within
a self-referential and self-perpetuating system of simulations, the
general loss of a sense of self-autonomy, belonging and an integrated
self-identity, an awareness of the relativity and locality of norms and
values, and accordingly a resurgence of interest, attachment and
allegiance to immediate localized communal identities, and the
paradoxical, simultaneously bewildering and exciting experience of
the continuous dispersal of meaning. (p. 194)
How these features play themselves out in the experience of different strata of the
South African population is an interesting social psychological question. But before
such a question can be answered, social psychology should be addressed once
more.
3.3. Knowledge and exploitation: locating science
What are the implications of all these descriptions and distinctions for social
psychology, and specifically on the problems in social psychology discussed thus
far? To answerthis question the social sciences, and in fact science as such, should
first be addressed in the light of the challenge of postmodernism. In this section it
will become clear that scientific activity is a (Western) cultural phenomenon, and that
postmodernism has indeed profound implications for its self-understandlnq". Social
psychology's crisis thus immediately is set within the context of a bigger one.
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3.3.1. Postmodemism and scientific reason
The postmodern critique of the Enlightenment addressed above challenges also the
scientific benchmarks of objectivity, rationality and the growth and accumulation of
knowledge. It reveals a scientific complicity with modernism and the modernising
project. When extended to the social sciences, this means at least two things. First,
social scientific knowledge claims cannot completely escape the charge of
epistemological relativism, making them not universal descriptions of an
independently existing reality but normative formulations of local values and
perceptions of reality. Second, social scientific knowledge production and
application emerge as integrally involved in the construction of modern cultural
forms, as well as its maintenance in diverse institutions and contexts (Doyal & Harris,
1986; Rosenau, 1992; Van Niekerk, 1992).
Before addressing the social sciences any further, it is useful to keep in mind that
postmodernism challenges science as such. In fact, the postmodern
problematisation of the natural sciences is a good place to start teasing out its
implications for a general critique of scientific reason. The natural sciences, as was
already indicated in the previous section, occupy a privileged position in modernist
discourses and in the project of modernity itself. Its method itself was thought to
provide grounding for a world-view free from religious dogma and mythological world
views, promising to liberate people from unquestioned authorities by providing the
appropriate procedures for attaining objective, universal knowledge. As Rosenau
(1992) expresses it:
Historically, science attacked the arbitrary authority of church and
monarch, both of which based their legitimacy on theology. Modern
sciences established its reputation on objectivity, rigorous procedures
of inquiry, the material rather than the metaphysical. Science, in turn,
came to claim its own monopoly of truth. Its authority expanded and
superseded that held by its more irrational and arbitrary antecedents.
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(p.9)
The traditional image of science as one of accumulation and progression further
coincided with the teleological idea of a linear history. As such, science was seen
as the perfect vehicle for the constitution and organisation of the modern world. This
followed from its undeniable ability to transform the world technologically, as well as
from its perceived capacity to provide the model that would also make the scientific
study of human institutions and behaviour possible. The cultural standing of the
natural sciences today, with its technological tokens in abundance all around us, is
a testimony of its success on many levels. But if the postmodern sensibility cannot
deny the almost complete colonisation of the world by science and technology, it
certainly challenges the modernist assumptions that underlie and accompany them.
For one, even though the traces of scientific enterprise are everywhere, it never
produced a world free of conflict, struggle and poverty. Even more important is the
realisation that the natural sciences themselves do not comply with the positivist
ideals it held forth as model for the social sciences. Postmodernism reveals these
to be romanticised images encapsulated in an ideal perspective that is ultimately out
of touch with the reality of scientific practice, institutions and outcomes.
Indeed, 20th century philosophy of science was characterised by much closer
attention to the reality of scientific activity, and started to acknowledge both the
subjective investment of the scientist and the influence of scientific ownership and
ihstitutionalisation on the nature of knowledge claims. One of the first to register this
erosion of an ideal image of scientific rationality in the natural sciences was Karl
Popper (1980), who responded as philosopher especially to developments in
theoretical physics: the work of Albert Einstein and later quantum mechanics made
it very clear that natural scientific observations could not be disentangled from
theoretical perspective and the process of measurement. But while Popper was
certainly not a relativist in any postmodern sense, laterfigures such as Thomas Kuhn
(1970) and Paul Feyerabend (1975) entertained thoroughly relativist positions on the
growth and production of knowledge. Nigel Pleasants (1997) provides a good
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description of the corrosive effect of these developments on the current image of the
natural sciences:
Natural science is no longer seen to provide certain knowledge, nor
formulate universalistic laws from which its explanatory and predictive
powers supposedly derive; and its success is seen to depend more
on its social and institutional organization than conformity to a special
methodological logic. (p. 145)
In short, rather than providing the benchmark for truth and certainty scientific activity
may itself be studied and situated sociologically and anthropologically. It carries with
it all the concerns, preconceptions and structures of perception characterising
Western culture, rendering its rewards variable, historically contingent, and open to
ideological concerns of all kinds. This vulnerability derives first from the regulative
impact of institutionalisation on the activities of scientific communities. Scientific
questions are not only dreamt up by scientists, but are often driven by the concerns
of specific institutions, such as the military, governance, health care or education.
More important to a postmodern reading, however, is the constitutive impact of
historically and culturally specific frameworks or paradigms on scientific knowledge
claims. Kuhn's (1970) conception of the scientific paradigm provides the classic
articulation of how historically and culturally specific preconceptions contribute to the
constitution of scientific objects, objectives and subsequent knowledge claims".
Consider Van Niekerk's (1992) description of the Kuhnian paradigm:
A paradigm is for Kuhn a disciplinary matrix or research tradition that
has its origin in certain key examples of scientific work, resting on
implicit, often very tentatively delineated conceptual, methodological
and ontological assumptions. Such paradigmatic scientific
achievements provide, for a particular time and within a particular field
of enquiry, the models for what are deemed scientific problems,
research techniques and possible solutions. A paradigm is not a set
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of clearly articulated rules, values or procedures, but rather a field of
reference made up of implicit assumptions to which a community of
inquirers have committed themselves and are accepted by them as
authoritative. (p. 62, my translation)
To summarise, epistemological relativism affects the integrity of science regardless
whether it studies natural or social phenomena. The natural sciences cannot and
do not provide the blueprint for objective knowledge claims. Similarly, the social
sciences are not exempt from ideological investment only by adhering to positivism.
The discussion will now return to the challenge of postmodernism in the social
sciences specifically, since there are important differences that set it apart from the
natural sciences. The social sciences are by definition not concerned with "natural"
phenomena, but with phenomena always bearing imprints of human activity (such
as scientific enquiry itself). This entails that not only the perspectives and
methodological logic guiding the social sciences are open to historical readings, but
indeed the objects of its enquiry itself. One way to illustrate this clearly is to discuss
it as a problem of participation (Pleasants, 1997).
As is clear in Kuhn's understanding ofthe natural sciences, sociological accounts of
natural scientific practice focuses on the effects of the participation of the researcher
in a community of researchers, guided by a paradigm. Such participation has
constitutive effects on knowledge production. However, in the natural sciences there
still exists an ontological distance between the scientific subject and its objects of
study. In order words, the subject does not participate as such in the realm of its
objects. The social scientist cannot claim a similar ontological distance: she is faced
with the problem of a double participation. Not only does she participate in a
community of scholars and the institutionalised structures of her discipline; she also
participates with or in the objects that she studies. In other words, no one studies
social life and experience without having lived and experienced social life.
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One of the curious effects of this is that social scientific knowledge claims are often
reflexively fed back into society, so that object fields start to resemble social scientific
discourse - rather than the other way around. Anthony Giddens (1984) has shown
this process at work in the way theories of society historically led to changes in the
nature and organisation of society itself. He refers to this process as a double
hermeneutic, and it is a clear indication of the power the social sciences have to
shape and pattern social structures and social experience. Social life is never static.
It changes over time, and the social sciences contribute to these changes. This
constitutive power of social scientific knowledge claims makes it necessary to
address them not only as forms of Western ethno-theory, but in the context of
ideology; understood here as representations and practices that substantiate
relations of power in a given social system.
In this regard postmodernism realises that social scientific objects do not simply have
their cross-cultural correlates in other environments under different names. Social
science, having as it does its roots in modernist forms of social organisation,
presents us not with democratically constructed knowledge claims, but with
institutionalised and programmatic vocabularies provided by specialists. Scientific
specialists are positioned in delineated sites of knowledge production that take the
form of disciplined fields, and the vocabularies they contribute to are geared towards
the regulation and construction of cultural forms. The focus of postmodernism in this
regard is thus to reveal the complicity of the social sciences in the regulation of
ihdividual lives and social groups for the specific purposes of modern societal
organisation; in contexts such as organised education and labour. In other words,
the practices of the social sciences are not dislocated as much as it is located by
postmodernism.
3.3.2. Postmodernism and the psychological sciences
The obvious question now is how postmodernism locates the psychological sciences
in particular? What does it say about individualism that extends the discussion
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beyond a review of social psychology's own metatheoretical choices, as was
focussed on in the previous chapter? Central to the postmodern critique of the
psychological sciences in general, and social psychology in particular, is the premise
that its individualism coincides with the validation of individualism in Western culture
at large. This validation has little to do with the historical importance of persons, but
with the organisational and developmental requirements of the modernising world.
The processes of modernisation already referred to in the previous section (such as
the birth of democracy, capitalism, and notions of freedom and responsibility)
assume an active human agent possessing an individualised subjectivity, and
psychology provided the vocabulary and techniques to enforce and regulate this.
This means that psychology's individualism was never a completely innocent
mirroring of a local (Western) self-understanding or ethno-theory. Psychologists
were situated as the specialists producing a particular subjectivity, and in this way
earned their validated social position precisely by contributing to the installment and
extension of social power. This is illustrated in the following account by the
prominent sociologist of the psychological sciences, Nikolas Rose (1989a):
The vocabularies of the psychological sciences have made two
distinct but related contributions to social powers over the last
century. First they provided the terms which enabled human
subjectivity to be translated into new languages of government, of
schools, prisons, factories, the labour market and the economy.
Second, they constituted subjectivity and intersubjectivity as
themselves possible objects of rational management, in providing the
languages for speaking of intelligence, development, mental hygiene,
adjustment and maladjustment, family relations, group dynamics and
the like. (p. 106)
It is clear from the above that what is spoken about and brought into the reach of
government by psychology is first of all a Western individual, with particular focus on
those of them who inhabit the urbanised Western cultural centres. This interrelation
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between psychology's subject and the subject of the modernising world at the time
when psychology emerged as a discipline is further elaborated in the following
extract from Stainton Rogers, Stenner, Gleeson and Stainton Rogers (1996). They
argue that the Western construction of the person was already in place as a site of
political intervention, and that psychology owes its development to its conceived
power to provide the means of such interventions:
A psychology which emerges within Modernism can then easily be
seen to have laid upon these new citizen-individuals a similar set of
psychological essences. Thus the person was held to be, as a self-
contained individual, inhabited by, or possessed of, personality,
attitudes, intelligence - just as they were by rights and
responsibilities. In this way psychology never (as it is purported to
have done) took on the task of discovering these traits in more or less
accurate ways. Rather, its task was to recover or uncover them, into
an area of governmentability - where they already operated as
specific, political constructions of the person-citizen. (p. 28)
However, the proximity between modern socio-political organisation and
psychology's investment in the individual has its most obdurate implications not in
Western societies, but in the Third World (Gilbert, 1986, 1989; Holdstock, 1981). If
restricted to an epistemological discussion postmodernism would seem to imply that
Knowledge claims generated in Western contexts are not valid in Third World
contexts. In terms of the arguments already presented however, it is clear that
postmodernism claims it is not validity but regulation that is often sought after in the
social sciences. In the Third World, due to the nature of its political relationship with
the West, issues like the regulation of people and the politics of citizenship had
always been and still are problematic areas. As is the case with other social
sciences, the transportation of psychological knowledge and practices to the Third
World must be seen as part and parcel of Western expansionism, imperialism and
colonialism (Nicholas & Cooper, 1990)6. To state it crudely, its primary concern was
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not with the empowerment or even the understanding of indigenous peoples, but
with their administration and positioning in the colonial system. Consider the
following statement by Bulhan (1993):
Psychological research in Africa has had a scandalous genesis. And
its genesis was indeed colonial. That the study of African psychology
is to this day markedly monopolized by Euro-Americans is not so
much a consequence of a genuine interest in the African as in fact
another working of colonialism. (p. 1)
Colonialism of course does not have only one history. From a South African
perspective it is necessary to discuss psychology with explicit reference to Apartheid
(Rex, 1984; Webster, 1986; Welsh, 1975). Critical psychologists agree that
psychology in South Africa reflected at many different levels the "maintenance,
elaboration and justification of apartheid" (Jansen, 1991, p. 3). Apartheid involved
the implementation of policies that enforced the formalised segregation of people in
terms of their racial characteristics, but its development cannot be seen as simply
caused by racism. South Africa experienced a process of rapid modernisation in the
early twentieth century, and these processes gave impetus to the institutionalisation
of a racism that had already existed. In order to understand the role of psychology
in this process it is useful to refer to the rise of industrial capitalism and the ideology
of Afrikaner Nationalism in this country.
While there are interesting debates about whether racist or capitalist ideologies were
most important in the development of Apartheid, this study accepts that it was an
outcome of many social forces. It was the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand,
especially, that fuelled the development of industrial capitalism and a rapid
urbanisation in this country (Van Onseien, 1982). Although disrupted by the Angio-
Boer South African War at the turn of the century, these processes picked up once
again, and by the 1920s South Africa was an established industrial force. The
industries, and especially the mines, created a huge need for cheap manual labour.
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Up to that point a large number of white South Africans were farmers, and many
black people either lived in rural areas on self-governed homesteads or were
working on white farms. For various reasons such as drought and the promise of
cash earnings in the cities, white farmers and black migrant workers began to satisfy
this need for industrial labour (Fullagar & Paizis, 1986; Louw, 1997).
Urbanisation and industrial labour presented social problems of their own. First,
people not fit for work due to disabilities had to be detected and regulated. The
government for example passed a Mental Disorders Act in 1916 and started
providing facilities for people that were thought of as mentally disordered and
defective (Louw & Foster, 1991). But this was a small problem compared to the so-
called "Poor White" question. In the early decades of the century a growing section
of the urban underclass was white and Afrikaans. This rebelled against the then
already firmly entrenched ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism, and also posed the
threat of a class alliance between these white people and their black socio-economic
counterparts. A huge amount of energy had been invested in the 1930s and 1940s
to address the "Poor White" question, with considerable input from the social and
human sciences (Louw, 1986).
The above is perhaps an arbitrary snippet from the political history of South Africa,
but it serves as a useful framework for understanding that it were socio-political
concerns such as these that provided the space in South Africa for the importation
óf psychology. This importation was initiaily spearheaded by the practice of mental
testing. Consider the depiction by Don Foster (1993):
Psychology as a separate discipline was only established in the
1920s. The impetus of its development came from the rise of mental
testing and concern about the 'menace' presented by the 'discovery'
- from about 1913 - of a category of people known as mental
defectives. It was a time of intense class-ordering in the new South
African union and the great political worry at the time concerned a
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potential class alignment between the emerging black and white
proletariat in the cities. Thus problems of class-ordering, labour,
'race'-thinking (informed by social Darwinism), mental deficiency and
crime were all intertwined. (p.68)
Psychology in South Africa immediately started providing knowledge that facilitated
the governing of the black person. Psychological testing, "so it was argued, provided
the possibility of scientifically ordering the population of a country, rationalizing
allocation of resources and opportunities" (Louw, 1997, p. 238). More specifically,
psychological testing seemingly provided proof that black people were mentally
inferior to Europeans. This helped to legitimate racist practices such as imposing
wage differences between white and black labourers, since black people were not
seen as capable of performing skilled labour. It also eventually legitimated the
provision of inferior schooling and training systems for black people, supposedly
necessitated by their inferior intellectual abilities. Quite clearly then the belief in the
accuracy of knowledge attained from the measurement of black intelligence was not
a misguided attempt to know more about black people. It was, for that time, a
sufficient rationale for the establishment of a governable black subject and for a
racially segregated society. Consequently, there was no real investment in the black
individual as individual. They simply did not matter enough, and the generalised
psychometric figure was sufficient to regulate the development of South African
society.
These remarks clearly indicate the political investment of early psychology in South
African society, but do not specifically implicate the notion of individualism. In fact,
the regulation of black people was first crudely collectively focussed, with too little
investment in their individual mobility and political and economic participation to give
individualism power as an ideology in this context. Before long, however, this would
change. From the early 1960s, and especially during the 1970s, the regulation of
black people required not only intervention in labour and education, but in the
regulation of a mounting resistance to Apartheid as well. Black resistance, especially
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in the guise of the Black Consciousness movement of the 1970s, emerged as a
powerful attempt to create an alternative black identity or subjectivity. While
government response to the rising resistance was primarily militant, basically
creating a police state, it was also accompanied by other more ideologically driven
strategies such as beginning to support the fostering of a black middle-class. The
necessity to invoke individualism and the role of psychology in this regard is
explained by Jansen (1991):
(T)he black middle class would develop a vested interest in the
capitalist formation and support it politically. An essential aspect of
this was the production of black intellectuals who would organize the
social hegemony of the black middle class - hence the importance of
education. The new education strategy of the ruling classes was
encompassed in the De Lange Report in 1981. The most important
functions of (educational) psychologists, psychometric testing and
counselling/guidance, were central in the meritocratic educational
system envisaged in the report. These functions were to give
'scientific' flavour to the ideology of individual merit. (p. 62)
Jansen (1991) argues that if black people bought into the idea of individual merit it
would have defused challenges to a system that oppressed people as a collectivity.
But if one accepts the importance of psychology in this regard - being itself now the
guardian of that illusive idea, merit - it is further also understandable that the
intensification of this ideological strategy would create the desire to specifically
produce black psychologists (Jansen, 1991). In a critical postmodern sense such
people were elected to become the guardians of a Western model and way of being,
and of its appropriate forms of subjuqation", They were envisioned as more than the
guardians of merit; they were to be the very personification of merit itself:
The black psychologists were part of and were intended to reproduce
a black middle class committed to 'free enterprise'. Psychology had
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been singled out because it carried individualism and subjectivism to
the extreme by throwing the person back onto her/his own feelings,
values and attitudes, while the social context was ignored. (p.63)
At this stage it is important to state that this history of political complicity cannot be
explained away as a case of the abuse of knowledge. In other words, racism in
psychology is not reducible to the racist intentions of a number of South African
psychologists. Even though there were and are cases of this as well, the issue here
is with a more fundamental complicity between psychology as a science and the
structure of the Apartheid society. Psychology is described as involved in the
reproduction of relations of power in social spheres. The naturalisation of such
power relations hide specific Western concerns, of which individualism is an
important ingredient. The postmodern critique thus argues that traditional Western
psychology, due to its fundamental individualism, will always assist in the
reproduction of social power - even when the intention of the researcher is contrary
to this. Psychology provides the researcher with a frame of reference that cannot
fully register the impact of the social.
These claims can also be illustrated with reference to the history of psychology in
South Africa. The use of psychological knowledge for racist ends has always been
challenged by a liberal humanist tradition in the discipline. It is further precisely this
tradition that provided the context for the development of social psychology in South
Africa. Liberal humanism in South African psychology was academically
institutionalised mainly at English-speaking universities, and can be traced back
professionally to the establishment in 1961 of two different psychological societies
-divided overthe inclusion of black members (Louw, 1987). Since liberal humanism
relies on the notion of the primacy of the individual - in this way itself making an
important ideological contribution to the development of capitalism and democracy
- it remains a problematic stance in contexts of political oppression.
Before turning to the emergence of themes in South African psychology that can be
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described as social psychological, consider as an instance of the problematic nature
of liberalism the work of Simon Biesheuvel (1943,1952, 1962). This psychologist
is often regarded as a champion of liberalism and anti-racism in South African
psychology, and he opposed very strongly the scientific merit of studies that
supposedly demonstrated the intellectual inferiority of black people (Louw & Foster,
1991 )8. This he did by claiming that psychometric tests were not cross-culturally
standardised and therefore could not be used to ground such claims (Biesheuvel,
1943). While he was correct in this claim he did not challenge the possibility and
meaning of comparison as such, or in any way reflected on the inherent racist
investments of the testing empire. This belief in scientific rationality and blindness
to the institutional embedded nature of all knowledge claims is rendered especially
problematic when Biesheuvel's own scientific practice and position is brought into the
picture:
From 1941 - 1946, Simon Biesheuvel, regarded as one of South
Africa's foremost psychologists, was an officer in the Aptitude Test
Section of the South African Air Force. This intellectual was also the
founder and, since 1946, the director of the NIPR. It was this
hegemonic apparatus's function to provide selection services for
(white) personnel in the army, for (white) administrative trainees in the
iron and steel industries, and for (African) mineworkers in the gold
mining industry. (Jansen, 1991, p. 59)
The NIPR referred to above was the National Institute for Personnel Research.
Through the development of many psychological tests (e.g. the General Adaptability
Battery), it pursued the quest for productivity amongst the South African workforce
(Fullager & Paizis, 1986). But the application of knowledge here is clearly equally
regulative and racist. Stating it differently, it carries little weight to say that blacks are
not necessarily intellectually inferior when the practice and context of psychological
testing simply echo and corroborates a racist social environment. It is a blindness
to social structure that is endemic of psychology's individualism and is central to any
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postmodern critique of the discipline.
Did the liberal tradition in South African social psychology give rise to the same
forms of social amnesia? The previous chapter argued that even the most deliberate
attempts in social psychology to make the discipline more social failed whenever the
discipline held on to a (cognitive) psychological metatheory. This indeed plays itself
out in the history of social psychology in South Africa. As was already indicated,
social psychology took root in South Africa within a general liberal framework. While
the dominant political ideologies saw the solution of intergroup tension in enforced
racial segregation, liberal psychologists deemed it necessary to address (especially
white) attitudes and prejudices. This liberal approach to intergroup processes led to
the importation of social psychological themes to South Africa, even if not the
importation of social psychology as a theoretical discipline (Louw & Foster, 1991;
Foster, 1999).
The debt in this regard was initially to traditional US approaches, a pattern of
influence that was corroborated in the 1950s by the professional visit of two very
prominent US social psychologists, Gordon Allport and Thomas Pettigrew (Louw &
Foster, 1991). This visit firmly established the study of attitudes and contact theory
as important concerns of South African social psychology, to be accompanied
especially by research guided by the theory of the authoritarian personality. The
following paragraph by Foster (1993) is informative of these developments:
Apart from early work on mental testing, psychological research has
been dominated by three areas: race attitudes, the authoritarian
personality, and the contact hypothesis. All three areas are informed
by a single, broadly liberal framework: the 'race-relations' position
which postulates prejudice as the cause of the problem. In this
framework relations between groups are assumed to be determined,
or at least shaped, by the attitudes one 'race' group holds towards
other 'race' groups. (p. 70)
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Quite clearly then social psychology in South Africa immediately shared the
individualism of its US counterpart. This did not go unnoticed, especially as many
influential South African social psychologists were well aware of the European
challenges to traditional social psychology discussed in the previous chapter. During
the 1980s then, the crisis in social psychology became a crisis also of social
psychology in South Africa. As was indicated in the previous chapter, this crisis
challenged social psychological metatheory without problematising its status as a
Western cultural practice. The continued importation of social psychology from
Western to non-Western academic markets was therefore not itself made
problematic, leading to social psychologists in this country refashioning the discipline
in terms of answers to the crisis created elsewhere - with developments happening
especially around the tradition of IGT (Foster & Louw-Potgieter, 1991; Campbell,
1993).
The previous chapter presented the argument that IGT remains caught up in a
perpetual and circular recycling of individualism, and that this seemingly
accompanies its insistence on being a cognitive social psychology. The value of
postmodernism in this instance is that it breaks away from purely metatheoretical
concerns and challenges science rather as a vantage point in the elaboration of
modernist social forms. No matter how contrary to these the intentions of IGT's
proponents are, its insistence on intra-individual cognitive explanations has the
following effect: it corroborates the political primacy of the individual, and this, even
though in line with liberalism, blinds social psychology to the real mechanisms that
reproduce social order. The South African social psychologist Don Foster (1993)
can subsequently critique IGT for taking
ideologically constituted 'groups' as unquestioned givens, and in so
doing assists in reproducing such groups. Second, the assumed
causal chain, that mental entities in peoples' heads cause subsequent
group relations, is questionable. Third, the 'race-prejudice' paradigm
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tends to ignore factors such as ideology, politics and class. (p. 71)
These critical remarks clearly indicate a theoretical neglect of the social. By
stressing the political primacy of the individual it is indeed possible to maintain that
cognitive social psychology, like other expressions of cognitivism, functions as
ideology (Sampson, 1981). Its corroboration of individualism provides the rhetorical
structure needed for accounts that place the blame for the lack of social and political
mobility on individual victims of political inequality and oppression themselves. This
is a very dangerous situation, and it is unfortunate when a social psychology that
desires to address these societal ills falls prey to the continuing contribution of its
knowledge claims to the justification of oppression. Unfortunately, neither social
cognition nor IGT can be overlooked on these charges (Henriques, 1984; Michael,
1989).
This critique can be illustrated with a South African example. Susan Lea (1996)
conducted an interesting piece of research into explanations and justifications for
racism at the University of Cape Town. She used psychology students who were
knowledgeable of social cognition research and IGT as interviewees, and asked
them to discuss the issue of race with her. In this manner she focussed on these
social psychological traditions as explanatory systems away from their formal
scientific settings. Her results showed that people found it possible to justify certain
racist claims by making use of these social psychological ideas. In other words, it
became quite clear that the science of social psychology, and specifically these
theoretical traditions, "continues to provide racists with arguments which support the
existence of races and the legitimation of racism" (Lea, p. 183).
In this section postmodernism was applied to social psychology in a critical sense.
It should be clear that postmodernism is not itself a theory or a body of propositions.
What was brought to bear on social psychology was a general sense of crisis in
scientific self-understanding, usually extending into a realisation that science does
not function independent of politics. Rather, the very structure of its rationality is
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geared towards the normative rationalisation of forms of life. As part of the
psychological sciences social psychology was formed as a discipline around the
notion of an individualised psychological subject, and in this way served the
regulation of individuals in the formation of the modern world. In a Third World
contexts, namely SouthAfrica, the psychologicalsciences contributed unequivocally
to the maintenance and justification of Apartheid. However, postmodernism does
not only problematise the abuse of knowledge by scientists who have racist ideas.
It attempts to politically locate scientific rationality as such. In this regard it was
shown that the critiques levelled against social cognition and IGT in the previous
chapter readily extends to the reproduction of social inequalities. Its individualism,
rooted in its insistence on an intra-individual cognitive economy, has ideological
effect.
This leaves the following questions unanswered: what should remain of social
psychology? Does it make sense to still insist on a social psychology? What
happens to the individual in the analysis of the social world? Questions such as
these will now be addressed.
3.4. Social psychology without a subject
The confrontation with postmodernism in social psychology is revealing ofthings that
the mainstreamwould do well to pay attention to. For one, theoretical and empirical
languages are never absolutely transparent and value-free in their depictions of a
supposed reality. Indeed, they are often intricately wound upwith the socio-political
naturalisation and ideological reproduction of culturally and historically specific
vocabularies as reality. For the scholar who takes more than merely a passing
interest in these challenges it becomes necessary to indicate how social psychology
should develop to get away from its metatheoretical and political problems. In the
light of what has been said thus far, confrontations with postmodernism should
ideally take the discipline in a post-individualist direction.
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In itself, however, such a statement is rather vacuous. It is unclear if it would mean
that social psychology should dispense with the concept of the individual altogether,
and what exactly the repercussions of such a step would be on epistemological and
empirical levels. On the other hand, if it does not compel social psychology in this
direction, it certainly necessitates a complete re-conceptualisation and repositioning
of the individual subject in its enquiries. This is an equally difficult and uncharted
task and introduces the relation between the individual and the social with renewed
force, rather than alleviating it. It seems that whatever direction is taken makes a
pressing question of whether it still makes sense to speak of a social psychology in
contexts where we wish to address the nature and knowledge of personal lives in
social worlds.
How than can the notion of the postmodern be used to reconstruct social
psychology? A first step towards answering this is to pause for a moment at
answers already provided by other social psychologists. For quite a few eminent
critical voices in the discipline postmodernism serves now also as a springboard for
the formulation of non-individualist and politically challenging approaches to social
psychology (Dowd, 1991; Liu & Liu, 1997; Roiser, 1997). Consequently there now
circulate a range of recognisable postmodern trajectories that supposedly provide
the shape for a critical refashioning, rather than merely a deconstruction, of social
psychology's disciplinary identity.
However, it is precisely when postmodernism is used to reconstruct social
psychology and so exceeds its critical guise that it becomes problematic.
Postmodernism is now a powerful cultural signifier, and its currency extends to nearly
all contexts of critical thinking and cultural self-reflection, whether these are
academically sanctioned or not. Since it is so pervasive in its critical posture, as well
as being generative for the elaboration of new understandings of society and human
interaction, it becomes difficult to address the limits of its applicability in very
circumscribed theoretical discussions - such as the nature of the relation between
the individual and the social in social psychology. This inflated currency should alert
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
84
social psychologists to be critical and to evaluate the applicability of the
reconstructive vocabularies they owe to traditions of postmodernism.
What makes this even more difficult is the fact that social psychology does not enter
the debate about postmodernism on terms that are equal with many other
disciplines. Simply stated, some disciplines lay more claim to the concept than
others - they are so positioned in the academic tield that their formulation and use
of postmodern vocabularies have greater authorial power than social psycholoqy",
Social psychology's lesser stake in this regard relates to its being part of the
psychological sciences, a phenomenon that will be addressed in greater detail in the
next section. The effect of this is very often a disproportionate amount of critical
reflection on social psychology compared to other disciplines that also develop in
postmodern directions. In fact, critical social psychologists often subscribe rather
uncritically to the authority of especially philosophical and sociological interpretations
of the postmodern, using the formulations they offer of experience and social life to
till up the void they see in their own discipline. This phenomenon will be very clear
in the few trajectories that will be described below, and sets the next section up as
a reformulation of the relation between social psychology and the postmodern.
Susan Condor (1997) captures the power and even vehemence of critical self-
reflection in social psychology very clearly in the following extract:
Psychology, with its history of racism, sexism, heterosexism, with its
insistence on the ultimate reality of the self-contained individual, with
its technologies for the scrutiny and the self-regulation of the
individual subject, with its modernist pretensions to scientific
expertise, is not a platform from which we wish to speak. (p. 112)
But social psychology, or so the postmodern sensibility will have us know, leave us
with less than a platform from which to speak. It also leaves us with very little left to
say about individual and collective life in the context of contemporary patterns of
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social (re- )organisation and change. For many social psychologists postmodernism
provides itself as an alternative gaze, one that accumulates from available theoretical
traditions a vocabulary that replaces the seemingly redundant remnants of traditional
social psychology. It is in these contexts that some critics claim that postmodern
discourses in themselves "capture more of what is happening in social interaction
and experience than academic social psychology" (Parker, 1989a, p. 136), resulting
from "a growing boredom with current psychological knowledge" (Kvale, 1992a, p.
10).
The elaboration of postmodern trajectories for social psychology nearly always takes
as point of departure the supposed erosion of the legitimacy of an essentialist
ontology of the individual person. As Steinar Kvale (1992b) asserts, the "question
arises as to the status of psychology as the science of the individual when the
individual has been dethroned from the centre of the world" (p. 40). What should be
clear is that this erosion is more than an epistemological challenge to social
psychology: it sees the erosion of individual subjectivity, the idea of a self-contained
psychological subject, as an effect of historical changes in the structure of Western
culture and society. Just as social psychology developed as a disciplinary apparatus
that had to contribute to the installment and regulation of the form of subjectivity
required by the development of industrial and democratic states, it now loses its
value precisely due to comparable changes that require less unified and self-
enclosed ways of being (Henriques, Hallway, Venn, Walkerdine, & Urwin, 1984). In
óther words, the figure of the Western individual that so plagued the development
of social psychology is not simply exposed for being culturally relative; it is also seen
as historically under threat in its own contexts of creation. The social psychologist
Edward Sampson (1989) describes the implications of this realisation for social
psychology in the following manner:
...(S)tudying the individual makes sense under the historical
conditions of modernism, in which the individual became the central
unit and organizing principle of society ... It is my contention that the
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age of individualism has already moved off centre stage for Western,
industrialized societies and is rapidly being replaced by a more
functional unit. Quite simply, understanding the individual qua
individual is no longer relevant to understanding human life. (p. 916)
Leaving aside for now the more functional unit of analysis that Sampson alludes to,
it is clear that he agrees that the crisis of social psychology should be redefined as
"a crisis of the problematic nature of the self in the contemporary (post) modern
world" (Dowd, 1991, p. 196). Social psychology should take heed of the nature of
the changes affecting the postmodern world and align its own practices with these.
However, since the changes are so often seen as ending the era of the individual,
and since social psychology is understood as existing by grace of a social system
structured around an individualised agency, some critical scholars claim that it
cannot align to these changes and remains a useful practice. Such social
psychologists re-adily claim that the concerns of social psychology "may just as well
be carried out by other disciplines, such as anthropology, literary criticism,
communication and media research" (Kvale, 1992b, p. 47). These disciplines are
more relevant, simply because they do not depend upon the notion of the individual.
As far as this registers as a developmental trajectory for social psychology it might
be referred to, in the words of Susan Condor (1997), as "emigration fantasies". The
place to be doing valuable social studies is elsewhere.
More creative perhaps is a trajectory one may refer to as "experiential
democratisation". According to Sampson (1991 )forexample, the postmodern social
psychologist should come to terms with the fact that her discipline provides no
universal descriptions of human nature. Rather, it circulates culturally specific
notions and leaves uncharted many other legitimate formulations of human nature
and forms of self-understanding. What is more, these other models of the person,
so to speak, are not only marginalised and ignored in social psychology, but in the
cultural texts and practices that reproduce Western society at large. These claims
relate to the realisation in the previous section that social psychology owed the
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relative stability and rationality of its knowledge claims to its complicity with
reproductive social power.
Sampson (1991) continues to say that social psychology should set itself up with a
radically new epistemological and political posture. It should direct itself at those
places where groups, cultures and subcultures resist the theoretical models that are
imposed on them, and assert the integrity of their own experience. Of course, there
are many such groupings, not only non-Western: women, homosexuals and the
disabled are but a few of the marginalised within Western society itself. The
involvement of social psychology here should not be in the service of truth but in the
service of change. This means that social psychology will not formulate expert
knowledge claims, but rather function as the midwife for the stories and narratives
that make up the diversity of cultures and that had hitherto been structurally denied
recognition by society.
Susan Condor (1997) summarises this approach in the following way: "The task for
Western psychologists would no longer be to inform other people about the 'facts'
of their psychology, but rather to analyse the processes by which indigenous
constructions of self function in the life of the community" (pp. 114 - 115). In other
words, a postmodern social psychology concerns itself not with knowledge as the
search for elusive universals, but with knowledge as local achievements in world-
and self-making. Politically speaking the epistemological and empirical task of the
social psychologists is to "give voice", a gesture that means social psychology
literally becomes again an (open) platform from which to speak. As Sampson (1991)
expresses it himself, social psychology undergoes
a kind of epistemological or experiential democraticization: that is, an
effort to democraticize the bases of human self-understanding by
establishing a greater equality of 'voice' in setting forth the very terms
by which human experience, knowledge and meaning are framed and
understood. (p. 275)
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A trajectory that relates closely to the above can be described as "experiential
transformation". This approach acknowledges that the form of individual life is
deeply rooted in contemporary social conditions and processes. Where modernity
fixed our sense of identity in individualist vocabularies and practices, postmodernity
somehow changes the experiential conditions that inform our sense of self and
identity, because it transforms the life-world in ways that concretely destabilises the
unitary individual being of a passing era. No longer can the stuff of psychology
(emotions, intentions, personality) be seen as unitary processes issuing forth from
a consciousness that exists prior to culture or forms of social relatedness more
generally.
According to some social psychologists, and the most notable here is certainly
Kenneth Gergen, this does not demolish social psychology but rather present it with
a different task. Gergen (1991) begins by analysing the nature of changes that
characterise the postmodern world with regard to human self-understanding and
experience. For his analysis he draws extensively from developments in information
technology. Because things such as electronic mail and air travel make it
increasingly easy to maintain multitudes of relationships and other media such as
television and the Internet make us always more vulnerable to meanings and
practices other than our own, we are saturated by others and by the knowledge that
our ways of life are very relative and contingent. The social and cultural frontiers that
encapsulate our experiences and sense of self are shifted further back:
...(S)ocial saturation brings with it a general loss in our assumption of
true and knowable selves. As we absorb multiple voices, we find that
each "truth" is relativized by our simultaneous consciousness of
compelling alternatives. We come to be aware that each truth about
ourselves is a construction of the moment, true only for a given time
and within certain relationships. (Gergen, 1991, p. 16)
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Consequently, we are also presented with the possibility of the self or of identity as
a personal and reflexive project, something not prefabricated, but made up in
relationship with others. The important fact for Gergen is that this possibility is the
experiential correlate of a new socio-historical phase: that of postmodernity. He
does not shy away from postulating that social psychologists should now study a
new form of consciousness, namely the postmodern consciousness:
With the spread of postmodern consciousness, we see the demise of
personal definition, reason, authority, commitment, trust, the sense of
authenticity, sincerity, belief in leadership, depth of feeling, and faith
in progress. In their stead, an open slate emerges on which persons
may inscribe, erase, and rewrite their identities as the ever-shifting,
ever-expanding, and incoherent networks of relationships invites or
permits. (Gergen, 1991, p. 228)
Because Gergen maintains that selves and identities are never substantially given
or projected from an isolated cognitive capsule, he stays clear of an essentialist
ontology of the person. Selves and identities are products of relationships and
therefore require an ontology that takes account of this (Gergen, 1995). For Gergen
dialogue and conversation are the proper units of analysis for social psychology,
because it is here that the relational events that are generative of persons take
place". This also leads him to reconsider the role of theory in social psychology,
and therefore the identity of social psychology as a discipline. The theoretical task
of social psychology cannot be simply descriptive or accommodating as was the
proposition by Sampson in the above paragraphs. Apart from telling it like it is,
Gergen maintains, social psychology should also tell it like it might become - the
nature of individual participation in social life, that is (Gergen, 1982, 1991). Because
social psychology has the ability to contribute to the nature of self-understanding in
a community, it should assist in the construction or the making available of models
that would be more suitable for life in a rapidly changing Western society. This
generative view of theory entails that social psychology's knowledge constructions
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feed directly into eventual cultural form:
... (O)nce we have fashioned a "picture of the self', we have
essentially charted the parameters within which all further questions
can be asked. We have also established the kinds of meanings that
will be communicated to the society, and that will contribute to the
cultural future. (Gergen, 1991, p. 25)
As such, social psychology becomes again an important intellectual pursuit. As
Gergen (1985b) explains in another context, social psychology assumes a
critical role in the intellectual community. To the extent that the
generation of knowledge is a social process and the social
psychologist is committed to an understanding of such processes, then
social psychological inquiry does not parallel that of the physicist,
chemist, historian, or economist, for example; rather, the social
psychologist could become indispensable in elucidating the grounds
upon which physical, chemical, historical, or economic knowledge is
based. (p. 548)
This trajectory differs from the previous example in that it does not stop short at
creating the narrative space for other subjectivities, but in that it sees social
psychology as itself capable of creating subjectivities that will result in a society
where we will be better suited to live with difference, with relationships that do not
share a cultural core or creed. This of course does not contradict the call for
experiential democratisation, but adds to that idea. Both redefine social psychology
ina manner that seemingly rids it of its modernist preconceptions, making it suitable
for a postmodern world. Of course, being suitable for a postmodern world cannot
and may not only mean that social psychology fits into prefabricated theoretical
notions of postmodernity. It has to mean, amongst other things, that it can be
exportedfrom the Western cultural and intellectual centres to the non-Westernworld
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in order to contribute to the understanding of social and individual phenomena there.
In other words, it has to be able to engage empirically in what is theoretically
captured by the notion of postmodernity.
Is this achieved by these three trajectories? Each of the three trajectories mentioned
have important failings. Saying for example that other discipline's are better suited
to study social processes neglect the fact that all knowledge has political dimensions,
and that other social sciences certainly were also in complicity with the modernising
project. What is more, it risks presenting postmodernism as a reified set of
propositions that leaves unquestioned the particular socio-historical and academic
locations that gave rise to them. Social psychology then ends up accepting social
scientific descriptions of postmodernity as a ready-made conceptualisation of the
social. In the next section it will be explicitly argued that social psychology and
indeed the social sciences in general gain little from resolutions offered in the form
of emigration fantasies, but it already becomes apparent in the other two trajectories
discussed.
The idea of experiential transformation, as is proposed by Kenneth Gergen, is limited
in at least two ways relevant to the current discussion. First, Gergen seems to
describe and capture only the experiences of one category of contemporary society,
namely the intellectuals. Insofar as intellectuals, and here the notion is generative
for academics, artists and the educated elite in general, are reassessing their
position in society and reflexively engaging in the formation of new identities, the
notion of the postmodern certainly has value (Bauman, 1994). However, for social
psychology to elevate as a rule the experience of one group of the society is not
acceptable. It does not tell us at all how the postmodern impinges on people who
live in the Third World for example; people with no access to the systems of
communication that Gergen describes and bases his argument on.
The trajectory here referred to as experiential democratisation might seem to come
closer at providing an understanding of social psychology in a multicultural context,
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and therefore better suited to conceptualise the nature of the social in social
psychology in the light of an understanding of postmodernity. For this reason it will
be looked at more closely in the next section, where it will be argued that it misses
important dimensions of both identity formation and the nature of the cultural
patterning of behavioural form.
3.5. A social psychology of the postmodern?
It is clear that the trajectories described above reveal the creativity of social
psychological responses to the postmodern, but that they are also problematic. The
reason for this is that they confront the postmodern as it is defined by other
disciplines, rather than studying its empirical manifestations independently. On the
surface this might seem laudable in an academic environment where the value of
interdisciplinary work is endorsed. However, rather than bolstering it limits
interdlscipllnary'work, since social psychology fails to elaborate and contribute its
own responses to what the postmodern might mean in terms of the structures and
processes of individual lives in social, cultural and historical contexts. Added to this,
social psychology ends up importing the blind-spots that other discipline's bring to
the study of postmodernity.
The current section takes these concerns further for two reasons. First, if
approaches to the postmodern in other social sciences are critically addressed, it
becomes clear that there are indeed certain blind-spots. Since many of these relate
once again to the difficulty of conceptualizing the relation between the individual and
the social, it is argued that it is premature to abandon the idea of a social
psychology. The second reason has to do with the role of the postmodern in the
remainder of this thesis. The next chapter will introduce and evaluate discursive
attempts to elaborate a postmodern, post-individualist social psychology. The
current discussion therefore seeks to elaborate a conception ofthe postmodern, and
of the notion of postmodernity in particular, that will serve as background for the
remainder of the study. Because it is still argued that the postmodern provides a
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useful framework for reconsidering social psychology as a social science, even
though the trajectories discussed have certain shortcomings, it is necessary to
enhance the framework that will be used.
In a recent critical discussion Gavin Kendall and Mike Michael (1997) compared
social psychology's response to expositions of postmodernism with that of sociology.
This was their conclusion:
In social psychology, grapplings with post-modernist ideas have been
mostly focussed upon redefining (and decentring) the identity of the
discipline. However, this stands in partial contrast to other treatments
of the post-modern, especially in sociology. There we find in addition
to a concern with epistemology and methodology, a parallel effort to
map out the reality of the post-modern in relation to a range of social
and theoretical issues. (p. 14)
This development in sociology provides a valuable comparative model to evaluate
social psychology's orientation towards the postmodern. The development in
sociology to which Kendall and Michael are referring was by no means accidental.
Now already more than a decade ago, sociologists started expressing their concerns
with what they regarded as the uncritical import of postmodern ideas into their
discipline. They claimed that while the debate about postmodernism provided
valuable dividends, it could not replace empirical sociological work altogether.
Featherstone (1989), for example, said that the uncritical importation of
postmodernist ideas from philosophy and literary theory specifically occasions "a
particularly restrictive notion of experience - that which appears in literary sources
and is so designated by intellectuals" (p. 199). He continued to say:
Thus while learned references to the characteristic experiences of
post-modernity are important we need to work from more systematic
data and should not rely on the readings of intellectuals. In effect we
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should focus upon the actual cultural practices and changing power
balances of those groups engaged in the production, classification,
circulation and consumption of post-modern cultural goods ... We must
relinquish the attraction of a post-modern sociology and work towards
a sociological account of post-modernism. (pp. 200 - 201)
The same critique can now be raised against recent developments in social
psychology. The question is of course whether social psychology, especially in the
light of its many metatheoretical problems, has any reason to resist the authority of
already existing descriptions of postmodernity and postmodern subjectivity - and
whether it has the authority to add anything useful to these discussions. This can
be affirmatively argued for by addressing instances of postmodernity as it affects the
political and experiential aspects of contemporary patterns of living, and then not
only in the Western world. The interrelated theme of multiculturalism and identity
politics is a useful framework in this regard, since it is both academically in vogue
and radically affects life in a post-Apartheid South Africa. In order to understand the
notion of multiculturalism in the light of discussions about modernity and
postmodernity, consider the following depiction by Van der Merwe (1997):
Multiculturalism ... refers to the paradoxical nature of the present,
globalising late-modern or "postmodern" culture. On the one hand
there can be no doubts that the cultural "forms of life" of modernity
which developed out of the European Enlightenment - for example,
democracy, market economy, science and technology - have
expanded and will continue to expand globally. The result of this
globalisation of modernity is the transformation and equalisation of the
everyday existence - the "Lebenswelt" - of all peoples of all cultures.
But, perhaps contrary to what might have been expected, this
globalisation ofmodernity is accompanied by a heightened awareness
of and attachment to particular cultures and culture-specific values.
The process of globalisation is not a process of cultural
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
95
homogenisation but of increasing fragmentation and pluralisation. (p.
75, my emphasis)
Closely related to this is the realisation that political struggle should be
conceptualised in an appropriate manner, leading to the popularity of the notion of
identity. Discussions of identity, seen as a socio-cultural rather than a psychological
phenomenon, have flooded the social sciences in recent years. As it is used to
describe the nature of political claims, the patterning of experience, and thus the
relation between the individual and the social (Glick Schiller, 1994), identity became
every bit as popular as the notion of class, for example, was earlier (West, 1994).
This popularity is also not limited to academic discussions abroad: consider the
following from a recent research proposal published in the monthly bulletin of the
National Research Foundation's Division for Social Sciences and Humanities
(Bornman, 1998):
The discourse of identity has spread rapidly within the academic world
where it has become the primary medium for understanding and
explaining the relationship between the personal (subjective) and the
social; the individual and the group; the cultural and the political as
well as the group and the state. (p. 1)
Therefore "most academics concur that aspects of identity are fundamental to
understanding the processes that link the individual and personal experience to
large-scale and political processes" (Bornman, 1998, p. 1). At this stage it might
seem as if the state of social theory simply corroborates the postmodern trajectories
for social psychology that was introduced in the previous section, especially that of
Sampson (1985, 1988, 1993). However, identity in itself can hardly account for all
there is to the cultural strategies and patterns that both reflect and create the
condition of postmodernity. Mala Singh (1997), for example, states that the social
sciences are faced with explaining how "psychological and political processes at
individual and communal levels intersect to explain why people become receptive
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or vulnerable to being organised around specific notions of identity at specific times"
(Singh, 1997, p. 121). Identity related phenomena should be explained in terms of
their social constitution and the psychological processes involved in political
organisation.
Closely related to discussions of multiculturalism and identity in contemporary social
sciences and philosophy is a concern with the development of a postmodern social
ethics (Bauman, 1995; Lash, 1996a, 1996b). Crudely stated the concern here is with
finding the most appropriate manner in which diversity might be acknowledged and
even celebrated, while also diverting the conflict so often imminent whenever it is
allowed to flourish in a society. Postmodern ethics is often envisioned as a
celebration of difference, a generative openness to "the Other" that finds its point of
departure in a radical realisation that the self is not a unitary essence, and always
already inhabited by "the Other". These are exciting and interesting debates, but
also in need of social scientific contributions that will ground it in richer accounts of
how difference is resisted and exclusive accounts of identity maintained. Consider
in this regard the following critical comment by Scott Lash (1996b):
The problem is that most postmodernist writers on ethics - such as
Bauman, Derrida and Levinas - only address the element of
deconstruction, of ambivalence or difference, while ignoring the
dimension of groundedness, the dimension of forms of life. (p. 91)
Part of these neglected dimensions have to do with the extent of the cultural
patterning of behaviour, affect and understanding. As approached by the social
sciences and philosophy, postmodern ethics cannot be divorced from important
discussions about epistemology. Since the possibility of intercultural understanding
or intercultural dialogue and negotiation of meaning is at stake, debates hover
between an epistemological relativism that claims different cultural experiences are
not communicable and incommensurable, and debates that say it is possible to
translate from one form of life to another. The aim is not to debate these issues
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here. In fact, Lash's critique implies that these issues are not only epistemological
in nature, and require a deeper understanding of the strategies of culture. Consider
Van der Merwe's (1997) claim:
(T)here will always be a point, both in our intercultural philosophical
endeavours and in our societal life, where we will stumble upon the
incommensurable - not because of a supposed mutual exclusion of
our cultures or the impossibility of intercultural communication and
understanding, but because our culturally embedded values defy
even our own understanding, justification and explanation. (p. 77)
A postmodern ethics then, just as the understanding of processes of identity politics,
requires deeper understanding of how culture manages to impinge on human life.
It therefore, in asking what ties us up in our culturally circumscribed behavioural
forms, also involves more than asserting and celebrating difference, as Sampson
(1991) for example implies. All these social and intellectual phenomena discussed
in this section effectively invites a social psychology to the fold of social studies.
This is not to say that any unitary individuality will be theorised. The sociologist Alain
Touraine (1995) provides a valuable formulation of the location of a social
psychology in the cultural sphere of postmodernity. He acknowledges the socio-
cultural genesis of modern individuality, but then asserts that this individuality still
poses certain questions of a psychological nature: "Mass society requires
ihdividualistic actors, but the capacity to be an individual and an actor requires long-
terms references, identification with a tradition as well as the capacity to use
techniques and languages" (p. 15).
While the above paragraphs are intended as a defence of social psychology as it
confronts postmodernism and the conditions of postmodernity, it was not made clear
why sociology, for example, cannot study the mentioned aspects of individual
embedded ness in culture on its own terms. In one sense it certainly can: the aim of
this section is not to naturalise disciplinary boundaries or to claim that culturally
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
98
circumscribed phenomena have ontological correlates on a psychological level.
What is argued however is that a social psychology remains a useful pursuit,
precisely because of the way that it problematises the relationship between individual
and social. This is clearly still an important conceptual dilemma even in theories of
the postmodern. What is important here is that the traditional division between
psychology and sociology not only negatively affected the former. Sociology itself
developed as a discipline with a rather impoverished account of the individual. As
Lynch (1992, p. 285) says, "whether designed to be passive or active, the 'agent' or
'actor' in a sociological theory is an abstraction." Social psychology might yet
become the useful bridge between the psychological and other social sciences it
once promised to be.
A final but very interesting concern is why sociology is allowed to play such a
prominent role in the development of theories of postmodernity? If it also suffers a
reductionism retated to modernist disciplinary formations, why is not problematised
to the extent psychology and social psychology are? If the severe segregation of
sociological and psychological perspectives is indicative of a "pathology of
knowledge" (Moscovici, 1993, p. 9), this pathology also makes itself felt in
contemporary postmodern approaches. As Moscovici (1993) continues: "We live
in an age of economics and sociology. Our natural inclination is to explain any kind
of phenomenon in terms of economics and sociology. If needs be, we carry this to
the point of absurdity" (p. 3). This inclination clearly reveals itself in theories of
postmodernity, where sociological and economic explanations are elevated to
account for most of the transformations it entails.
The general poverty this brings to an understanding of individual participation in
social and cultural life can be illustrated by revisiting the sociology of scientific
knowledge. The sociological accounts of science that have fed into the postmodern
turn in the social sciences often leave unquestioned the role of the scientist as an
active and involved agent, in a manner which mirrors the placid subjectivity ascribed
to social actors generally. As Pleasants (1998, p. 144) describes it: "Neither the
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accounts of scientists themselves, nor those of their philosophical'underlabourers'
were able to withstand this new sociological scrutiny". This translates for Pleasants
into a "sociological hegemony" (p. 144) or a "sociological imperialism" (p. 144),
"portraying scientists as 'sociological dopes" (p. 149). The challenge for a social
psychology of the postmodern - whether it wants to study postmodernity as a set of
social and cultural shifts or the spread of ideas itself - is clearly to overcome this
reduction of individual agency without receding to its own traditional reduction of the
social.
3.6. Conclusion
This chapter set out to place the crisis in social psychology in a larger intellectual and
cultural framework. In order to do this the notion of postmodernism was introduced
and applied to social psychology. It was argued that its reconstructive use is
somewhat limited, and that social psychology would do well to move in directions
that will enable it to provide independent contributions to our understanding of the
conditions of postmodernity. The direction that social psychology should take will
have to be post-individualist, but should also provide a language that better
describes individual participation in social and cultural life. It is here that the
philosophy of language itself becomes useful, and it is to this that the discussion now
turns.
NOTES
1. The work of the artist Andy Warhol comes to mind here. Recall the way he presented as works of
art repetitious images, such as his famous painting of the cans of Campbell's soup.
2. Both the ideas of Derrida and Foucault will be introduced in the next chapter. For valuable
introductions to Heidegger and Adorno, see the book on European movements in philosophy by
Richard Kearney (1995).
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3. Baudrillard is an extremely popular figure in intellectual circles. Often referred to as the "high priest"
of postmodernism, his work is characterised by intriguing analyses of the "signscapes", so to speak,
of modern Western society. For example, he wrote a popular book about the significations surrounding
end-ist fantasies and thoughts associated with the coming of the new millennium (Baudrillard, 1995b).
4. This implicates, as will become clear, both the natural and the social sciences. In this section
themes from both will be addressed to attain an understanding of the nature the postmodern critique
against science, and thus knowledge and truth, in general.
5. The notion of paradigm will be revisited in the next chapter, when language is introduced in terms
of discourses: frameworks of meaning that determine what can and cannot be thought and
communicated. What here constrains activity within the circumscribed domains of scientific disciplines
will then prove to structure social life - and individual participation in it - in general.
6. Studies about the history of psychology in South Africa have been few and far between. There are
indications, however, that this is changing. A very useful way to throw light on the history of
psychology is by doing content analyses of published material. In this way trends (what is being
researched?; where is it done?; who is doing the research?; etc.) are revealed, and one can get a clear
indication of important shifts in the discipline. For a broad overview of the themes and concerns that
have characterised South African psychology from 1948 to 1988, see Seed at (1998). Another
overview, focussing on the themes of race and relevance in the South African Journal of Psychology,
is provided by Durrheim and Mokeki (1997).
7. This shouldn't be read as implying that all black psychologists were mere pawns of the Apartheid
regime. For a contrary indication, just think about the important critical work of N. Chabani Manganyi
(1973, 1981, 1991), who was the first black clinical psychologist to be trained in South Africa.
8. This work was done specifically in response to the research around intelligence by M.L. Fick (1939).
This psychologist was instrumental in the standardisation of the first intelligence tests for South African
conditions, and also used his research to "prove" that black people were intellectually inferior and in
fact not "educatable".
9. Sociology is in fact a good example of this. Many of the most prominent theorists of the
postmodern nowadays are affiliated to the discipline of sociology. In this regard just refer to Bauman
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
101
(1992,1994), Featherstone (1989) and Lash (1990). Apart from Kenneth Gergen (1991) there are but
a few psychologists (or social psychologists) that really enjoy a warranted voice in these intellectual
debates.
10. Dialogue and other relational terms hinting on the role of language have become very important
in psychology. This will be addressed in more detail in the following chapter.
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Chapter 4
Discourse, culture and experience:
Critical reflections on language in social
psychology
4.1. Introduction
The table is now set to take on seriously the challenges posed to social psychological
theorising by contemporary developments in the philosophy of language. While these
challenges can be addressed on many different levels, the focus will remain here on
the nature of the relation between the individual and the social, still the major site of
struggle for social psychology's identity as a discipline. Where the previous chapters
have traced attempts to breech this metatheoretical dilemma from two quite distinct
vantage points - the metatheoretical constraints imposed by (especially cognitive)
psychology and the geopolitical formation of psychology as a discipline - this chapter
will focus on how an explicit focus on the role of language sheds new light on both
these perspectives, while locating the discussion specifically in the context of the
development of a critical social psychology in South Africa.
The reference in the last sentence above is of course to the development that has
already been introduced as discursive social psychology. Drawing from non-
referential accounts of language, discursive social psychology indicates an integration
of empirically and socio-politically driven concerns around a social constructionist
understanding of psychological phenomena as emerging from discursive processes.
This integration (the unitary notion of a discursive social psychology is itself a
rhetorical move that hides a considerable amount of intellectual labour) is however not
without complexity and contradiction: the notions of discourse that have been
introduced in social psychology often differ substantially, especially with regard to the
position of the individual in relation to the production of meaning. It is one of the
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challenges of this chapter to differentiate between these approaches while at the
same time indicating their integration into a discursive approach.
The scope of discursive social psychology can best be understood in terms of the
discussions in the preceding chapters. In order to account for meaningful human
activity and the interrelation between cognitive and societal processes, and thus to
break down the rift between cognition and society, the ground covered by especially
intergroup theory is revisited. Language use is now employed to provide a better
account of cognition and processes of meaning-giving such as categorisation. But it
is not only the domain of cognitive social psychology and its metatheoretical
constraints that is revisited. By focussing on how language is constitutive of
subjectivity and psychology as such (including here its disciplinary status), the
geopolitical nature of social psychological knowledge claims is also dismantled. As
this relates to the discussions about the postmodern in the previous chapter, it is
necessary at this point to note that the paradigm shift in the understanding of
language, from one that sees language as merely a referential system to one that
sees it as constitutive of human experience and reality, is itself often cast as part of
the postmodern turn. The turn to language accompanies the crises of rationality,
positive knowledge and modernisation as a crisis of representation. However, it will
here be discussed as an independent development, or rather set of developments,
that have histories in philosophy and linguistics quite distinct from discussions of the
postmodern .
The main objective of this chapter is of course to provide a critical evaluation of
discursive social psychology in terms of the way it addresses the relation between the
individual and the social. Here the use of non-referential accounts of language is of
great concern, and it will be argued that language does in fact not provide the best
grounding for a social psychology that has to study individual lives as they are
enmeshed in the social, cultural and political realities of contemporary South Africa.
The reason for this is that although it clearly achieves a more social account of
cognition and experience, and although it seemingly resolves challenges of intellectual
colonialism by endorsing a constructionist understanding of social psychological
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phenomena, discursive social psychology makes itself guilty of another reduction. It
sees the relation between the individual and the social as patterned only on the level
of the symbolic or the reflexive, leaving the material and practical involvement of
individuals in the world largely unaccounted for. The effect of this, quite simply, is that
social psychology still falls conceptually short of really understanding the nature of
oppression and the vistas open for resistance and social change on a level that takes
seriously the social and cultural dimensions of experience. These are serious claims,
and to sufficiently flesh them out the chapter will be structured as follows.
Since language forms such an integral part of the developments in social psychology
discussed here, the first section will map the philosophical shift from referential to non-
referential accounts of language. One of the interesting aspects about these
developments is that they take the form of what appears like a philosophical or
intellectual Zeitgeist: shifts to non-referential theories of language occurred
independent from one another both in terms of intellectual tradition and geographical
location. However, this does not mean that these traditions agree on how language
should be understood as a constitutive medium. In this section the focus will fall on
two such traditions that have proved of particular importance to social psychology in
recent years. The first is the tradition of analytical or ordinary language philosophy,
here represented by the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein; and the second the
post-structural accounts fed by Ferdinand de Saussure's structural linguistics.
The three sections following this description map out the development of a discursive
social psychology along these philosophical lines. This way of breaking up the terrain
might be somewhat artificial, but it provides valuable insight into what language does
in social psychology on different levels. First to be discussed is the ordinary language
approach as itwas spearheaded byWittgenstein and his philosophical heirs. In social
psychology this is elaborated to provide theoretical and empirical correctives to many
of the concerns riddling the development of traditional cognitive social psychology.
This is illustrated in terms of the development of a rhetorical approach to
categorisation by the social psychologist Michael Billig, and its relevance particularly
to research on racism in South Africa.
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Second on the agenda is the way analytic or ordinary language philosophy goes
further to challenge the notion of information processing as a metaphor of the human
mind. In its place a social constructionist view of mind and of the person in general
is proposed. These developments have greater resonance with postmodern debates
in that it clearly locates itself as critical of the ontological assumptions of traditional
social psychology. Rather than seeing psychological phenomena as rooted within a
unitary individual, it sees it as localised cultural achievements. While many of these
debates focus more on the reconstruction of cognitive psychology as such, it is
definitely social psychologically relevant. Most importantly it shows that individual
psychology is a derivative of a prior social psychology rather than the other way
around.
This focus on the social construction of the person provides a link with post-structural
accounts. From this perspective it is not the use of language that is of vital
performance, but language conceived as an abstract framework of meaning, or a
generative system that carves up the world into particular categories, possible objects
and subject positions. In other words, it precedes the actual use of language and
determines what can legitimately be said and thought. Here it is especially the work
of French philosopher and historian of ideas, Michel Foucault, that has been extremely
influential in social psychology. His accounts of the relation between power and
knowledge embellish a view of discourse that has exciting political implications.
The following section is more concerned with the integration of these approaches and
the way a discursive social psychology addresses the relation between the individual
and the social in social psychology. In this regard two notions are especially relevant:
that of reflexivity and ideology. While reflexivity is used to account for the nature of
meaning and the way experience is socially produced and patterned, ideology is used
to account for the naturalisation of experience when the particular meanings that
frame a form of life are actually reproductive of power relations in a society. Together
these notions promise to abolish the existence of a dichotomous relation between the
individual and the social. Rather, the relation is dialectical, in that it is both in and
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through language that subjectivities are located and have the power to challenge
those constructions.
The chapter then moves on to critically evaluate the claims made in the name of a
discursive social psychology. In this regard it is argued that since the exclusive
demarcation of psychological phenomena as belonging to the discursive order makes
it impossible to see experience as also pre-reflexively and non-propositionally
patterned: the immersion in a form of life is always, on the psychological level,
reflexively mediated. This is a problematic stance, because it makes it difficult to
understand the tenacity of experiences and forms of conduct, as well as the nature of
the agency that will occasion social change when particular cultural patterns are
deeply ingrained.
This study has as its aim only a critical introduction of discursive social psychology.
There is therefore no systematic attempt to rectify on a conceptual level the limitations
that are identified here. In the concluding section, however, a few suggestions are
made to open possible avenues of exploration in this regard.
4.2. The turn to language in twentieth century thought
Twentieth century philosophy is characterised by a pervasive, even obsessive concern
with language. References to the linguistic turn are now commonplace in philosophy,
referring to the way different traditions of thought, in largely independent fashion, have
stumbled upon the realisation that language is not the transparent vehicle of thought
and experience it was traditionally understood to be. Rather, language increasingly
revealed itself as an obstacle that should be accounted for in terms of its mediating
and even constitutive role in thought and experience (Van der Merwe, 1994a). This
gradual realisation exceeded the internal transformation of philosophy and also
caused a "changing of the guard" in both the philosophy and practices of the social
sciences. It would in fact be justified to say that the preoccupation with language and
its constructive nature is one of the most decisive features of the contemporary state
of academic debate in the social sciences and the humanities.
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The linguistic turn in philosophy hinges on a few general assumptions. These
assumptions are best presented in contrast to traditional images of language adhered
to in philosophy ever since early Greek thought. First, language does not passively
represent thought and experience, but has a constitutive role in our thought and our
experience of reality. In some recent approaches, as will become clear, language is
in fact attributed with the construction of reality'. Second, and related to this,
language is not a collection of names or a nomenclature. This implies that the
meanings of words are not entirely external to language itself - they are not based in
an objectively known reality, nor in the conceptual projections of a self-present and
self-reflexive mind. The meanings of words are to a large extent internal to the logic
of the linguistic system, or a function of their contextual use. Third, with language no
longer seen as primarily referential, and the self-evident nature of thought and
experience suspended in terms of a constructionist logic, our epistemological relation
to reality becomes dependent upon interpretation (Ricoeur, 1979; Van der Merwe,
1994a).
To relate these general comments to the discussion of social psychology it will be
useful to introduce two specific traditions of philosophical reflection on language. First
of these is the approach of analytical philosophy and its concern with ordinary
language, spearheaded and here represented by the influential work of Ludwig
Wittgenstein. The second is that of post-structuralism, or to draw the net somewhat
wider, all those approaches that feed from the linguistic work of Ferdinand de
Saussure. This model of language will be discussed here alongside its post-structural
reformulation by Jacques Derrida. While these traditions and scholars are adequate
exemplars of the process under discussion, namely the shift from referential to non-
referential understandings of language, they are also more than this. Discursive social
psychologists actively engage their ideas in theoretical discussion, making them
important and explicit reference points in the development of recent developments in
social psychology.
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The discussion will begin with Wittgenstein. This philosopher started his career within
the framework of logical positivism, where the nature of language and meaning
became an important topic in the context of understanding scientific rationality (Pears,
1985). Because scientific knowledge was paradigmatically confined to sense data,
language had to have the ability to mirror empirical reality without adding to or taking
anything away from it. Because ordinary language itself is far from perfect as a
referential vehicle, logical positivists attempted to identify the core laws of logic and
to produce mathematical or ideal languages suited for scientific knowledge claims.
Wittgenstein's earliest work (Wittgenstein, 1961) can be read in this context, since he
explicitly set out to determine through logical analysis the exact boundaries or limits
of the meaningful use of language. Stated differently, he wanted to delineate the
relation between language and experience in order to understand how it is possible
for language to refer to things in the world, or to have a referential or representational
function.
This philosophical project was guided by the assumption that meaning has a universal
and logical structure, and that its relation to language is thus transcendental. Because
this relation is transcendental, it is possible to determine the limits of meaningful
language through a purely philosophical reflection on logic. This focus on the
transcendental preconditions ofthe constitution of meaning clearly reveal a traditional
understanding of language as transparent; language merely carries a structure that
exists prior to it. In fact, Wittgenstein's early philosophy can be seen as an attempt
to justify the traditional view of language within the context of factual discourse, which
almost inevitably implies scientific language. To summarise in the words of Van der
Merwe and Voestermans (1995):
Wittgenstein attempts to justify these traditional assumptions by
reducing language, through a rigorous logical analysis, to the essential
structure or 'logical grammar' which makes the constitution of meaning
- and therefore the reference of language to experience - possible. (p.
30)
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
109
Many philosophers considered the product of Wittgenstein's labour a brilliant
philosophical justification for the positivist programme of logical empiricism in the
sciences (Kenny, 1973; Pears, 1985). Brilliant it certainly was, but it was also marred
by a fundamental flaw that would make the shift to a non-referential account of
language necessary. Wittgenstein (1961) described language as a totality of
propositional symbols that provide logical pictures of facts or possible facts in the
world. In other words, there is (or should be) an exact pictorial correspondence
between the elements of a sentence or proposition and that which it depicts. It is this
correspondence that makes any linguistic product meaningful. The critical
consequence of this is that many language acts we encounter in our everyday lives
cannot really be said to be meaningful, and thus fall outside the domain of scientific
knowledge - since "the only experience expressible or describable by means of
language are actual or possible perceptions of actual or possible empirical facts" (Van
der Merwe & Voestermans, 1995, p. 31).
It is thus clear that Wittgenstein's early inquiries assumed that language was a purely
referential system, and that this made it possible to impose upon it the requirement
of a transcendental logical form when applied to the rational scrutiny of scientific
knowledge claims. However, while many philosophers and others bought into this
analysis, Wittgenstein (1987,1988) realised that his theory of language was clearly
self-defeating. Developing a theory that sees meaningful language as consisting of
propositions that picture objects or facts in the world is itself a linguistic statement or
language act - one that cannot itself make claim to being meaningful. Since it is
impossible to verify such a view of language with reference to any sort of (possible)
fact in the world, it must be dismissed as an unverifiable metaphysical speculation,
and always beyond the threshold of rational (scientific) knowledge. The implications
of this insight were immense in the subsequent development ofWittgenstein's thought
and Western philosophy at large. As Van der Merwe and Voestermans (1995) state
it:
By default the book on a whole history of naïvety with regard to the
functions of language in our experience of the world was finally and
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
110
effectively closed by showing that the function of language cannot and
should not be reduced to that of representation. (p.32)
Wittgenstein's "mistake" indeed created a huge philosophical shift, and it is very
interesting that he himself became an important actor in the working out of its
philosophical implications. In the critical commentary on his work this gave rise to the
common distinction between his early and later philosophy (Kenny, 1973; Pears,
1985). Just as the early philosophy resonates with the logical empiricism that fed into
behaviourism and certain strands of cognitivism, the later philosophy is closely related
to developments in psychology and social psychology. It is used explicitly to give form
to a discursive social psychology on at least two levels. First, Wittgenstein's analytical
turn to the ordinary use of language rather than studying a supposed transcendental
and logical grammar, with the subsequent notion of language-games, paved the way
for a more socially and interactively embedded conception of cognitive processes and
meaning-giving in general. Secondly, Wittgenstein wasn't unaware of debates in
psychology in the early and mid twentieth century, and in fact commented quite
extensively on these (Wittgenstein, 1988). He developed in this regard a clear and
coherent critique of cognitive mentalism and notions of mind and consciousness as
individual and abstracted from socio-cultural processes.
Before these aspects of his thought are explicitly translated to the development of
discursive social psychology (in following sections) it is necessary first to explain the
structure ofWittgenstein's later reflections on language. Although the later philosophy
is often depicted as radically different from the early, it was in fact guided by the same
concern: namely, to understand and account for the burden of meaning that rests on
language. How is it achieved, and how can it be evaluated? The critical difference
between the early and the later philosophy is that he chose for a new point of
departure, one that didn't assume language to be transparent and meaning to be
determined by a fixed essence or transcendental identity. Because ordinary language
is clearly meaningful at least in the sense that it successfully facilitates communication
between people, philosophy should abstain from imposing upon it the transcendental
question. Philosophy should rather investigate the constitution and negotiation of
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meaning in various communicative contexts and restrict itself to the task of clarifying
misunderstanding. This clarification should obviously only proceed in terms of the
contextually determined logic that guides the meaningful use of words.
Wittgenstein himself led the way in this by studying de facto instances of language
use, showing that meaning is governed by relatively stable and coherent patterns of
meaning-giving to which he referred as language-games (Wittgenstein, 1987, 1988).
Religious language, for example, with all its concepts, statements, metaphors and
symbols, constitutes a language-game that differs in terms of its requirements for
meaning from the language-game of science. One language-game cannot be judged
from the perspective of the other, for each carries its own criteria for meaning and
truth (Pears, 1985). Therefore, meaningful communication is not achieved in terms
of a universal grammatical logic, but according to a "depth grammar" that is unique to
the particular language-game. This "depth grammar" can be described as "a set of
publicly accepted rules or culturally determined conventions which govern the use of
language within that language-game" (Van der Merwe & Voestermans, 1995, p. 33).
These conventions are further not present in the language-game as fixed conceptual
identities. Rather like the members of a family resemble one another without there
being one exact and essential feature that link them, so the uses of words in a
language-game resemble one another. A word like forgiveness, for example, will
display a complex pattern of use not reducible to an essential meaning.
The idea that the meanings of words, utterances or other speech acts are to be found
in the analysis of their use, and that this is governed by rules that are conventional
rather than transcendental, had a huge impact on social psychologists who were
disillusioned by traditional social psychology. This influence, as will become clear in
subsequent sections, is however not confined to Wittgenstein. Analytic philosophy
developed under the influence of his later ideas, and the focus on ordinary language
and non-referential functions of language flourished immensely. One example is the
work done by J.L. Austin on performatives (Austin, 1962). Apart from this, other
functions of language such as metaphor, rhetoric and narrative are now studied in
many contexts, also for the part they play in the language-games of science and
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philosophy (Taylor, 1996). In conclusion one could say that Wittgenstein's legacy is
tied up with a concern for the action orientation of language: its ability to constitute
and construct and not only represent things and facts in the world.
Although also a non-referential approach to language, post-structural accounts and
uses of language differ in important ways from the tradition discussed above. These
differences are accentuated by the fact that the two approaches developed
independently both geographically and in terms of their intellectual precursors. The
term post-structuralism is used here to refer to all those developments in especially
French philosophy and social science drawing on the linguistic work of Ferdinand de
Saussure (1974), but that is critical of the positivist programme of structuralism that
was the latter's immediate application in the social sciences (Kearney, 1995t Even
though those who are referred to as post-structuralists differ fundamentally from each
other, it would be impossible to understand any such figures as Michel Foucault,
Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan and Roland Barthes without reference to the
influence of the structuralist grammar of Ferdinand de Saussure (Kearney, 1995).
As a tradition of thinking about language and social reality post-structuralism
contributed in important ways to contemporary developments in social psychology.
In some circles, for example, Foucault's definition of discourse provides the
paradigmatic instance of the unit of analysis in social psychology (Parker, 1992)3.
More generally, post-structuralism embellishes a view of language that does not limit
its constructive capacity to ordinary use, but that extends it to frameworks of meaning
that precede and determine our seemingly individual and voluntary use of words. This
emphasis, which in fact implies that the realities, social relations and identities we
experienced as natural are in fact textual, enable a political critique of power and
domination within a society. Whatever meanings our experiences are submerged in
are not only conventional achievements; they are ideological achievements that serve
the reproduction of skewed relations of power in society.
In order to understand the implications of the last paragraph for social psychology it
is necessary to first address the logic of De Saussure's structural linguistics. De
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Saussure's model of language informed a view of reality as radically textualised
(Culler, 1976, 1982). Starting out by saying the basic element of language is the
linguistic sign, he goes further to say that the sign should be sub-divided it into a
signifier (a word) and a signified (a concept). In terms of a traditional conception of
language as nomenclature, this would not be such a radical idea: it could simply have
meant that the signifier serves as a name for a concept that has an existence outside
of language. However, De Saussure immediately refutes this traditional image of
language by postulating what he referred to as the arbitrary nature of the sign. On the
most basic level, the sign is arbitrary in the sense that no signifier can have an intrinsic
link with a signified. For example, there is no intrinsic reason why the thing on which
this sentence is typed should be called a "keyboard" and not a "qwerty" .
More fundamentally still, the arbitrary nature of the sign also implies that language
articulates its own categories and concepts, and does not just name a pre-existing
field of concepts and categories in an arbitrary fashion (Culler, 1976). This can be
illustrated quite simply with reference to the problem of translating between
languages. The mere existence of different languages already confirms the first
dimension of the arbitrary nature of the sign. What is called a "keyboard" in English,
for example, is called a "sleutelbord" in Afrikaans. However, translation is rarely as
straightforward as in the above example. When we are confronted with another
language, we are regularly also confronted with conceptual fields, or categorisations
of the world, that differ from the concepts and categories that characterise the
representation of reality in our own language. Jonathan Culler (1976) explains this
basic principle very well:
If language were simply a nomenclature for a set of universal concepts, it
would be easy to translate from one language to another. One would
simply replace the French name for a concept with the English name. If
language were like this the task of learning a new language would also be
much easier than it is. But anyone who has attempted either of these tasks
has required, alas, a vast amount of proof that languages are not
nomenclatures, that the concepts or signifiers of one language may differ
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radically from those of another. The French "airner' does not go directly
into English; one must choose between "to like" and "to love". "Dérnarrer'
includes in a single idea the English signifieds of "moving off' and
"accelerating". English "to know" covers the area of two French signifieds,
"connaitre" and "savoir". The English concepts of a "wicked" man or of a
"pet" have no real counterparts in French. Or again, what English calls
"light blue" and "dark blue" and treats as two shades of a single colour are
in Russian two distinct primary colours. Each language articulates or
organizes the world differently. Language do not simply name existing
categories, they articulate their own. (pp. 21 -22)
Culler (1976) then summarises this as implying that "since there are no fixed universal
concepts or fixed universal signifiers, the signified itself is arbitrary, and so is the
signifier" (p. 23). The implication of the linguistic principle of the arbitrary of the sign,
and especially the implication that the signified itself is arbitrary, is that the idea of
meaning as uncontaminated by language is immediately overruled. It also makes it
possible to understand another dimension of De Saussure's model, namely his
distinction between parole and langue. With this he distinguishes between individual
utterances or language use and an autonomous, self-regulatory system of rules which
govern the meaningfulness of linguistic signs and thus of individual instances of
language use. Because signs are arbitrary it does not make linguistic sense to study
parole: if the conceptual and categorical demarcations that guide signification in a
language are not anchored in an extra-linguistic realm, it must somehow be conjured
up by language itself. In other words, meaning precedes the experiential encounter
of its speakers with the world and therefore necessitates an account that is restricted
to the level of langue. De Saussure accounts for such a production of meaning by
describing language as a differential system. That is, the meaning of signs resides
in their differences from other signs within the system. De Saussure (1974) discusses
this point in the following manner:
...(I)n all cases, then, we discover not ideas given in advance but values
emanating from the system. When we say that these values correspond
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to concepts, it is understood that these concepts are purely differential, not
positively defined by their content but negatively defined by their relations
with other terms of the system. Their most precise characteristic is that
they are what the others are not. (p. 117)
Culler (1976) explains the same idea with reference to the sounds that make up a
particular signifier in the following extract:
The noises made can vary considerably (there is no essential property
which they must possess) so long as they do not become confused with
those of contrasting signifiers. We have considerable latitude in the way
we utter bed, so long as what we say is not confused with bad, bud, bid, -
bode; bread, bled, dead, fed, head, led, red, said, wed; beck, bell, bet. (p.
27)
In itself this theory of language already destroys the traditional conception of reality
as appearing to consciousness independent of language, and ushers in a notion of
reality as itself textually constituted. The structuralism to which De Saussure was
committed was however still characteristically positivist (and modernist) in its intended
scientific scope. Its aim was nothing less than the laying bare of the complete
structure of meaning in a given system at a given time. Post-structuralism, in stark
contrast, is based on the premise that meaning can never be present in a way that will
make such a project possible, and that interpretation is therefore a much more
complex task. This can be illustrated in terms of the influential reworking of De
Saussure's theory by Jacques Derrida (1967).
If meaning is the product of differences within the system, and if the sign is arbitrary
to the extent that signifieds aren't locations outside of language, then the distinction
between signifiers and signifieds largely becomes artificial. Because all linguistic
elements are differential values within the system, signifieds are just signifiers seen
from a different angle - they lose the essential referents that would make them less
textual and that would warrant its substantial distinction from signifiers. This also
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means that every signified can in turn be the signifier of another signified, which is a
process that can go on indeterminately. In Derrida's account the signified, and thus
the last resort to a reality outside of language, is deconstructed; all that remain are
chains of signifiers (Culler, 1982). In post-structuralist theory the arbitrary nature of
the sign is taken to its extreme to mean that language never signifies its own
exteriority; or, as Derrida (1982) would have it, there is nothing outside the text.
The fact that language continuously folds back upon itself does not mean it is a closed
system. While structuralism would still have supposed such a closed system, and
therefore the possibility of assuming a fixed hermeneutic position, Derrida's
deconstruction of the relation between the signifier and the signified effectively
showed that meaning not only is the product of difference, but that it is always
deferred. Because a signified is always yet again a signifier to something else, the
process of signification is itself always a simultaneous arrival and departure of
meaning. The retrieval or tracing of meaning is always suspended according to a
(non)logic Derrida calls differance (Culler, 1982; Derrida, 1982t. Any attempt to
create a fixed hermeneutic position, or a final interpretation, will yield only the traces
of signifiers and signifieds that are yet again the trace of new signifiers. Language is
thus fundamentally open, and meaning is always undecided. This undecidability of
meaning makes signification also a site of struggle; it always calls forth both
processes of construction and deconstruction.
It is not necessary to dwell further on the complexities of Derrida's reading of other
post-structural developments at this stage. For the remainder of the study the
important principles arising from structuralism and post-structuralism in terms of
seeing language as a non-referential system can be summarised as follows. First,
meaning is a systematic and not an individual affair; and second, because it is a
function of the system, meaning is indeterminate. Together these have had important
and interesting ramifications in the social sciences. Paul Ricoeur (1979) formulates
it nicely when he says there is a shift from seeing social reality as the referent of
language to seeing it
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as a system of codified signs; if the various orders - economic, family,
political and religious - can be held to be systems of communication
governed by structured laws like that of language, then it is no longer
possible to say that signs are of sociological origin; one must say,
rather, that society is of semiological origin. (p. 261)
These ideas have found fruitful ground in fields such as sociology and anthropology
from as early as the 1950s. Yet, it is only recently that (social) psychologists have
seriously started incorporating into their discipline. The reason for this reluctance has
to do with the currency of individualism in traditional social psychology. Language as
is theorised from a post-structural perspective decentres the human subject: individual
experience and the notion of the person must itself be seen as textual effects. In
other words, semiotic analyses are inevitably not performed on an individual level of
analysis, but on a broad social or cultural level. The rise of postmodernism in social
psychology has obviously changed this resistance in some circles, and post-structural
ideas are looked upon by some to provide a solution forthe crisis in social psychology.
These descriptions of language have been very brief, but will serve an important
function in the remainder of this chapter. They provide the background and structure
for the discussion of the development and various dimensions of discursive social
psychology. It is to this that the discussion now turns.
4.3. Discourse as doing
In this section the incorporation of language will be discussed not in terms of the
concerns of postmodernism, but in terms of the initial individualism that was indicated
in traditional approaches to social psychology. The political dimensions of knowledge
production addressed in the previous chapter are bypassed for a moment, and the
focus placed once more on cognitive social psychology. It is argued that performative
accounts of language and meaning-giving facilitates an understanding of the individual
as an active agent of meaning without falling into the trap of reducing social processes
to individual cognitive ones. When the focus is placed on what people do with
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language it becomes clear that meaning-giving is an interactional, contextual and
contradictory process.
When discussing cognitive social psychology earlier in this study, it was argued that
it does not get away from its individualist reductionism. This reductionism, as became
clear in the earlier discussion of attribution, is closely related to a cognitive
perceptualism: by setting the individual up as a perceiving subject cognitive
processes are theorised as ontologically divided from social interaction. Human
cognition is an isolated, private and natural process, functionally serving the
processing of information that is not itself dependent on social processes. If this is
brought to bear on the topic of this study, the relation between the individual and the
social, then it is clear that social psychology perpetuates an ontological distinction
between cognition and society. What is more, this distinction persisted even in
intergroup theory's attempt to make social psychology more social.
The first response to the above dilemma in this study was to investigate cognitive
accounts for their ideological effects, and to show the value of individualism as socially
constructed and politically reproductive in Western and non-Western contexts alike.
While this challenges the discipline of social psychology very deeply, its implications
are not as simple as to warrant a mere dismissal of the relevance of meaningful
human action as unit of analysis in the study of social life. It is therefore necessary
to find better conceptions of what occurs psychologically when individuals engage in
actions such as remembering, categorising, attributing, judging, disclaiming (Edwards,
1996). This becomes possible once it is acknowledged that cognitive perceptualism
depends on language being treated as a transparent medium for thought. A different
understanding of social cognition and meaning-making in general emerges when
language is encountered as non-referential and performative in the sense established
by Wittgenstein and his heirs.
That traditional cognitive social psychology draws from a theory of meaning assuming
language to be transparent and referential reveals itself forcefully in the
methodological form that most of its inquiries take. Social psychology is traditionally
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described as the discipline that studies social thought and thinking. Although this can
only be revealed in language, it is not language itself that is addressed; the unit of
analysis is of course an internal process, namely cognition. Language is thus social
psychologically informative, but since the methodological task of the cognitive social
psychologist is to move through language to underlying cognitive processes and
structures, language should for this very reason be made transparent. Consider the
technology of the questionnaire as an example. It is constructed by de-contextualising
and generalising individual propositions, so that they can be presented to a
respondent as a circumscribed set of statements to which s/he can respond in an
equally circumscribed manner; to a set of items that already enclose within itself a
universe of possible psychological meanings. The assumption of the transparency of
language is thus the theoretical and empirical linchpin that enables the extension of
cognitive psychology into social psychology, and ensures social psychology remains
a mere subdivision of general or individual psychology (Edwards & Potter, 1992).
Discursive social psychology> attempts to undermine these traditional assumptions
while still seeking to provide an adequate account of meaning-making processes. It
does this by saying social psychology cannot assume language to be transparent
without allowing for serious theoretical, empirical and methodological reductions. As
Edwards and Potter (1992) makes it clear, the "understanding of everyday practices
has been deformed by a combination of methodological prescription and a failure to
theorize language as the primary mode of social activity" (p. 12); or, as Potter and
Wetherell (1987) write, the "failure to accommodate to discourse damages their
(traditional social psychologists) theoretical and empirical adequacy" (p. 1). In order
to breach these reductions the focus in social psychology should shift from a formal
focus on cognition to the study of discourse, which is here understood to be language
as social action. Focussing on the use of language in this way enables the discipline
to still address traditional constructs such as attribution and categorization, but now
conceptualises these as discursive processes, and therefore as contextual and
rhetorical achievements (Billig, 1991, 1995; Edwards, 1996; Haste, 1994). In the
words of Edwards and Potter (1992):
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(R)ather than seeing such discursive constructions as expressions of
speakers' underlying cognitive states, they are examined in the context
of their occurrence as situated and occasioned constructions whose
precise nature makes sense, to participants and analysts alike, in terms
of the social actions those descriptions accomplish. (pp. 2 - 3)
Categorisation, or social categorisation as it is often referred to in order to locate it as
a social psychological concern, provides a useful example for fleshing out this
dimension of the discursive approach. The categorisation ofthe social world, locating
people as other or part of an in-group, will always play an important part in any
attempt to understand intergroup processes and identity politics in general (Antaki,
Condor, & Levine, 1996). In traditional social psychology categorisation is theorised
as a basic intra-psychic cognitive process that only becomes social when it is directed
towards a stimulus domain that comprises of other people. What discursive social
psychology does, on the level that it is addressed here, is to challenge the application
of cognitive levels of explanation to social thinking - but without taking on explicitly the
metatheoretical claims of cognitivism itself. It in effect wishes to loosen social
psychology from issues in general psychology by maintaining that categorisation can
be addressed more thoroughly as a feature of social thinking when its discursive
rather than its information processing status is taken into account. In other words,
when categorisation is seen as something that people do with language in
communicative contexts.
The idea that social thinking, and in this instance categorisation, is something people
achieve in and through language, and that this implies an interactive or social rather
than a perceptual account of the achievement of meaning, is of huge importance for
discursive social psychology's attempt to address the dilemma of the relation between
the individual and the social. One such attempt by a social psychologist to move from
a perceptual to a discursive understanding of categorisation will now be discussed,
namely that of Michael Billig (1985, 1987). Billig locates his discussion of
categorisation within the context of research on prejudice, an important tradition of
social psychological research and theorising. The cognitive (information processing)
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revolution in psychology had an interesting effect on the study of prejudice. While
earlier approaches, such as the work on the authoritarian personality (Adorno,
Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), saw prejudice as a cognitive style that
should be distinguished from tolerant thinking due to its rigidity and inability to accept
ambivalence and difference, information processing accounts made prejudice a
natural and general characteristic of all thinking. This remained part of social
psychology and infiltrated social cognition and intergroup theories as well, causing
Billig (1985) to lament that the concept of tolerance all but "slips from the social
psychological agenda" (p. 80).
Billig (1985) indicates that categorisation as conceptualised in cognitive social
psychology plays a crucial part in the abovementioned shift. In this regard he
identifies four themes that clearly describe the role of categorisation in the discipline.
First, categorisation is seen as a basic element or a building block of all thinking. In
other words, when interested in the bestowal of meaning on the social environment
categorisation cannot be passed by. Billig (1985) quotes Tajfel (1981) as saying that
"social categorization lies at the heart of commonsense, everyday knowledge and
understanding ... it is central in social life" (p. 81). Second, the process of
categorisation involves the simplification and subsequent distortion of the stimulus
field. Since it is a function of a general cognitive economy driven by limited
information processing capacity, the social perceiver is always prone to do an injustice
to what he or she perceives. Third, and related to the above, categorisation leads to
the inevitabil_ity of stereotypical thinking about other people. Finally, if stereotypical
perception is a natural response, prejudice cannot be anything else than inevitable,
at least to a certain extent. That is, resulting from a particular model of human
thinking, there is no conceptual room for any other type of thought but that which is
prejudiced.
The issue of debate here is not whether people are normally prejudiced or tolerant
and open towards other people. The problem is that prejudice is seen as inevitable,
natural, and thus emerging as a completely individual constriction on social
perception. It completely ignores that antagonism between social groups has its base
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in historical and ideological phenomena, and that social groups themselves aren't
natural but constructed. In reality people do not arrive at their derogatory stereotypes
in isolation from other people, but by sharing a discursive space and interests in
particular meanings with other people. Moreover, and it is this that Billig makes very
clear, even when people do engage in prejudiced thinking, this thinking is not severely
rigid. In order for statements to be meaningful they have to comply with rules of a
communicative context, and will always reveal contradictions, disclaimers and other
rhetorical devices (Billig, 1991). Standard questionnaires, being as they are premised
on the consistency and often rigidity ofthought, miss something very important of how
individuals really make sense of their experiences.
Billig (1985) proposes an interesting theoretical advance in the study of categorisation
(and prejudice) that overcomes what he calls a bureaucratic model of thought:
categorisation always has a dialectical counterpart, namely particularisation. He
explains this notion in the following manner:
If categorization refers to the process by which a particular stimulus is
placed in a general category, or grouped with other stimuli, then
particularization refers to the process by which a particular stimulus is
distinguished from a general category or from other stimuli. The term
"particularization" would cover the process by which an individual
stimulus might be extracted from a category or by which it is
distinguished from the category in the first place; above all it covers the
processes by which a particular stimulus is treated as a particular or
"special case". (p. 82)
Because traditional perceptual accounts cannot explain such f1exibilities in thinking,
and must see categorisation as a natural process divorced from the particular
demands made by the communicative context, it is necessary to find a better
conception of this process. It is here that Billig suggests language might be useful.
Language forms an integral part of the process of social thinking, and it does not carry
with it the perceptual and functional constraints imposed by the traditional cognitive
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models. In his own words,
although perceptual schemes may simplify information, it is not clear
that linguistic categories must do so. Thus language can be used to
both simplify and to enrich; similarly, language can be used to
categorize or "lump together" particulars, but it can also be used to
particularize and to argue for special cases. (p. 85)
In other words, taking into account that it is in and through language that social
thinking happens, Billig argues that language itself provides a better model for
understanding what is traditionally studied as social cognition. Empirically speaking
this means that it would be more productive for social psychology to focus on the
"actual categories of language, rather than the inferred categories of perception"
(Billig, 1987, p. 135). How do people manage to bestow meaning on the world by
carving it up into parts, and what is it that they achieve when they do it? This opens
social psychology up immensely, because the actual categories of language are
negotiated between people, have a historical genesis, and resonate with ideological
themes that naturalise the particular configurations of intergroup relations, status and
power in a society", Potter and Wetherell (1987), in their important introduction to
discursive social psychology, provides a good valuation of Billig's contribution to the
study of social categorisation:
Instead of seeing categorization as a natural phenomenon -
something which just happens, automatically - it is regarded as a
complex and subtle social accomplishment .... (T)his work emphasizes
the action orientation of categorization in discourse. It asks how
categories are flexibly articulated in the course of certain sorts of talk
and writing to accomplish particular goods, such as blamings and
justifications. (p. 116)
The conversational, performative and argumentative nature of categorical talk is neatly
illustrated in a research project by South African social psychologist Kevin Durrheim
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(1997a). He makes explicit use of insights gained from Billig as well as Potter and
Wetherell in an analysis of an interview with a right-wing spokesperson, Koos
Vermeulen. In the extracts used here Vermeulen comes out in support for the
assassin of then Communist Party leader, Chris Hani. The interview was conducted
just after the Hani assassination in 1993, and the flexibility of the subject's thought-in-
action is a good example of why discursive social psychologists choose to study talk
itself, rather than trying to make language transparent in order to locate and study
supposedly consistent cognitive and affective formations.
Consider Vermeulen's response to a question by the interviewer regarding his
identification with Hani's assassin:
Vermeulen: I'm not for any person to be assassinated. I think with
talking we can do a lot, but then on the other hand we must keep in
mind that the ANC want to talk and they want to er war, and there is no
way for both of it. There's no room for both of it. (p. 755)
What is displayed here is an emphatic categorisation: there is a difference between
talking (negotiation) and warring (armed struggle), and in no way can these categories
be blurred. The ANC discredit their legitimacy in the eyes of Vermeulen precisely by
blurring these categories. The interviewer, however, responds to this answer by
Vermeulen in a challenging manner. He confronts Vermeulen with his own
(Vermeulen's) double talk, his own blurring of categories:
Leslie: But then the person you're supporting killed, assassinated
people, or assassinated Mr Hani. Um and that is not talking. (p. 755)
The contradiction is clear enough: Vermeulen professes talking (non-violence) as a
solution to political concerns, and also categorically states that one should make a
clear choice either for negotiating or for violent struggle. However, at the same time
he supports the assassin of Chris Hani. Does he then not support the assassination
of Hani as well, and thus the necessity of armed struggle? It is Vermeulen's counter
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to the challenge by the interviewer that is really interesting and demonstrates the
flexibility and argumentative nature of thought - and in the same instance thus the
impossibility of separating social thinking from the use of language.
Vermeulen: Right, the fact is that one should look at a motive, at a
background of a person. The person that killed Mr Hani was someone
that fled communist tyranny. He was a victim for the best part of his life
of communist tyranny and it's logical that in a time of despair anyone
of those people feel more threatened than anyone else and he would
go for the chief of the Communist Party. (p. 755)
What Vermeulen does here is, in terms of Michael Billig's theory, to particularise in
order to defend the integrity of his initial position (Durrheim, 1997a). Hani's assassin
can make claim to an exception on the rule because for psychological reasons he felt
himself personally victimised by what Hani stood for, namely communism. As
Durrheim (1997a) states, "the situation of dialogical interaction moves along, the
relations between speaker, audience and content change and new kinds of thinking
are called for" (p. 755). What discursive social psychology claims is that the richness
of these shifts and their contextual and rhetorical effects are lost when they are
abstracted from their contextual and rhetorical form. What is to be gained by moving
from a confrontation of the performance of thought to some supposed hidden world
of information processing? If one keeps in mind that such a move in any event
violates something of the function of language and nature of meaning itself, then it is
certainly understandable why discursive social psychologists profess the study of
language itself. It is between people that the micro-politics of meaning emerge, not
in a perceptual cocoon.
These examples illustrated what is the most basic level of the incorporation of
language into social psychology; it sets the discipline up as having its focus the "action
orientation of talking and writing" (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p. 2). This recognition of
the rhetorical and performative aspects of language, and thus of the situated and
emergent nature of social psychological processes of meaning-making, has therefore
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as its most basic and first dimension the importance of disentangling social
psychology from cognitive psychology, both theoretically and empirically. As Potter
and Wetherell (1987) states, "the point is that analysis and explanation can be carried
out at a social psychological level which is coherently separable from the cognitive"
(p. 35). It was made clear that this level is language and its contextual and rhetorical
contexts of use; that is, language as communicative act. As a summary, consider the
following statement by Edwards and Potter (1992):
(W)hen we study such discourse, rather than discovering in it how
people represent, understand and remember events, what we find is
an indefinitely variable range of situated versions and stories, accounts
and glosses, descriptions and formulations, the best sense of which is
achieved by examining them for their pragmatic placing and
interactional orientations. (p. 17)
4.4. Language, mind, society
The above depiction of discursive social psychology does not mean that it merely
disentangles itself from the traditional cognitive metatheory; that is, as if it leaves
unquestioned the assumptions of cognitive psychology itself. Had this been the case
itwould have serious implications for an understanding of the disciplinary identity and
position of social psychology. By implication individual psychology would still exist
somewhere apart from social psychology as a foundational and ontological repository
of psychological phenomena, leaving the question regarding the relation between
individual and social unresolved.
Thus while it is certainly true that discursive social psychologists at times refrain from
taking on cognitive psychology on a conceptual level, this is often an instance of
pragmatic bracketing rather than a philosophical agreement with the dominant
paradigm. Certain general problems are acknowledged with regard to the cognitive
metatheory, but set aside in order to focus on the practical and methodological
aspects of discursive analysis itself. As Edwards and Potter (1992) make it clear, they
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"bracket, or set aside, the issue of reductionism and origins in favour of an orientation
to method and analysis" (p. 19). But not all discursive social psychologists choose to
remain on this level of critique - in fact, even the mentioned authors in other contexts
have provided strong foundational critiques of cognitive psychology and the ideal of
an individual psychology as such. In this section discursive social psychology is
described from this angle, where the philosophy of language provided the impetus for
foundational critiques of cognitivism and mentalism and the individualism they entail.
In this regard the focus will remain on Wittgenstein and his application in psychology.
A shift from a referential to a non-referential model of language denies psychology any
fantasy of retreating into a notion of mind and meaning-making (cognition) that is
centralised, functional, and operating according to formal laws and symbolic or
propositional representations. The reason for this is that the notion of mind, which is
so characteristic of cognitive psychology and underlies the analogical description of
cognition as information processing, is, once again, only possible when the
transparency of language is assumed. Thus even though cognitive processes are not
directly observable they can be treated as if they exist within individual minds, as long
as they are made observable through operational definitions. A neglect of the
constructive nature of language therefore underlies an empiricism that assumes
observation to be theory neutral, which in turn makes it possible for the psychological
sciences to locate its ontology on the level of mental substances and processes.
When the referential model of language is challenged it becomes difficult to maintain
that the concepts of psychological language really refer to discreet entities or
processes in the mind. According to Wittgenstein's (1987, 1988) later understanding
of linguistic meaning as socially and conventionally bound up in language games, as
was already discussed, we discover the meaning of words by learning their currency
within a specific speech community. As Michael Billig (1997) states: "We learn how
to use words such as 'table' and 'chair' by observing how these words are used: in
this way, we learn the appropriate language-games, in which such words are used"
(p. 39). Linguistic meaning is regulated, in other words, by public criteria. The
important insight that Wittgenstein (1988) himself came to in this regard is that words
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invested with psychological meaning, such as "remembering" or "understanding", also
owe their meaning to the accomplishment of socially produced criteria. What counts
as an instance of "understanding", for example, cannot be related to inner mental acts
or representations. Wittgenstein (1988) exposes this traditional fallacy with the
following seductive little "exercise":
Say a sentence and think it; say it with understanding. - And now do not
say it, just do what you accompanied it with when you said it" (para. 332f.
It should be clear quite quickly that this is impossible. It is impossible to engage in
mental activity without engaging in language. And language (and meaning) is a public
or social phenomenon. In terms of this Wittgenstein challenge a mentalistic theory of
meaning and thus locates mind (and cognitive events) in the public or social domain.
He shows compellingly that when we think, inevitably in language, "there aren't
'meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language
is itself the vehicle of thought" (Wittgenstein, 1988, para. 329). Cognitive psychology
buys into mentalism due to the fact that it neglects a basic feature of language,
namely that it is not primarily referential. In terms of seeing the individual agent of
meaning as an information processing system, the lesson to be drawn from
Wittgenstein's critique is that "we don't first process information (in our heads), and
then act according to the forthcoming instructions"; in other words, there is no "dual
processing of information" (Durrheim, 1997b, p. 179).
Before continuing to further draw out the implications of this for social psychology,
consider another example. The sociologist David Bloor (1983), in an important study
of the implications of Wittgenstein's thought for the social sciences, narrates the
following thought experiment:
Point to a pencil and say "tove", suggests Wittgenstein. What does
"tove" mean? Does it mean "pencil", or "brown", or "thin", or something
else? The only way to find out is to put the isolated act in the context
of a protracted exercise in classification which begin to sort the world
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into "toves" and "non-toves" . This is how we should explain the
meaning, and this is what enables us to say something determiate,
rather than nothing, is meant by the word ... The significance of a piece
of pointing behaviour taken in isolation is indeed difficult to discern, but
that is not because it is hidden in the mind, but because it depends on
the surrounding activity. Its meaning is perfectly open to view, it is on
the surface, but it is spread out over time and shared with others. (p.
13)
Again it is made clear that meaningful conduct cannot be abstracted from a social
interactional context. Cognition is always located and the achievement of meaning
takes place outside, not within us. The full implications of these ideas for psychology
in general has translated into what many now refer to as social constructionism (Burr,
1997; Danziger, 1997a; Gergen, 1985a; Girishwar, 1993; Harre, 1987; Jordaan, 1993;
Potter, 1996; Shatter, 1993a). Being a metatheoretical alternative to positivism and
empiricism, social constructionist thought takes seriously the challenge that
psychological concepts are social products. In other words, as Durrheim (1997a)
explains, "the relationship between what is, and what we say what is, cannot be
evaluated in terms of accuracy, truth or correspondence, for there are no independent
things in the world which are merely pictured by words" (p. 130). But while this is an
epistemological challenge to the science of psychology, what does it have to say
about its ontology? The fact remains that there are individuals and that they do act
and make sense of the world. How should this be accounted for if psychology cannot
locate it within an essentialist ontology?
It is in answering this question that social constructionist developments have their
most interesting implications for the psychological sciences, implications that directly
involve a focus on language. If mind and cognition are de-centred from the individual
to the conversational nature of interpersonal and cultural life, psychology should
concern itself not with imposing its own language-games but rather "provide an
account of psychological 'objects' (e.g. mind, intentions, reasoning, etc.), human
action, and social practice by showing the 'conditions of possibility' within which they
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are imbedded" (Durrheim, 1997b, p. 181). These conditions of possibility are primarily
linguistic: they are the language-games and depth grammars Wittgenstein (1988)
describes. Stating it differently and to make the link with the previous section clear,
they are meaningful frameworks that function as sources from where particular
individual speech acts are made possible. Psychology itself, since it traditionally
assumed its own language-games to be simple truths, adds to this background
against which people negotiate meaning. Such a focus can thus encompass a critical
reflection on the way Western psychology found its lanquaqe" (leading back to the
discussions in the previous chapter), as well as refurnish psychology as a science that
studies multiple constructions of persons and meaningful actions in different contexts.
In other words, in so far as there can be an ontological base for psychology as a
science of persons, this should be sought in language. As Harre and Gillet (1994)
states, "discursive phenomena, for example, acts of remembering, are not
manifestations of hidden subjective, psychological phenomena. They are the
psychological phenomena" (p. 27). John Shotter (1993b), another important social
constructionist psychologist, agrees that reality is conversationally constituted and
maintained, and follows this up by saying that "an understanding of anything
psychological is an understanding of the role of language in human affairs" (p. 73).
The developments in language discussed in this chapter thus underlie a discursive
model in which the significance of discourse transcends the study of performance to
an ontology "in which utterances, interpreted as speech acts, become the primary
entities in which minds become personalized, as privatized discourses. In this
ontology, people are locations for discourses, both public and private" (Harre & Gillet,
1994, p. 36).
The above remarks should make it clear that the relation between general and social
psychology undergoes a radical shift. No longer is it possible to see social psychology
as a derivative of a general psychology that is located within an isolated individual.
Rather, the non-referential nature of language de-centres psychology to be social first,
and only then individual. Psychological phenomena are emergent properties, and
discursive processes can be used to explain the social construction of individual
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persons as particularised vantage points of experience. Kenneth Gergen (1985b)
subsequently accounts for the disciplinary identity of social psychology as
psychological science in the following way:
When the implications are fully elaborated, it becomes apparent that the
study of social process could become generic for understanding the nature
of knowledge itself. Social psychology would not stand, in this case, as a
derivative of general psychology. Rather, the latter would be viewed as a
form of social process. (p. 556)
Taken together the last two sections have traced the implications of analytic or
ordinary language philosophy (with the focus on Wittgenstein) for social psychology.
The discussion in this section specifically made it clear that the introduction of
language in social psychology adds to the empirical shifts already described, setting
it up as a completely different disciplinary formation. Before the success of these
discursive developments in accounting for the relation between the individual and the
social can be addressed, however, post-structural accounts should be discussed.
4.5. Discourse and power
Think back on the example of Koos Vermeulen (Durrheim, 1997a) used earlier in this
chapter. In order to achieve his rhetorical move of slamming the ANC for doubletalk
while he himself simultaneously professes negotiation and supports the assassin of
Chris Hani, he provides a psychological explanation of the assassination. The
plausibility of this account, and that which makes his move possible, is a function of
the commonsense understandings of individual psychology that circulate and
permeate our culture. In other words, psychological knowledge in this case forms a
significant background that makes possible certain identities, meanings and social
events. In a society where the psychology of people is narrated in a different manner
one could well imagine this rhetorical move not being possible.
The developments discussed thus far have focused on language in its rhetorical and
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performative sense. The fact that meanings however do not emerge without a prior
background that guides, constrains and enables what can be said and thought
necessitates a focus on what David Bloor (1983) calls "the contribution that society
makes to our knowledge" (p. 6). As was made clear in the discussion of social
constructionism this aspect of meaning was well provided for by Wittgenstein's notion
of language-games, which implies treating language not only as located performance,
but as constrained by a history of use. However, when it does focus on the prior
resources that people draw from, Wittgenstein's work still reveals a limited account of
power: language-games are consensual domains, and there is no questioning of who
is favoured by particular patterns of signification, and who is made silent in turn. The
subsequent organisation of social psychology around the conceptions of language
discussed thus far therefore often neglects the political nature of social life (Parker,
1996a; 1996b).
It is precisely this dimension, the relation between discourse and power, that is added
by post-structural approaches to language in social psychology (Henriques, Hallway,
Venn, Walkerdine, & Urwin, 1984; Parker, 1992). As was made clear earlier, post-
structural theories of language see it as a larger, more abstract signifying system that
makes individual usage derivative ofthe internal logic ofthe system. It is therefore not
concerned with what individuals can achieve with language, but with how language
itself constructs subjectivity, experience and possible patterns of social interaction.
In the discussion of post-structural views of language it was further mentioned that
Michel Foucault occupies an important position in this extension to social psychology.
Indeed, from the angle of post-structural theory Foucault's influence on the
development of a discursive social psychology rivals that of Wittgenstein. His work
provides a valuable example of the impact of a post-structural view of meaning on the
relationship between social scientific knowledge, individual subjectivity and the
reproduction of power relations in society.
It is outside the scope of this study to provide a detailed introduction to Foucault's
work. However, some brief comments will suffice to show how post-structural
conceptions of discourse differ from what was discussed up to this point, informing a
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social psychology not interested so much in how individuals construct social reality
through language as in how language positions individuals and patterns their
experience. Foucault (1982) saw as his own intellectual project "to create a history
of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects" (p.
777). Such a history is not made up of discreet and arbitrary events, but structured
by significant shifts in the epistemological configurations dominant in particular eras",
This can be illustrated in terms of, and Foucault indeed focuses on, the development
of the human sciences. Since language is not transparent and rather constructs the
world as a textual domain (remember his Saussurian heritage), the birth and growth
of the human sciences in the 18th and 19th centuries contributed something very
significant: it ushered in the individual human being as itself an object of human
understanding (Foucault, 1972). The human sciences (and especially psychology) did
not discover the hidden depths of the psychological subject. It constructed the
individual being as a psychological subject.
The appearance of discovery and truth that emanate from the human sciences
depends on overarching epistemological configurations that precede and make
possible particular disciplinary formations. These configurations - Foucault (1972)
called them "epistemes" - function like Saussure's notion of langue: they are not to
be equated to actual scientific statements but rather exist as abstract conditions of
possibility for a range of possible statements regarding a range of textually
demarcated objects. What is more, they also determine and delineate a range of
places from where it is possible to speak, to be referred to here as subject positions.
Foucault's notion of "epistemes" differ from Kuhn's (1970) notion of paradigm in that
these configurations not only determine the discursive space and regulative activities
of the human sciences; they reveal themselves in all discursive activities and social
practices, giving rise to a pervasive textual matrix from which particular forms of
subjectivity emerge.
In his later writings Foucault (1977, 1980) became more concerned with the role of
power in discursive practices. The construction of the person that emerged from the
discourses of the modern era correlates with a subjectivity that is regulated and
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subjected to societal scrutiny in a very unique way: the modern subject is self-
regulatory. In order to understand this it is important to grasp the unique way in which
Foucault conceived of power and its relation to knowledge (and thus to the human
sciences). In this regard Ian Parker (1989b), who played a big role in introducing the
ideas of Foucault to social psychology, provides a good description:
Power is usually thought of as the exercise of the will of one social actor
over others. This model of power is most appropriate, according to
Foucault, to the period up to the end of the eighteenth century. After that
date the growth in population, and the concentration of economic
production, had reached the point where "disciplinary" power became
dominant. This is a type of power that operates independent of the
intentions of individuals. The first model of power can be thought of as
"sovereign" power. The second is relational- "disciplinary" ... The character
of disciplinary power is masked by the invitation that modern discourse
makes to us to assume full responsibility for our acts and intentions. (pp.
61 - 62)
This invitation that Parker refers to is present in many different discursive practices in
contemporary society: practices such as certain forms of therapy, advice columns in
newspapers and magazines, and television talk shows. What they all have in
common is a confessional structure (Foucault, 1981). The implication of this for a
discipline wanting to study individual lives and identities in social worlds is that it
should always look for the configurations of power/knowledge or discourses that
predetermine and structure human experience in all contexts where individual
subjectivity is at stake. Along with this it should analyse the effect the continuation of
these discourses has on the maintenance of relations of power in a society. Consider
the following explanation of the relevance of Foucault's approach to discourse studies
for social psychology (Burman, Kottler, Levett, & Parker, 1997):
Foucauldian discourse analytic approaches allow us to connect directly
with issues of power and subjectification. These approaches help us
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address how we are made into selves that speak, how we experience
the self as if it were an individual enclosed thing, and the way in which
modes of disciplinary apparatus govern us. They are also particularly
useful for examining the circulation of psychological talk through culture.
(p.2)
The differences between such an approach to discourse and the developments
discussed earlier is clear. What is at stake here is not the rhetorical use of language,
but a conception of discourses as abstract frameworks of meaning that. are
transcendental to individual instances of language use". In this regard discourse as
a unit of analysis for social psychology has also been referred to as generative social
languages (Durrheim, 1997a) and forms of institutionalised intelligibility (Wetherell,
1998). The notion of institutionalisation here is very important, because discourses
are not seen as consensual domains but structures that ensure the maintenance of
power. As this notion of discourse plays itself out in social psychology, activity,
agency and experience retain less currency, which leads to another important
difference. This is, namely, that post-structural approaches show little concern for
attempts to establish better conceptions of mind or cognition. Because meaning is not
an individual achievement, it is not important to understand meaning-making
processes on the level of individual participation in social life. More interesting is how
notions of agency as a location of meaning is socially constructed and what purposes
they serve. These differences are clearly illustrated in the following post-structural
formulation of the study of identity in psychology (Gergen & Shatter, 1989):
...(T)he primary medium within which identities are created are not just
linguistic, but textual: persons are largely ascribed identities according to
the manner of their embedding within a discourse - in their own or in the
discourses of others. In this way cultural texts furnish their "inhabitants"
with the resources for the formation of selves. (p. ix)
Since social psychology itself is so intimately related to the currency of modern
constructions of the person it should be of no surprise that post-structural approaches
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would invest a lot of energy in studying the circulation of psychological talk through
culture; and the political effects of such talk. However, power relations are also
maintained in cultural texts other than that of social psychology and the human
sciences in general, so that critical social psychologists from this perspective can turn
their critical analyses towards these as well (Ibanez & Iniquez, 1997; Tolman, 1995).
While there is of course no reason for such critical activity to be social psychological
as such, social psychology provides a useful category of recognition when the topic
of study is the relation between psychologised subjects and social reproduction.
4.6. Readdressing divides
The obvious question now is how these developments around language fare in
addressing the divide between the individual and the social in social psychology? In
the context of this study, as is clear by now, this question should be addressed on at
least two levels. First, how does a discursive approach address the metatheoretical
difficulties of accounting forthe production of meaning, which is the traditional domain
of cognitive social psychology; and second, how does it bridge the divide between
social psychology as a Western practice and its application in the non-Western world?
In other words, does it provide the raw material for a social psychology of the
postmodern as it was discussed in the previous chapter? A social psychology with the
ability, for example, to study the currency of identity in contexts where experience is
politicised. Or, one that has the ability to describe in full the way culture impinges on
the form of social conduct.
Before evaluating how these metatheoretical divides are bridged, this narrative first
needs to negotiate a few divides of its very own devising. The presentation of
discursive social psychology here in terms of different levels of the incorporation of
language was useful in order to link developments in social psychology to broader
intellectual debates. However, in reality the lines of influence aren't nearly as clearly
defined. While there are studies that generally focus more on the use of language
and others that are more concerned with discourses as abstract frameworks of
meaning (Wetherell, 1998), most discursive studies do not comply with these as is.
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In other words, they very rarely operationalise themes from the philosophy of
language in any linear way. What is more, there have been interesting debates and
a definite synergy between the different traditions, something that is especially
beginning to characterise discourse studies in South African social psychology (Levett,
Kottler, Burman, & Parker, 1997). One reason for this is that discursive social
psychology is less concerned with intellectual purity than it is with critical application
especially in contexts of oppression, struggle and social change.
However, more conceptual concerns obviously also play an important role in this
developing synergy. In themselves the different approaches to language discussed
above cannot address the issues that this study is grappling with, and their importation
into social psychology does not lead to an automatic resolution of the limitations of
cognitivism and postmodernism alike. First, post-structural accounts often make
themselves guilty of a blunt dismissal of subjectivity, leading to accounts of social
action that is hopelessly deterministic. The same critiques that were raised against
postmodern accounts in the previous section count here as well, and there is in fact
a whole literature of criticism against the deterministic trends in Foucault's work that
social psychology cannot ignore (Fairclough, 1992; McNay, 1999). Second, work
around the social construction of mind, although providing a valuable background,
does not explicitly address social psychological concerns. In other words, even if we
should agree with its account of the relation between language, mind and culture, we
are still left to develop from there a proper social psychology. Third, the notion of
discourse as action discussed as the first level of language introduction also has
certain apparent shortcomings. Even though it moves away from seeing cognition as
self-enclosed, it still works with an all too voluntaristic account of meaning. Meaning
emanates from micro-contexts of language use, which can give rise to just another
incarnation of individualism, in that it may blind the social psychologist to the structural
constraints imposed on people's lives (and their talk).
But if discursive social psychology is most successful when it integrates the
performative and post-structural paradigms of language in social psychology, some
discussion is still needed to understand how this explicitly allows the discipline to
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address the relation between the individual and the social and to disentangle itself
from the colonial or imperialist tendencies of Western knowledge claims. In this
section then the incorporation into social psychology of discourse on two levels will be
addressed: as both indicating abstract frameworks of meaning and the performative,
rhetorical dimension of language as it emerges in everyday interactions as the
principal form of meaning-making. This integration often reveals itself better on the
level of empirical investigation than in theoretical reflection, and therefore a few South
African studies will be used as illustration. In this regard Kevin Durrheim's (1997a)
study used as an example in earlier sections could be referred to once again. While
Durrheim clearly focusses on the rhetorical and argumentative moves made by the
speakers, their situated cognitive achievements, he locates this within the generative
social languages that make them possible. In other words, an analysis of discourse
as rhetoric and argument, although important, cannot be social psychologically
complete when ideological and historical themes, belonging in this case specifically
to Apartheid South Africa, is not addressed at the same time.
Another example that also analytically treats social agents as both cognitively
sophisticated and socially constrained is the study (also mentioned earlier) Susan Lea
(1996) conducted around psychology students' talk about "race". In this study
students actively drew from social cognition and social identity theories to account for
"race" and racism. These theories, due to their scientific status, provided them with
the footing to present themselves as non-racist while offering accounts that naturalise
and take for granted the current status quo, thus in fact discursively reproducing racist
practices. Because racism is constructed as biologically and cognitively inevitable,
and because this construction is scientifically warranted (however the respondents
may have misrepresented these theories), racial segregation seems like a natural and
viable solution. While the theories themselves functioned as generative social
languages, their tenacity had also to be related to the history of Nationalism in this
country.
The work by John Dixon and his colleagues (Dixon & Reicher, 1997; Dixon, Reicher,
& Foster, 1997) on the social construction of space in post-Apartheid South Africa is
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also a good example of the tendency under discussion. Dixon investigated White
people's reactions to phenomena such as informal settlements (Dixon & Reicher,
1997; Dixon, Reicher, & Foster, 1997) and integrated beaches (Durrheim & Dixon,
1998). In these studies he focussed foremost on the rhetorical construction of
arguments and accounts that have racist effects but are so presented that the speaker
disqualifies him or herself from racism. He also made it clear, however, that such
effects aren't purely rhetorical in the sense that speakers are cognitively
unconstrained: they are only possible against the background of ideological
configurations and traditions such as liberalism, environmentalism, family values and
the historical constructions of race and space in South Africa.
Alongside the dual focus on "abstract" and "situated" discursive practices, there is also
a general adherence in discursive social psychology to critical realist positions with
regard to social institutions and the structural relations of power within them (Parker,
1992). This should not be seen as a psychological realism, in the sense that
psychological phenomena emerge or exist extra-discursively". It is rather an attempt
to stay clear of any understanding of discourse that remains blind to the materiality of
oppression. Stating it differently, it is an attempt to stay clear of seeing the constraints
imposed on subjectivity (and thus on cognition and behaviour) as being only textual.
Even though discursive social psychology gives primacy to language when accounting
for the emergence of psychological phenomena and subjectivity itself, it never
pretends that this takes place within an environment where relations of power are not
materially institutionalised and imposed. A recent edited volume of discourse analytic
studies in South African social psychology (Burman, Kottler, Levett, & Parker, 1997,
p. 8) makes this very clear when discourse is described as referring to
language-in-action, to sets of social practices that are linguistic, but more
than "merely" linguistic. We take discourse to mean frameworks of
meaning that are realized in language but produced by institutional and
ideological structures and relations. (p. 8)
Before moving on to look more closely at how this dual focus on discourse is
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conceptually accounted for, a few words in summary. Once the above definition of
discourse is accepted the object of study for social psychology is no longer to chart
the strategies of a solitary cognitive system. Rather, it has the task of teasing out the
"structuring effect of language, and of connecting institutional power relations with talk"
(Burman et al., 1997, p. 1). The interpenetrating nature of the two broad approaches
to discourse in social psychology can now be explained as follows. While the
emergent, situated and conversational nature of social cognition and meaning-making
is acknowledged, it is not seen as completely voluntary in its force of signification.
Meanings are determined also by larger signifying systems and various material
constraints, usually theorised as belonging to social structures and institutions. In a
certain sense the development of discursive social psychology is in itself an
experiment in addressing the traditional division between the individual and the social,
or between subject and society. Burman et al. (1997) sums it up nicely:
Discourse work inside and outside South Africa refuses the traditional
distinction between individual and society: language constitutes who we
are, constructs the positions we occupy, is the medium by which we
interact with other people and understand ourselves. (p. 7)
This being asserted, however, social psychology is still left with the difficult
metatheoretical as well as analytical task of accounting for the way social structures
are instilled in language, and how subjective experience is structured or patterned
discursively without reducing the social agent to a mere pawn of social forces. Stating
it differently, discursive social psychology needs to indicate how individuals engage
in the production and circulation of meaning without presuming the primacy of
individual intention, and for this it makes extensive use of the notions of reflexivity and
ideology (Durrheim, 1997b; Parker, 1992). One of the interesting things about how
reflexivity and ideology are employed in accounting for the generation of meaning and
the way social agents are situated and involved in this process, is that they stand in
a double relationship to each other. In a sense they are employed to work both with
and against each other: they work together in providing for an ontological account of
individual experience and its political determination in a social constructionist
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framework, and against each other in the sense that reflexivity also enables, as an
epistemological grasp on meta-discourse, resistance to ideology and other forms of
power as they are naturalised in particular political (or politicised) contexts.
The role of reflexivity and ideology in discursive social psychology should now be
examined further, beginning with the former. Kevin Durrheim (1997b), in a recent
defence of social constructionism in South African social psychology, provides a good
description of its role in the production of meaning:
Social constructionism maintains that meanings are produced by a
process of reflexivity. If we want to understand the meaning of "shooting",
for example, instead of representing an accurate picture of what is
happening, we reflect on a set of actions from within a frame of reference
(i.e. a "language game" or discourse) ... Being imbedded in a particular
"form of life" (e.g. supporting the apartheid government or the liberation
movement) makes available certain discourses which lend meaning to
objects and events. (p. 180)
It is quite clear in the above that there is little distinction between the production of
meaning on two levels: that of the social scientist wanting to understand social life,
and that of the social agent as his or her experiences emerge as meaningful in the
context of a particular form of life, which is always culturally and historically situated.
The notion of reflexivity therefore not only designates the epistemological posture of
a social constructionist metatheory, but also points the way towards what is ostensibly
a discursive ontology. Invoking objective discursive and material structures to explain
how particular behaviours, positions or identities attain their subjective meaning for
participants in a social world is in itself to explain the nature of human experience. As
such, reflexivity reveals to the social scientist the meanings that propel subjects along
the particular psychological trajectories made available by a form of life; but because
it reveals the constructed nature of things it is also the principle that enables new
meanings to be generated, and thus to reconstruct the dominant forms that identity,
experience and conduct take on in a particular form of life. This principle, the active,
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reconstructive agency, also has to apply to both the social psychologist and the social
agent. Before this critical and reconstructive agency is addressed however, it is first
necessary to account for why dominant discourses are often so tenacious, and for this
it is necessary to introduce ideology.
Because the rhetorical and performative production of meaning in conversations and
arguments are overridden by larger and more abstract regimes of signification, and
because people experience their actions and cognitions as authentic and true - thus
do not always achieve the reflexivity that allows the recognition of meaning as
constructed and culturally determined - the mediation between conversational or
argumentative utterances, institutional structures and relations, and discourse
conceived of as "generative social languages" is further often captured by the
introduction into social psychology of the concept of ideology (Billig, 1982, 1991;
Parker, 1992)12. By acknowledging both the institutional tangibility of the social and
its more malleable semiotic circulation in discourses, the notion of ideology extends
its theoretical usefulness in social theory by re-describing social cognition as the
rhetorical penetration of utterances by societal commonplaces, understandings and
values.
This strategic introduction of ideology is especially useful in contexts where social
psychology wants to understand intergroup relations, racism, and the politics of
identity against the background of the (re- )production of power relations in a society
(Parker, 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). In Apartheid South Africa, for example,
legislation dividing the population into different races treated all African people as
belonging to one category. While this revealed an ignorance about the different ethnic
and linguistic identifications that existed in South Africa, the category of being black
was materially imposed and subsequently structured the experience of the greater
part of South Africa's population. This became a political and experiential reality to
such an extent that the development of a politics of identity around being black (this
was of course not limited to South Africa) became possible, as the Black
Consciousness Movement clearly showed. Even though the category "black" was
thus socially constructed by an oppressive system around the ideologies of racism
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and capitalism, amongst others, it was finally rhetorically taken up to struggle against
dominant discourses and material conditions.
The implication of this for a social psychology of the postmodern is first that it is
impossible to reduce real historical categories to perceptual ones, since this hide their
constructed nature, the historical changes they undergo, and the way they structure
and are structured by human experience. Secondly, it is equally impossible to reify
constructed categories to such an extent that it excludes consideration of the way they
are brought to bear on reality in the ongoing acts of signification individuals engage
in. Had this not been the case it would have been difficult to provide social
psychological explanation for how being "bureaucratically" and ideologically identified
as black from outside could become an important subjective social identification
against an oppressive system. Social agents participate in the construction,
reconstruction and tenacity of particular experiential forms. Ideology, understood here
as meaning in the service of power (Thompson, 1984), clearly relates material
conditions and institutional power relations with talk and rhetoric. It is thus a useful
way (with reflexivity) to sustain a discursive ontology that does not subsume to
voluntary conceptions of the production and circulation of meaning, and acknowledges
the culturally encapsulated nature of conduct and experience without removing a
critical conception of agency.
The social processes of the construction and reconstruction of experience in and
through language should now be clear. Being constructed as the subject of
experience and assuming the position of an agent of change are both discursive
effects, even though they are dependent on different conceptions of discourse. In
other words, being made part of a form of life and moving about within it is achieved
in and through language, which means psychological life is both transcendentally and
rhetorically constructed, but always social and never reducible to an interior of private
thoughts or mental processes. Discursive social psychology, by approaching
"individual experience as socially constructed" (Burman et al., 1997, p. 7), attributes
to language an all-encompassing role as model, both epistemologically and
ontologically. This means that subjectively belonging to a form of life, assuming
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certain behavioural patterns or, as Pierre Bourdieu (quoted in Wacquant, 1992)
formulates it, "schemes of perception and appreciation" (p. 14) as natural and
authentic, is ultimately the product of being positioned within a discursive order. This
is the reason why, according to Burman et al. (1997), a focus on discourse can for
example "illustrate the way racial and sexual categories are not simply imposed, but
are lived out by their subjects as 'true' for them" (p. 3).
But truth as such, indicating the grasp of a reality beyond discourse, ceases to be a
concern of discursive social psychology (Durrheim, 1997b). Its conception of the
discursively constructed and ideologically encapsulated nature of psychological life
ventilates in an energetic affirmation of social psychology as geared rather towards
social change. The discursive social psychologist attempts to deconstruct dominant
discourses and representations that sustain oppressive power relations. In this
context, ideology critique entails reflexively detecting the guiding themes, images and
rhetorical strategies that make particular meanings compelling, and keep them in play.
Stating it differently, reflexivity is positioned as an analytic lever against the closure
of ideology where it concerns the production of meanings and the reproduction of
social practices. As Durrheim (1997b) says: "Reflexivity is employed here to produce
new meanings by showing how taken-for-granted, everyday and scientific objects are
embedded in certain 'regimes of truth'" (p. 181). Unmasking the working of ideology
as it stands in the service of power, then, will reveal the constructed nature of the
material conditions shaping any form of life, and provide the space for the elaboration
of new discourses. It is in this sense that reflexivity work against the effects of
ideology on the flow or circulation of meaning. To summarise:
What, however, is the point of overturning convention and deconstructing
truth? In short, it has political aims of disrupting the oppressive and
exploitative effects associated with institutionalized discourses and forms
of life. Discourse analysis is a critical enterprise, a form of ideology
critique. It does not aspire to truth, but to change. (Durrheim, 1997b, p.
181)
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It is clear that discursive social psychology provides sophisticated perspectives on the
nature of psychological phenomena, experience in general, and sees its maintenance
and change as always a function of social processes. While it privileges social levels
of analysis in this manner, it also claims to have a balanced approach to social
agency. This it does primarily by saying psychological phenomena are themselves
not private entities, but properties that emerge from social processes. Experience,
meaning, change: these are always social achievements. For the same reason,
psychology being an emergent and not private and universal reality, discursive social
psychology also heralds the death of the intellectual imperialism so characteristic of
the modern era. By focussing on the construction of meaning and the patterning of
experience and conduct in a given context implies that Western theoretical and
conceptual models will not be forced on situations where they do not apply.
Is it thus possible to conclude that by turning to language social psychology has found
its appropriate postmodern form? In order to evaluate this it is useful to stay with the
notions of reflexivity and ideology: its success in addressing the relation between the
individual and the social revolves to a large part around whether the power granted
the discourse analyst through this focus on reflexivity is echoed (to stay with the model
of language!) on the experiential level of the social agent.
4.7. Discourse and its discontents
This description of discursive social psychology as a critical alternative shows clearly
why it would be so popular, especially in South Africa, at a time when concerns with
culture and multiculturalism, identity and identity politics, as well as the politics of
experience more generally, are increasing among social scientists and philosophers
in this country (Singh, 1997; Van der Merwe, 1997). In this regard one cannot deny
that much of social psychological life is indeed illuminated by the focus on discourses,
practices of signification, and the study of ideology. So, for example, can we explain
categorisation and identification as discursive achievements related to larger
configurations of meanings and practices, rather than as centralised mental
processes. This can, amongst other things, provide challenging descriptions of how
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identity-categories are ideologically charged and politically mobilised in the South
African context - leading not only to interesting readings of historical trends but also
of the unfolding cultural and political landscape that is present day South Africa.
Concerns related to identity politics, multiculturalism, power, exploitation and
transformation, in whatever discipline they are pursued, require an understanding of
the moral and political capacities of individuals as well as the patterning of their
experiences and responses by larger social systems. Discursive social psychology,
as was made clear, conceptualises the relation between the individual and the social,
and the cultural form of human conduct and experience more generally, as by and
large discursively patterned. In other words, both the hold that forms of life attains
over people's self-understandings and behaviours and the power they have to
challenge discourses or representations that help sustain forms of life - especially
when these are oppressive - are theorised on the level of discursive processes. As
Ian Burkitt (1994) explains, since social reality is seen as the "product of conversation
or discourse ... this also determines the power of individuals as individual persons" (p.
7).
While people certainly display the ability to create new discourses or representations,
the cultural form of conduct and experience are often also very tenacious, and
seemingly lingers on despite reflexive attempts to challenge it. Social relations (think
specifically of the reproduction of gender and racial relations) often stumble over the
impervious nature of acquired tastes, habits, ways of seeing and meaning-giving.
Particular social positions or identities are deeply imbedded in experience, and
understanding the limits imposed on reflexivity (whether these be material or also
discursive) challenges the social psychologist on at least two levels. First, it is
necessary to address the processes by which particular discourses, at a particular
time and place, become compelling. The social world is clearly home to many and
often conflicting frameworks of meaning, and it is therefore necessary to understand
the forces that solidify certain understandings and interpretations so that they begin
to seem natural. Secondly, if the social psychologist wants to understand insidious
patterns of conduct and experience, it is further necessary to reflect "on why it might
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be that the use of alternative discourses does not lead automatically to alternative
social farms" (Parker, 1992, p. 37). In the context ofthis study this the more important
challenge. While the first can be empirically addressed by imbedding discursive
studies in interdisciplinary frameworks, the latter clearly pose a conceptual challenge
to how the relation between discourses, the process of meaning construction, and
experience is understood.
When challenged with understanding the lingering on of practices, behaviours and
even feelings after discourses have changed and people have been brought to
reflexive realisation of the way they are discursively located (or storied, as
constructionist and discursive approaches to therapy would have it), it is experience
that poses the greatest conceptual challenge. Since the cultural patterning of
experience can evidently outlast the constructions and constraints of discourses, it
becomes necessary to ask once again what it means to say that experience is socially
constructed? Formulating this somewhat differently, the social achieves a grip on
human experience that differentiates it from the textual resources from which it is
paradigmatically constructed; and whether ideology is the adequate concept to
describe and explain this phenomenon depends ultimately on where the materiality
of a form of life is located.
It was already made clear in the previous section that discursive social psychologists
do not treat discourses as free-floating and immaterial. This is made clear again by
Ian Parker (1992) in an interesting attempt to address precisely the above mentioned
dilemma by considering "the material resources which make discourse possible" (p.1 )
In this regard he identifies alongside physical coercion and the material organisation
of space also the
habitual, physical orientation of the individual to discourse of different
kinds ... the way a speaking body is engaged in action as it follows the
tracks of dominant representations of the world. The behavioural aspects
to patterns of speech and 'reading' of texts is ingrained habit. The real
body, bent in a variety of postures of deferment and position in different
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discourses, is such that only a shock, a break can release the potential
for the development of new possibilities. (p. 39)
The introduction here of the human body is very relevant to this study". Human
beings are inevitably embodied, and the body is implied in all action and experience
on a level that cannot be reduced to the biological only (Stam & Mathieson, 1995).
Think about gender: its socially constructed nature points beyond anatomical
differences to involve the body also in the way girls are taught to walk and sit
differently from boys. In this regard Parker (1992) goes as far as saying that the
human body itself is a material resource that enables and constrains the production
of discourses, and that its relevance to experience cannot be explained by recourse
to language alone. This is an important contribution, but the question remains
whether this real body is sufficiently theorised to overcome the problem of experience
in a social psychology where its construction and political determination are
paradigmatically discursive and ideological? In other words, what is the status of the
body, psychologically speaking?
Since a discursive ontology necessarily precludes experience and behavioural
organisation as also pre-reflexively and non-prepositionally patterned, any reference
to the material resources that make discourse possible, even when these also
strategically involve the human body, has to be theorised as an institutional property,
relayed from there to the acting subject via the inter-penetration of cognition and
ideology. The social is deemed materially objectified on an individual level only as a
second instance. The first has already been achieved via discourse in the form of the
implementation of a belief-system or the development of discursive repertoires.
Discourse might thus be said to provide psychologisedform that only afterwards instils
itself materially in the form of an embodied arrest. There is an ontological distance
between psychology as a symbolic or reflexive system, and the materiality of the body.
The body might be an object of discourse and the site of material oppression and
regulation, but it can have no real experiential currency: in Foucauldian (1977) terms
the body is docile, a carrier of meanings rather than itself involved in the production
and circulation of meaning (Sampson, 1996; Scott & Stam, 1996; Voestermans,
1995).
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Such a conception of the body, a place where discursive meanings and their material
correlates collide on an individual level, might arguably provide a useful enough
account of the tenacious nature of conduct and experience even when it outlives
discursive change. Yet, it provides no positive account of the way individual powers
of articulation, to reflexively challenge ideology, might effect a transformation of
embodied arrests. The reason for this is of course that transformation would imply
some form of individual grasp, however limited, on the production of meaning. Since
the giving and taking of meaning is a paradigmatically reflexive and propositional
affair, and since individual participation in this process has subsequently been
theoretically limited to the discursive, individual agency exclude the body as itself
involved in the construction and reconstruction of experience and conduct in general.
However, given the fact that the naturalisation of experience is not only a reflexive
process of propositional assimilation or an ideological feat of subjectification, and that
agency is only theorised in terms of reflexivity, it remains unclear how resistance and
change is possible from the perspective of the social agent. Yet, discursive social
psychology invests a lot into making precisely such claims: consider the following
statement by Burman et al. (1997):
...(F)irst, here is no safe retreat into authentic experience to escape the
insidious regimes of truth that institutions construct; but, second, such
institutions and their powers of regulation and evaluation are no longer
accorded so absolute a determination of our action as to make resistance
hopeless. (p. 2)
It is certainly so, and this is one of the gains of social constructionist ideas in general,
that there is no such safe retreat: experience is inevitably socially constructed and
patterned. However, merely asserting the power of agency against overt institutional
determinism does not in itself explain the nature of agency and the psychological and
social possibility of resistance against oppression; or how the social actor should
imitate the (reflexive) powers and capacities that the discourse analyst indeed
assumes for him- or herself. The question that remains to be answered by discursive
social psychology, but that it is barred from answering precisely due to the way it
makes use of language, can now be formulated as follows. How is it possible, if
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capacities and psychological powers remain on a reflexive level, and the social
individual remains a reader of texts or a semiotic path-finder (however habitually this
occurs), to challenge embodied arrests that are themselves not sufficiently explained
through the illumination of discourses and representations? I
I
Before returning to this question in the concluding section the reduction of the
materiality of social conduct and experience in discursive social psychology should be
accounted for, and its effects be weighed. Recall in this regard that discursive social
psychology warrants its critical voice around two things: first, that it provides a more
adequate account of the meaning-giving process and social action in general than
traditional cognitive social psychology; and second, that it minimises the reproduction
of Western assumptions and values in non-Western contexts of knowledge
production. Just in terms of what was presented as discursive social psychology in
this chapter, it should already be clear that the approach has been at least partially
successful in taking social psychology beyond certain traditional impasses. The focus
on the constructive aspects of language use has provided a more sophisticated and
social account of meaning-giving, while social constructionist and post-structural
approaches have located psychological phenomena as cultural constructions and so
answered to the challenge of post modern critiques. Together these approaches have
gone a long way in fending of the nagging reduction of individual agency by seeing
the individual as a discourse user as well as a subject of discourses.
Yet, while it certainly gave rise to a more social version of the discipline, discursive
social psychology has also to confront the fact that it does not explain the relation
between the individual and the social as also pre-reflexively and non-propositionally
patterned; with effects that have been outlined in the preceding paragraphs. What
seems to be epistemologically at stake in this reduction is a failure to distinguish
between the experiential domain of the actor and the descriptive domain of the
observer. In other words, because the social scientist understands and can make
sense of social phenomena only against the background of what he or she confronts
as cultural texts, propositionally made available in discourses, reflexivity is also
assumed to be the only mode of experiential involvement of the social actor in that
same environment. Baerveldt and Verheggen (1997; see also their 1999) explain this
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as follows:
...(W)e fail to distinguish between the phenomenal domain of the acting
individual, rooted within his or her bodily constitution, and the descriptive
domain of an observer who recognises the behaviour of individuals to be
socially patterned. In such an indiscriminative context, observed social
structures too often come to be identified as autonomous forces or entities,
existing outside of, or independent from human actors. As such, those
reified structures are in turn easily be confused with the dynamics,
processes and mechanisms that actually fashion human action. (p. 1)
This epistemological assumption reveals and reproduces Western intellectual or
philosophical dilemmas that have always existed alongside the individual-social
dichotomy: mind vs. body; symbolic vs. material; cognition (reason) vs. emotion
(feelinq)". While discursive social psychology thus provides more social and more
sophisticated accounts of social thinking and meaning-giving, and manages to
problematise the intellectual imperialism of traditional approaches to a great extent,
its value is also curbed by neglecting to account for important aspects of the social
construction of experience. What is more, this neglect itself reveals Western
assumptions and values. Discursive social psychology is thus limited as a social
psychology of the postmodern in at least one important sense. Because the
materiality of practices is seen as only reflexively instilled on the level of experience,
it remains blind to important aspects of constructed and changing life-forms, as well
as the nature of resistance to change.
4.8. Conclusion(s)
Sufficiently addressing these shortcomings in discursive social psychology will require
metatheoretical and empirical work that is beyond the scope of this study. However,
it will not be completely satisfactory to simply abandon the discussion at this point by
asserting that the debate around social psychology, and especially social psychology
in South Africa, is still open. This final section, therefore, will indicate possible
directions for further work around the questions that have been raised throughout this
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chapter and study as a whole. Before proceeding it should be made clear once again
that these critiques are not in any sense a dismissal of the development of discursive
social psychology as such. The development of discursive social psychology is
tremendously useful and is still under way: one of the key characteristics of this
approach is its willingness to take the challenge of deconstructing social psychology's
Western and academic biases seriously. The developments that are suggested are
therefore not a turn away from discourse and discursive social psychology, but a way
of taking the debate about the role and the place of language in social psychology
further. This is a crucial debate, especially for psychology in the Third World, since
it raises once more the important questions about subjectivity and agency, meaning
and experience; and oppression, resistance and change.
In the previous section the following question was asked: how is it possible, if
capacities and psychological powers remain on a reflexive level, to challenge
embodied arrests that are themselves not sufficiently explained through the
illumination of discourses and representations? This question arose with the
realisation that discursive social psychology pays insufficient attention to the nature
of human embodiment. The way forward seems to imply the development of a
conception of social practice that sees the involvement of the individual in society, and
the cultural form of experience and conduct more specifically, as also governed
pre-reflexively. !n other words, the description of cultural form should be disentangled,
in part at least, from notions of discourse, so that its constitution can be shown as
achieved also outside the reflexive domain.
Quite clearly then, social psychology should move away from pursuing social agency
only as a dialectic between being a discourse user and being positioned by
discourses, and address embodied activity and the patterning thereof in social
relations (Jast, 1995). This is, unfortunately, a bigger challenge than it might seem
at the outset. It doesn't make sense to simply say that the embodied nature of human
activity should be introduced to social psychology -- for in itself, what would this mean
and what would guard it from receding into yet another form of individualism? In the
remainder of this section three contexts for the development of a "more embodied"
social psychology will be sketched. The first is provided by cultural psychology. Here
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the relation between culture and embodiment has been a focus point during the last
few years (Voestermans, 1995), a development that reveals its relevance when the
implicit theory of culture in discursive social psychology and social constructionist
understandings in general is unpacked a bit.
By focussing only on discursive and argumentative processes in the construction of
social life, discursive social psychology portrays culture effectively as comprising
merely, like a bag, the depositions of negotiated meanings, social representations,
and clearly demarcated norms and rules with regard to the regulation of behaviour
(Voestermans, 1992, 1997). It is an understanding of culture that elevates its
discursive above its practical aspects; it neglects to think of culture as activity.
Voestermans (1991) describes this received notion of what culture is, and, importantly,
the role of ideology to keep it there, as follows:
...(A) somehow propositionally and argumentatively organised system of
ideas on a par with all sorts of idea systems. Culture thus understood
becomes something in people's heads or something to be tapped from
"discourses". Defined this way - we leave aside the colloquial use of the
term in order to designate a large human group with distinctive features -
culture turns out to be a subset of ideology. (p. 338)
This echoes the critique developed in the previous section: discursive social
psychology, through its focus on ideology with regard to the regulated nature of
experience and strategies of domination, bars any conception of the social as
pre-reflexively - working directly on embodied structures and capacities - constructing
and patterning experience. A richer theory of culture provides a context where such
understandings of experience and conduct can be elaborated. Reflect on gender
again in this regard: while discursive accounts will always accompany and frame the
shaping of behaviour (how you walk, sit, eat or talk, for example), it is not the accounts
themselves that make particular ways of interacting become "second nature" and
recurrent. It is the embodied patterning itself, and the interactive activities engaged
in to foster and regulate it, that provides the groundwork, so to speak, for subsequent
gendered subjectivities. It is this dimension of culture and its patterning of experience
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that needs to be incorporated into discursive work in social psychology.
If the practical, active aspect of individual participation in social life is acknowledged,
there is also no reason why cognition itself should be seen as an entirely ideational
process. Recent developments in cognitive psychology (although marginal) have
criticised cognitivist and social constructionist accounts alike for the way cognition is
theorised without accounting for the active embodied engagement of persons with the
world (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Sheets-Johnstone, 1990, 1992; Varela,
Thompson, & Rosch, 1991 )15. Consider the following statements by Sacha Bem and
Fred Keijzer (1996) in this regard:
Knowledge seems to be wrought exclusively in language. Because
language is so dominant in human cognition and psychology, it seems to
be the only medium by which humans have relations with the world.
Classical cognitivism as well as social constructionism convey the
impression that language is indeed the only medium of knowledge. For the
one "the language of thought" and networks of propositions constitute the
all-cognitive code. The other, first, reduces cognition, and psychology as
a whole, to a discursive epistemology; everything - actions, emotions,
schizophrenia, child and mother's love - is exclusively constituted in
discourse ... Our cognitive relation to the world does not consist in
language alone. As already suggested, cognition is a collective name for
a number of tasks or functions. For instance, all kinds of actions, such as
grasping, walking, crying, enjoying, belong to our cognitive management
of the world. (p. 458)
Of course, the focus is here more formally on cognitive structure, not so much on the
content of cognition; in the latter case the discursive approach still has a great
advantage over cognitivist accounts, as was already indicated in this study. However,
discursive social psychology would do well to engage in debate with these
developments in cognition, in order to flesh out a conception of the material
involvement of persons in cultural practices.
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Finally, the recent resurgence of Marxist themes in psychology must be mentioned
(Agoustinos, 1999; Billig, 1999; Foster, 1999; Parker, 1999). While these
developments are perhaps principally aimed at informing a psychology that will be
receptive to oppression and struggle in a world order where the market economy,
globalisation and the like are ideologically naturalised, yet occasions massive
unemployment, poverty, environmental decay and other forms of social sufferinq",
Marxism also offers a lot on the level of metatheory. Its dialectical-materialist
understanding of consciousness and subjectivity has perhaps been underplayed by
its political uses in the past, but it remains a valuable contribution to social theory not
yet adequately investigated by social psychology. In a recent discussion of Marxism
in social psychology, and the possible gains it offers over especially discursive
models, Don Foster (1999) made the following claims:
Furthermore, while psychology still remains predominantly "lost in thought"
in its cognitivist mainstream, Marxism gives primary attention to "sensuous
human activity, as practice". It is these understandings of persons that
modern psychology has lost. While the emphasis upon practice (or praxis)
has to some extent been recovered by discursive psychology, giving
attention to what language does, achieves or constructs, the Marxist
ensemble of social relations sees human activity involved in more than just
speaking, writing or reading, core activities though these may be.
Sensuous activity involves also planting, reaping, building and digging
(producing) and holding, touching, loving (reproducing) the means of our
existence. (pp. 345 - 346)
How these perspectives should be meaningfully introduced to social psychology in
South Africa will have to remain a question. If the limitations of discursive social
psychology and constructionist thought in general should teach one thing, it is that
psychology (human experience and meaningful action, not the discipline as was the
subject of this study) cannot be studied from scholarly heights. Reflexive work, and
a metatheoretical study such as this, has a definite function in indicating conceptual
dead-ends and possible new areas of exploration, but it cannot substitute the
necessity of empirical work and the development of theory from the bottom up.
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Therefore, a social psychology of the postmodern, as it designates current
transformations on social, cultural and indeed experiential levels, will only be
developed as a dialectic between these metatheoretical frames and a direct
involvement in the study of actual forms of life. Reflexivity and ideological critique will
always be necessary to ensure that theoretical traffic does not become too heavy with
notions that are epistemologically and politically suspect, but it will be less than useful
for providing a final answer to how people's lives are patterned in the ways they are;
how those lives are actually lived or merely beared; or how they are challenged and
changed.
In conclusion then, this study can alert social psychology to the necessity of locating
the currency of individual lives within the cultural arrests and sudden shifts that
characterise postmodern conditions - that is, the world as consisting of forms of life
not reducible to Western forms, especially with regard to the models that we use to
understand them - but it can only precede the studies that really will begin to achieve
that.
NOTES
1. An early classic in the development of social constructionism, indeed the book that made the idea
popular, was of course Berger and Luckmann's (1971) The social construction of reality.
2. De Saussure's influence is an interesting one. The book on which it is based, Course in general
linguistics (1974), was not written by him. It was compiled, after his death, from student notes.
3. Foucault's contribution will not be discussed here, but in a later section.
4. This principle is central to Derrida's philosophy, but is hard to grasp in English translation. It signifies
both "to differ" and "to defer" (Culler, 1982). This is of course a useful way to summarise the central
properties of meaning as Derrida sees it.
5. For the sake of discussion the notion of discursive social psychology will be used in each of the
following sections, even though it will become clear later that discursive social psychology usually draws
from different traditions of theorising language, rather from just one.
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6. The role of ideology in discursive social psychology will be critically discussed in a later section.
7. Since Wittgenstein wrote his later work as numbered paragraphs, it had become an accepted
practice to refer to specific paragraphs rather than to page numbers when discussing this work.
8. This notion of psychology "finding its language" is borrowed from Kurt Danziger's (1997b) study,
Naming the mind: How psychology found its language.
9. Foucault's career is often divided into structuralist and post-structuralist phases (Kearney, 1995).
In the former he held the idea that different "epistemes" correlated with clearly delineated temporal
blocks. In this regard he identified amongst others the Renaissance, the Classical Age, and Modernity
(Parker, 1989b). Since his more post-structural ideas discarded of such over-determined notions of
historical change, it will not be discussed here.
10. ''Transcendental'' is used here not in the metaphysical sense of that which is spiritual or
supernatural, but in the philosophical sense of that which is preceding, or that which functions as the
condition of possibility for something else.
11. The realism-constructionism debate is one of the most important in recent theoretical psychology.
In this regard see the exchange between Greenwood (1992) and Harre (1992).
12. Ideology has for quite long been ignored in social psychology, even though it is a central concept
in social theory (Foster, 1991). The history of this concept is complex and will not be discussed here.
For good general introductions see Larrain (1979) and Thompson (1984). For an introduction to specific
ideological traditions and their relevance for understanding South Africa politics, see Esterhuyse, Du
Toit, and Van Niekerk (1987). For a discussion of ideology in South African psychology, see Foster
(1991) and Hayes (1989).
13. There is a definite upsurge in theoretical consideration of the body in psychology and other social
sciences. While psychoanalysis and phenomenology were for a long time the only traditions that treated
the body as more than a biological organism, recent publications have addressed the social and cultural.
dimensions of the body from diverse angles (Stam, 1996). In this regard psychology follows in the steps
of important work done in social theory; for example, Synnot (1993) and Turner (1984).
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14. Pierre Bourdieu (1983, 1988) provides related analyses of what he sees as a scholastic or
intellectualist fallacy pervasive in the social sciences. In his 1998 he formulates it as follows:
Picturing all social agents in the image of the scientist (of the scientist reasoning on human
practice and not of the acting scientist, the scientist in action) or, more precisely, to place
the models that the scientist must construct to account for practices into the consciousness
of agents, to operate as if the constructions that the scientist must produce to understand
and account for practices were the main determinants, the actual cause of practices. (p.
133)
15. Here is another case of geographical divisions bedeviling psychology. An activity approach to
human cognition is not really new: it has always been a characteristic feature at least of Russian
psychology (Vygotsky, 1978).
16. As I write these final sections two news events bear witness to what may seem small challenges
to the contemporary globalisation of the market economy: first, the riots in Seattle on the occasion of a
meeting of the World Trade Organisation; and secondly, the burning of cocoa beans in the Ivory Coast
by farmers protesting market exploitation by the West. Theoretical reflection in academic settings often
seem and often are very far removed from such events, but it is exactly to break down these barriers
that social psychology should reflect on itself in these times.
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